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Abstract 
 
This thesis is an investigation into how successfully we can measure well-
being through measuring happiness.  We care about our well-being – how 
well our lives are going for us.  And we often treat happiness as a proxy for 
well-being in our practical lives.  It is no surprise, therefore, that there is a 
burgeoning field of social science that aims to measure well-being through 
measuring happiness.         
There is no consensus in this field, however, over what well-being and 
happiness are, and how successfully we can measure the former through 
measuring the latter.  It is these issues that I aim to address in this thesis.  I 
will argue in favour of the Indicator View, according to which we should treat 
happiness as an indicator of local changes in well-being.  I will further argue 
that some of the local changes in well-being indicated by happiness constitute 
an important aspect of our well-being (what I will call our local well-being).  
The upshot is that we can measure an important aspect of well-being – 
namely changes in local well-being – through measuring happiness.       
This conclusion is directly relevant to the empirical study of well-being for two 
reasons.  First, I will employ an account of happiness that is similar to one of 
the main constructs used by social scientists in the measurement of well-
being.  Second, my conclusion rests on an understanding of well-being that is 
consistent with all plausible substantive theories of well-being. 
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 Introduction 
 
Happiness is currently the topic of a wide range of empirical research, and is 
increasingly becoming the focus of public policy.  The interest in happiness 
largely stems from its connection with well-being.  We care about well-being – 
how well our lives are going for us.  If we are happy, it seems that, to some 
extent, we must be doing well.  This suggests that we may be able to 
successfully measure well-being through measuring happiness.    
The problem is that both happiness and well-being are elusive and their 
measurement is far from uncontroversial.  What exactly does information 
about happiness tell us about well-being?  Is there more to well-being than 
happiness?  If so, to what extent is happiness connected to well-being?  Does 
the relationship between happiness and well-being hold in certain contexts, 
such as in the case of deluded, base or immoral forms of happiness?  These 
are controversial questions, but answers to them must be given if we are to 
make progress in the measurement of well-being.         
In this thesis, I will focus on a particular view of happiness that is currently 
employed by empirical researchers in the measurement of well-being.  This is 
an affective state view of happiness, according to which happiness is a 
person’s (broad, relatively long-term) affective state.  In chapter one, I will 
argue that this conception of happiness adequately accounts for the fact that 
happiness tends to be used as a proxy for well-being by laypersons (in 
practical deliberation and evaluation) as well as empirical researchers (in the 
measurement of well-being).  This provides us with good reason to suppose 
that happiness tends to be strongly correlated with well-being.         
How can we further investigate this correlation?  In chapter two, I will argue 
that we can investigate the correlation between happiness and well-being 
without a substantive theory of well-being.  This approach has been relatively 
unexplored in the philosophical literature, yet has the advantage of avoiding 
substantive disputes over the nature of well-being that hinder the prospect of 
measuring well-being through measuring happiness.  I will develop a theory-
neutral account of well-being, which provides us with an understanding of 
well-being that is consistent with most substantive theories of well-being.  
According to the theory-neutral account of well-being, happiness may be 
correlated with well-being either because it is constitutively or causally related 
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to well-being.  The extent to which happiness is correlated with well-being is 
determined by its causal connections to “well-being ingredients” (the objects 
of platitudes about well-being that are causally connected to the objects of 
other well-being platitudes).  
In the remainder of the thesis, I will consider the extent to which happiness is 
causally connected to well-being ingredients.  I will show that, from the 
function of happiness and the theory-neutral account of well-being, we can 
infer the extent to which happiness is correlated with well-being.   
In chapter three, I will argue that the function of happiness is to inform and 
guide action, which it does partly by detecting well-being ingredients.  It is 
reasonable to presume that happiness is not generally dysfunctional and 
thereby that it reliably performs this function.  However, in certain contexts, 
happiness should inform and guide action by detecting non-prudential 
features of our environment, such as moral or aesthetic features.  And, under 
certain conditions, happiness fails to perform its function.  We must be open, 
therefore, to the empirical possibility that happiness does not generally 
indicate well-being.  Rather, I will argue that we should treat happiness as a 
defeasible indicator of well-being.  I will call this the Indicator View.      
In chapter four, I will refine this view.  I will argue that happiness is a 
defeasible indicator of changes in well-being.  This is a largely unappreciated 
feature of the relationship between happiness and well-being, yet has 
important implications for the measurement of well-being and happiness.  I 
will additionally argue that, in certain contexts, happiness tends to indicate 
unexpected changes in well-being or certain aspects of one’s level of well-
being.  I will show that this refined version of the Indicator View provides us 
with plausible and informative interpretations of the Easterlin Paradox and the 
phenomenon of adaptation, as well as other key findings from the empirical 
study of happiness.            
Lastly, in chapter five, I will argue that happiness tends to indicate local 
changes in well-being (i.e. how well we are doing, from moment-to-moment, in 
our short-term objectives, goals and concerns).  These changes will not tend 
to be indicated by more global measures of well-being, such as measures of 
life satisfaction.  Again, this has important implications of the measurement of 
well-being.  I will argue many of the local changes in well-being indicated by 
happiness have intrinsic prudential value; I will call these changes in our local 
well-being.   
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Some theorists have recently argued that our global (in contrast to local) well-
being has a distinct kind of value, in virtue of the fact that it is constituted by 
meaningful life narratives or concerns.  I will argue against this view.  I will 
argue that both local and global well-being constitute overall well-being in the 
same way; neither kind of well-being has a distinct kind of prudential value.  
Moreover, I will suggest that the relative values of people’s local and global 
well-being vary across their lifespan, personality and cultural environment.  
The central conclusion of this thesis, therefore, is that we can successfully 
measure an important aspect of well-being (i.e. changes in local well-being) 
through measuring happiness.     
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Chapter 1 
Measuring Well-being Through Measuring Happiness 
 
Abstract  
In this chapter, I will argue that we have good reason to suppose that 
happiness tends to be strongly correlated with well-being.  This is shown by 
the fact that happiness tends to be used as a proxy for well-being: it is used 
by empirical researchers as a formal proxy in the measurement of well-being; 
and it is used as an informal proxy by laypersons in practical deliberation and 
evaluation. This potential correlation provides us with reason to investigate 
how successfully we can measure well-being through measuring happiness.      
In order to investigate the relationship between happiness and well-being, we 
need a clear understanding of the nature of both well-being and happiness.  I 
will claim that a person’s well-being is how well that person’s life is going for 
them, and that this notion is distinct from both a happy life and a good life.  I 
then claim that a person’s happiness is a broad, relatively long-term positive 
psychological condition.     
In the remainder of the chapter, I outline a theory-neutral account of well-
being and an affective state account of happiness.  A theory-neutral account 
of well-being provides us with a broadly informative understanding of well-
being that is consistent with most substantive theories of well-being.  An 
affective state account of happiness is the view that happiness is constituted 
by a person’s affective state.  According to the version of this view that I will 
defend, a person’s level of happiness consists in their balance of positive over 
negative affective states over a relatively long period of time.            
The remainder of the thesis is an investigation into how successfully we can 
measure well-being (thus understood according to the theory-neutral account 
of well-being) through measuring happiness (thus understood according to the 
affective state account of happiness).  This thesis can also be viewed as a 
philosophical assessment of empirical research that aims to measure well-
being through measuring happiness in this respect. 
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1.1  Introduction 
We care about well-being and its promotion.  When we question what makes 
someone’s life go well for them, we are asking questions about their well-
being (or their “welfare”1).  If I am successful in my career, will that make me 
better off overall?  How good is my friend’s long-term relationship for them?  
What can we do to improve the lives of those who are worse off?  These kinds 
of questions are difficult to answer.  Nonetheless, we often ask such 
questions and formulate answers in response: “A life of well-being involves 
doing something you are passionate about, having caring relationships, 
appreciating beauty” and so on.  The measurement of well-being promises to 
provide us with answers to questions about well-being that are not readily 
accessible to us.  What things tend to be the key determinants of well-being?  
Do rich people tend to have higher levels of well-being than poor people?  
What are the benefits of well-being?  We may be able to roughly answer 
these questions intuitively, from our own experiences, or rationally, from 
knowledge of human nature, societal conditions, and so on.  However, without 
having a way of measuring people’s well-being, we cannot accurately answer 
such questions.  Accurate answers to questions about well-being are the 
promise of well-being measurement.    
The measurement of well-being has perhaps never received so much 
attention as it does today (Wren-Lewis, forthcoming).  Well-being has always 
been an important part of the rationale for economics, health policy, law, etc.  
However, more recently, it has become an object of study independently of 
any single application to which it may be relevant. The study of well-being 
consists in a broad range of empirical research, from psychology, 
neuroscience and biology to economics, sociology and political science.  
These researchers measure well-being in a number of different ways, and 
have come up with several interesting and important findings over the past 
few decades.2        
In addition, the study of well-being has recently become the focus of public 
policy (Wren-Lewis, 2013).  Policy makers around the world have expressed 
an interest in “National Accounts of Well-being” (Kahneman et al. 2004).  For 
                                            
1 I will treat the terms “well-being” and “welfare” synonymously throughout this thesis.   
2 I will review a number of these findings in chapter four. 
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instance, in 2010, the British government declared its intention to monitor the 
nation’s progress through measuring the well-being of its citizens.  Findings 
from the UK’s National Well-being Programme are used to assess and 
develop policy (Dolan et al. 2011). Other governments and international 
organisations are considering similar measures (Helliwell et al. 2012), or have 
already implemented them (Stiglitz et al. 2009).  These institutions claim to 
measure well-being in an attempt to “measure what matters”.   
In this thesis I will look at one kind of well-being measure in particular, namely 
measures of happiness.  Measuring happiness is an increasingly prominent 
way in which both social scientists and public policy practitioners aim to 
measure well-being.  This thesis aims to investigate the philosophical 
foundations of this practice.  What are well-being and happiness?  What is the 
relationship between the two notions?  To what extent can we measure well-
being through measuring happiness?  In this chapter, I will argue that we have 
good reason to suppose that there tends to be a strong correlation between 
happiness and well-being.  This potential correlation provides us with reason 
to investigate how successfully we can measure well-being through 
measuring happiness. 
 
1.2  Why measure well-being through measuring happiness?   
In this section, I will provide three lines of evidence that suggest that 
happiness tends to be strongly correlated with well-being.3  
1.2.1  Why measure well-being through measuring something 
else? 
Before outlining those lines of evidence, however, it is worth asking why we 
would even think of measuring happiness in the area of well-being 
measurement.  Why not measure well-being directly?  If you want to measure 
how many books you have bought, for instance, you would probably start by 
counting each of the books on your bookshelf.  You would not try to measure 
how many books you have bought through measuring something else, such 
as the amount of knowledge you have, or your level of educational attainment.  
It makes sense to directly measure the amount of books you have bought.  So 
                                            
3 I will discuss what happiness and well-being are later in the chapter.  For now, I will assume 
that each line of evidence concerns similar notions of happiness and well-being.      
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why not do the same for measuring well-being?  Why measure well-being 
through measuring happiness?     
There are two answers to these questions.  The first reason to think about the 
indirect measurement of well-being is quite simple: it is not obvious what well-
being consists in.  We may, for example, think that achievement partly 
constitutes well-being.  But do all kinds of achievement constitute well-being, 
such as achieving goals that are unskilful or immoral?  Does a particular 
achievement constitute well-being if we are not aware of it, such as the 
posthumous achievement of one of our goals?  And what if we fail to value 
our own achievements – do they still constitute part of our well-being?  These 
kinds of questions cast doubt on our knowledge of the constituents of well-
being.  There is no widely accepted theory of well-being amongst well-being 
theorists.  Any current theory of what well-being consists in is controversial 
(Keller 2009; Heathwood 2010).            
If we don’t know what well-being consists in, we cannot directly measure well-
being.  However, even if we did know the constituents of well-being, we may 
not be able to directly measure those constituents.  This is the second reason 
to think about the indirect measurement of well-being.  Suppose, for example, 
that well-being is largely constituted by a person’s valued achievements.  In 
order to measure a person’s well-being, therefore, we need to measure their 
level of valued achievement.  How do we measure a person’s valued 
achievements?  This may be difficult to do accurately: subjects’ actions may 
not reflect the goals that they most value; subjects may forget about certain 
kinds of achievements; and so on.  It may be easier to measure a person’s 
level of valued achievement indirectly, through measuring something else.  
What we would need to measure is something that is strongly correlated with 
a person’s valued achievements.  For example, subjects may experience 
pleasure each time they achieve something they value.  If this were the case, 
we may be able to accurately measure a person’s valued achievements 
through measuring their level of pleasure.  No doubt things are likely to be 
much more complicated than this, but such a relationship would justify the 
indirect measurement of well-being – in this case, measuring well-being 
through measuring pleasure.   
It is for these two reasons that we need to think about the indirect 
measurement of well-being.  Firstly, we may not know what well-being 
consists in, in which case the direct measurement of well-being is impossible.  
Secondly, even if we did know the constituents of well-being, those 
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constituents may be hard to measure.  In practice, the constituents of well-
being may be most accurately measured through measuring things that are 
strongly correlated with those constituents.  
 
1.2.2  Why measure well-being through measuring happiness? 
In the previous section I contrasted two different ways of measuring well-
being – directly and indirectly – and considered the virtues of both.  In this 
section, I will show that we may be able to measure well-being directly and 
indirectly through measuring happiness.   
Firstly, we may be able to measure well-being directly through measuring 
happiness.  This is because happiness may constitute well-being.  Some 
theorists believe that happiness wholly constitutes well-being; others believe 
that happiness partly constitutes well-being.  I will review the role of happiness 
in different theories of well-being in chapter two.  The point, for now, is that a 
person’s well-being may (at least partly) consist in their level of happiness.  If 
this is the case, we can (at least partly) directly measure well-being through 
measuring happiness. 
Secondly, we may be able to measure well-being indirectly through measuring 
happiness.  This is because happiness may be correlated with the 
constituents of well-being in two important ways.  First, happiness may cause 
the attainment of certain well-being constituents.  For example, happy people 
may be more productive or sociable, which in turn may tend to lead to 
worthwhile achievements or relationships respectively.  These things may (at 
least partly) determine one’s level of well-being.  Second, happiness may be 
caused by a person’s well-being.  For example, attaining certain things (such 
as a good job, a healthy lifestyle, etc.) may cause a person to be happy.  If 
happiness were correlated with the constituents of well-being in either of 
these ways then we could indirectly measure well-being through measuring 
happiness.    
The claim that happiness may be correlated with well-being can be justified 
either because happiness is constitutively or causally related to well-being, or 
both.  That is, happiness may be correlated with well-being either because it 
constitutes well-being or because it causes or is caused by well-being (or 
both).  This is illustrated by figure 1.1.  The claim that happiness may be 
correlated with well-being is ambivalent over whether this is the result of a 
constitutive or causal relationship between the two things.      
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Fig 1.1.  
The potential ways in which happiness may be strongly correlated with well-being (where the 
arrows represent the causal direction between happiness and well-being). 
Do we have any reasons to think that happiness tends to be strongly 
correlated with well-being in any of these ways?  In the next section, I will 
discuss three lines of evidence that suggest that happiness tends to be 
strongly correlated with well-being.  
 
1.2.3  Why think that well-being and happiness tend to be strongly 
correlated? 
So far, I have suggested that we may be able to successfully measure well-
being through measuring happiness.  Happiness and well-being may tend to 
be strongly correlated.  This potential correlation can be explained by the fact 
that happiness may constitute, cause or be caused by (at least part of) well-
being.  Each of these relationships could result in happiness being strongly 
correlated with well-being.  I will investigate each relationship in more detail in 
chapter two.  For now, I will provide an initial case for thinking that happiness 
and well-being tend to be strongly correlated.  
This case rests on three lines of evidence regarding the ways in which we 
tend to treat happiness as being strongly correlated with well-being.  The 
primary line of evidence, for the purposes of this thesis, is that happiness 
tends to be used as a proxy for well-being in the formal measurement of well-
being.  This is often referred to as the “study of happiness” or the “study of 
subjective well-being”.  A host of empirical researchers, from psychologists 
 10 
and neuroscientists to economists and sociologists, aim to measure people’s 
well-being through measuring their happiness.  These researchers tend to 
treat happiness as a proxy for well-being.  The fact that some people are 
happier than others is often taken to mean the former individuals are better off 
than the latter individuals (Graham 2010; Layard 2005).  Similarly, the fact 
that various life circumstances, such as income, relationships, health, etc., are 
correlated with happiness is often taken to mean that those factors are good 
for us (Diener & Biswas-Diener 2008; Frey 2010).  This is reflected in the fact 
that several prominent researchers have pushed for “National Accounts of 
Well-being” (Kahneman et al. 2004; Dolan et al. 2011; Diener et al. 2009; Bok 
2010; Helliwell et al. 2012).  The proposed national accounts consist in 
measures of happiness, in addition to standard measures of well-being, such 
as measures of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).    
I believe that the study of happiness provides us with strong evidence to think 
that happiness may tend to be strongly correlated with well-being.  Of course, 
it may turn out that such research is based on mistaken beliefs about the 
relationship between happiness and well-being.  However, we do not have 
reason to presume this is the case from the outset.  A large body of empirical 
research that tends to treat happiness as a formal proxy for well-being may be 
sufficient evidence of a potential strong correlation between happiness and 
well-being.  This evidence alone may provide us with reason to investigate 
how successfully we can measure well-being through measuring happiness.    
One could object, at this point, that such research may rest on the assumption 
that well-being is wholly constituted by happiness.  For example, when 
researchers conclude that people with good relationships are happy, perhaps 
they are assuming that such people are thereby well off.  Although this 
assumption is certainly made by many happiness researchers (Angner 2010), 
I think it would be a mistake to think that the entire study of happiness is 
based on this assumption.  Such assumptions go against the primary 
methodology of empirical psychology.  According to the psychometric 
approach, measures are justified on the basis of their correlations with other 
related measures, and not on the basis of theoretical assumptions 
(Alexandrova 2012b; Alexandrova 2012a).  For example, measures of 
happiness are often justified on the basis of being strongly correlated with 
other measures of well-being, such as certain resources and capabilities 
associated with well-being (e.g. income, health, education, etc.) (Oswald & 
Wu 2010).  Of course, this is not to say that measures of happiness are not 
influenced by theoretical assumptions.  The assumption that happiness 
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constitutes well-being may have motivated the development of happiness 
studies.  But such assumptions do not, ultimately, justify the practice.  It is 
best to think of empirical research as being effectively theory-neutral when it 
comes to measuring well-being.   
Nonetheless, even if one does doubt that the study of happiness provides us 
with sufficient evidence that happiness and well-being may tend to be strongly 
correlated, there are additional lines of evidence that suggest happiness and 
well-being are related in this way.  I will consider two further lines of evidence 
in the remainder of this section.        
The first line of evidence is that happiness tends to be used as an informal 
proxy for well-being by laypersons is practical deliberation and evaluation.  In 
our practical evaluation, we often take someone’s level of happiness as a 
rough indicator of their level of well-being: knowing that someone is happy 
makes us think that they are doing well; knowing that someone is unhappy 
makes us think the opposite.  When we want to find out how well someone is 
doing in an important respect, we often appeal to his or her happiness.  Thus, 
concerned parents inquire as to whether their child is happy or unhappy at 
school.  We ask friends whether or not they are happy in their work or in their 
relationships.  In general, if asked how we are doing, we frequently reply by 
noting how happy or unhappy we are.  
In our practical deliberation, we often appeal to considerations of happiness 
with regards to important life decisions.  Someone trying to decide what kind 
of career to have, for instance, will often ask which option would be best with 
regards to their happiness: Will I be happy as a teacher or a lawyer?  Similar 
questions arise about other important choices – whether to get married or to 
have children, whether to live in the city or the countryside, etc.  Policy-
makers likewise consider the impact of proposed policies on the happiness of 
their constituencies.4  
Note that we often use happiness as a proxy for well-being even when we do 
not explicitly refer to it as such (Haybron 2003).  We may often use the term 
“happiness” when considering a person’s general well-being.  In contrast, we 
                                            
4 It is important to note that, in such contexts, people are not merely referring to well-being as 
“happiness.”  If laypersons merely treated happiness as synonymous with well-being, the 
relationship between happiness and well-being would be an uninteresting one – the 
terms “happiness” and “well-being” would simply be two ways of referring to the same 
thing.    
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may sometimes refer to more specific forms of happiness when considering 
particular aspects of a person’s well-being.  For example, to say that someone 
is depressed may be a way of saying that they are unhappy in a particular 
sense. Likewise, we often claim that we have been “stressed out” over the 
past week, “feeling anxious” recently, or had a consistent “sense of 
fulfillment.”  Indeed, it may well be that most talk about happiness does not 
use the more general terms of “happy” or “unhappy” (Haybron, 2003).  This 
makes sense: it is, after all, more informative to talk of these more specific 
psychological states than a blank assertion of unhappiness.  But the broader 
category of interest here is nonetheless that of happiness; as Dan Haybron 
notes: “the report of being depressed, for example, could just as well have 
been an answer to an explicit query about how unhappy one is.” (Haybron, 
2003: 315)     
The fact that we use happiness as a proxy for well-being in our practical lives 
is telling.  It shows that one of the main ways in which we informally measure 
well-being is through keeping track of happiness.  In order to know how well 
someone is doing, we ask whether they are happy.  Formally measuring well-
being through measuring happiness is intuitively plausible for this reason – we 
frequently (albeit informally) measure well-being through measuring 
happiness in our practical lives.        
The third line of evidence for a strong correlation between happiness and 
well-being is the philosophy of well-being.  On most theories of well-being, 
happiness is viewed as an important constituent of well-being or something 
that is strongly caused by well-being.  I will consider theories of well-being in 
more detail in chapter two.  For now, it is worth mentioning how happiness 
features in the three main kinds of theories of well-being influentially outlined 
by Derek Parfit (1984).  Parfit’s taxonomy consists in hedonist, desire-
satisfaction and objective list theories of well-being, which I will very briefly 
consider in turn.5   
                                            
5 For each theory, there are many complications, which I will not consider now, but leave until 
chapter two.  For instance, there are many forms of each theory, as well as theories that 
are not included in Parfit’s list (Woodard 2013).  For example, veridical hedonism is the 
view that only true pleasures constitute well-being; idealized desire-satisfactionism is the 
view that only the satisfaction of informed and rational desires constitute well-being.  
Other views, such as Sumner’s Authentic Happiness Theory or Haybron’s Self-
Fulfillment Theory, do not fit neatly into Parfit’s taxonomy.  In light of such omissions, I 
intend the above as merely a sketch of how happiness relates to well-being on most 
philosophical theories of well-being.      
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According to prudential hedonism, happiness entirely constitutes well-being.  
Other goods, such as achievement, knowledge, virtue, etc., have merely 
instrumental value in their ability to bring about happiness.  Thus, there is a 
perfect correlation between happiness and well-being, according to hedonistic 
theories of well-being.   
In contrast to hedonism, desire-satisfactionism is the view that the satisfaction 
of desire constitutes well-being.  Happiness and well-being can come apart, 
according to desire-satisfactionism, in that we can be unaware of the 
satisfaction or frustration of our desires.  However, it is reasonable to assume 
that, in general, the satisfaction of our desires often makes us happy.  
Happiness and desire-satisfaction often coincide.  In addition, many people 
desire happiness.  Thus, there is likely to be a strong correlation between 
happiness and well-being, according to desire-satisfactionism (Angner 2012).   
Lastly, according to objective list theories, certain objective goods constitute 
well-being, such as pleasure, knowledge, achievement, virtue, etc.  
Happiness and well-being can come apart, according to objective list theories, 
in that certain goods constitute our well-being regardless of whether or not 
they make us happy.  However, much as with desire-satisfactionism, it is 
reasonable to assume that the attainment of such goods often makes us 
happy.  Happiness and the attainment of objective goods often coincide.  In 
addition, happiness is often included as one of the objective goods on the list.  
Thus, happiness will tend to be strongly correlated with well-being, according 
to objective list theories.      
It is perhaps not surprising that philosophical theories of well-being often 
entail that happiness is strongly correlated with well-being.  We have already 
seen that happiness tends to be used as a proxy for well-being.  Insofar as 
philosophical theories of well-being aim to develop a descriptively adequate 
account of well-being, therefore, we will tend to see theories that entail that 
happiness is strongly correlated with well-being.6  A theory of well-being that 
                                            
6 On this, Sumner writes: “[T]he best theory about the nature of [well-being] is the one which 
is most faithful to our ordinary concept and our ordinary experience. That experience is 
given by what we think or feel or know about well-being, both our own and that of others. 
The data which a candidate theory must fit, therefore, consist of the prodigious variety of 
our preanalytic convictions.” (Sumner 1999: p.10-11; see also Tiberius 2004: p.299).  In 
short, a theory that tells us about the nature of well-being must be “faithful” to our 
common sense judgments about well-being.  
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results in well-being being too divorced from happiness will fail to account for 
the ways in which we tend to treat happiness as a proxy for well-being.   
In sum, I have presented three lines of evidence that suggest there is a strong 
correlation between well-being and happiness.  We tend to use happiness as 
a proxy for well-being, on both a formal and informal basis. Formally, 
empirical researchers use happiness as a proxy for well-being in the 
measurement of well-being.  Informally, laypersons use happiness as proxy 
for well-being in their practical deliberation and evaluation.  This potential 
correlation provides us with reason to investigate how successfully we can 
measure well-being through measuring happiness.     
 
1.2.4  Assessing the evidence 
One might think that the method of analysis used in the previous section is 
problematic.  I outlined ways in which empirical researchers, laypersons and 
well-being theorists tend to treat happiness as a proxy of well-being.  Yet, we 
cannot be sure that, when social scientists, the folk and philosophers use the 
terms “happiness” and “well-being”, they are all referring to the same things.  
We need to be clear on what well-being and happiness are in order to further 
assess the relationship between them.7   
In the remainder of this chapter, I will consider the nature of well-being and 
happiness on two different levels: the concepts of well-being and happiness, 
and the conceptions of well-being and happiness.     
The concepts of well-being and happiness concern the broad phenomena in 
question.  What is well-being, for instance?  We may disagree over what well-
being consists in, yet agree over what well-being is, on a broader level.  For 
example, we may agree that well-being concerns a life that is good for 
someone.  However, you might think that such a life consists in a favourable 
balance of pleasure over pain.  In contrast, I might think a life that is good for 
someone consists in the achievement of certain goods, such as virtue, 
knowledge, intimate relationships, etc.  We are not disagreeing over the 
                                            
7 One might worry that, if the folk, social scientists and philosophers all hold different notions 
of happiness and well-being, the three lines of evidence outlined above are invalid.  This 
may turn out to be the case, but I do not think it makes sense to assume that it is so.  In 
the analysis of the concepts and conceptions of well-being and happiness below, I will 
argue that there are concepts and conceptions of both things that can account for the 
evidence outlined above.   
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concept of well-being; we agree that well-being concerns a life that is good for 
someone.  What we are disagreeing over is what well-being consists in.   
The conceptions of well-being and happiness concern what these things 
consist in.  Different conceptions of well-being, for instance, concern different 
views of the constituents of well-being – what well-being consists in.  The 
three different kinds of philosophical theories of well-being outlined above are 
all different kinds of conceptions of well-being.  
In the next two sections of this chapter, I will consider the concepts of well-
being and happiness respectively.  I will argue the following: Well-being is a 
life that is good for someone; such a life is conceptually distinct from both a 
happy life and a good life.  Happiness is a broad, relatively long-term 
psychological condition.  I will show that these concepts adequately account 
for the fact that we tend to use happiness as a proxy for well-being.    
In the final two sections of this chapter, I will consider different conceptions of 
happiness and well-being respectively.  I will not argue in favour of a particular 
substantive theory/conception of well-being.  Instead, I will outline a theory-
neutral account of well-being.  This account rests on the causal connections 
between various “well-being ingredients”.  With regards to happiness, I will 
argue in favour of an affective state account.  According to this view, 
happiness is a person’s affective state.  I will show that the affective state 
account adequately accounts for the fact that we tend to use happiness as a 
proxy for well-being.        
 
1.3  Well-being: Concept(s)  
In this section, I will consider the concept of well-being.  What is well-being?  
Why do we care about it?  I will show that a person’s well-being is how well 
that person’s life is going for them, and that this notion is distinct from both a 
happy life and a good life.  I will suggest that there are a number of reasons 
why we might care about well-being, and that these reasons justify the role 
that well-being plays in our practical lives.   
1.3.1  What is well-being? 
Most people consider their own and other’s well-being to be valuable.  For 
some, well-being is the only thing of final value.  We care about well-being 
and its promotion. The promotion of well-being is one of the primary goals of 
individuals, caregivers, developmental charities and organisations, and public 
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policy.  It is for this reason that the “science of well-being” has recently 
become an area of study in its own right.        
In what way do people care about well-being and its promotion?  On a 
personal level, our own well-being is what we aim to achieve when we are 
being “self-interested,” “looking out for ourselves,” “wanting to get something 
from a situation,” and concerned to know “what’s in it for us” (Campbell 
forthcoming).  The notion of well-being refers to how good a life is (or how well 
a life is going) for the subject whose life it is.  When we aim to benefit our lives 
in some way, we are aiming to promote our well-being.  As Tim Scanlon 
states, “well-being serves as an important basis for the decisions of a single 
rational individual, at least for those decisions in which he or she alone is 
concerned.” (Scanlon 1998, p.108)8 When we think about whether it would be 
better for us to have a different career, get married, or make some other major 
life change, we consider our own well-being.  Well-being is one of the main 
goals of individuals who care about how well their lives are going for 
themselves. 
These self-interested motivations can be contrasted with beneficent 
behaviour, which aims at achieving what is good for someone else.  When we 
care about someone, we want that person’s life to go well for him or her – we 
care about his or her well-being.  As Scanlon states, “well-being is what a 
concerned benefactor, such as a friend or parent, has reason to promote.” 
(Scanlon, 1998: p.108) When we consider how to respond to the needs or 
wants of another person (a dependent, spouse, or friend) for his or her sake, 
we are considering the well-being of others.9  Well-being is one of the main 
goals of caregivers and of social policy for governments and developmental 
organisations.   
                                            
8 This is not to say that we necessarily care about our well-being, or that the promotion of our 
well-being provides us with certain reasons to act.  For example, Scanlon explains that, 
“If you ask me why I listen to music, I may reply that I do so because I enjoy it.  If you 
asked me why that is a reason, the reply “A life that includes enjoyment is a better life” 
would not be false, but it would be rather strange.” (Scanlon, 1998: p.126) The things we 
care about (such as enjoyments, success in one’s main aims, and substantive goods 
such as friendship) are not desirable because they promote our well-being.  They may 
end up promoting our well-being, but we do not tend to justify their desirability on this 
basis.  Thus, Scanlon labels well-being an “inclusive good” – one that is made up of 
other things that are good in their own right, not made good by their contributions to it 
(Scanlon, 1998: p.127).       
9 Indeed, Darwall (2004) argues that a person’s well-being consists in what a benefactor 
would rationally want for them.   
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It is worth noting that, in our self- and other-interested behaviour, we often 
care about promoting different aspects of well-being.  We can distinguish 
between different aspects of well-being on the basis of (a) its temporal 
dimension, and (b) its contextual dimension.  Consider, first, the different 
aspects of well-being based on the period of time in question.  We can 
distinguish between synchronic well-being (how well one’s life is going at a 
particular time) and diachronic well-being (how well one’s life is going over a 
certain period of time).  Some well-being theorists further distinguish between 
these two aspects of well-being and lifetime well-being (how well one’s life is 
going as a whole) (Velleman 1991; Raz 2004).  There are also different 
aspects of well-being based on the context in question.  We can distinguish 
between different aspects of well-being considered in different practical 
contexts, such as mental well-being, physical well-being, childhood well-
being, material well-being, emotional well-being, spiritual well-being, and so 
on (Alexandrova 2013).  These distinctions are important insofar as our self-
interested and other-interested decisions tend to be confined to certain 
periods of time and contexts.  We often think about what is good for us, or 
someone else, in a specific practical context or period of time.  For example, 
within a medical context, it may make more sense to consider a patient’s 
physical well-being, rather than their overall well-being.  As another example, 
when you ask your friend, who you see roughly once a week, how they are 
doing, you may only be asking about their well-being over the past week or 
so.  In general, the aspect of well-being that we care about is determined by 
the relevant period of time or context.   
A life of well-being (i.e., a life that is good for the subject whose life it is) can 
be distinguished from a range of other notions of a good life.  A life can go 
well from an impersonal perspective, such that its existence contributes to the 
value simpliciter of the world.  A life can go well from a moral, aesthetic, 
perfectionist or religious perspective, such that its existence promotes or 
exemplifies moral, aesthetic, perfectionist or religious values respectively.  For 
instance, a life can go well from a perfectionist perspective, such that its 
existence exemplifies the excellences characteristic of one’s nature.  As 
Wayne Sumner notes, “Lives…are complex things whose value can be 
assessed along a number of different dimensions or from a number of 
different standpoints.  Welfare represents only one of these dimensions.” 
(Sumner, 1996: p.20) 
These other notions of a good life are conceptually distinct from a life that is 
good for someone or something.  The life of Mother Teresa, for example, was 
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undoubtedly a morally good life, but not necessarily a life that was good for 
her.  Her life was full of depression and loneliness.  This may have enhanced 
the moral worth of her life, but casts doubt on whether it was good for her, 
which shows that the two notions are distinct.  Of course, it may be that, 
according to the correct theory of well-being, a morally good life will coincide 
with (or even ipso facto be) a life that is good for the person whose life it is.  
However, even if a life that is good for someone and a life that is morally good 
are bound to coincide substantively, this does not mean that the two concepts 
are not distinct.  This is shown by the fact that suffering from depression and 
loneliness casts doubt on whether Mother Teresa had a life that was good for 
her, but not on whether her life was a morally good one.  This would not be 
possible if the two notions were not conceptually distinct.   
What makes a life go well for the subject whose life it is?  Well-being theorists 
refer to the kind of things that contribute towards our well-being as having 
prudential value.  The extent to which our life is good for us, therefore, is 
determined by the prudential value of the things that constitute our life.  
Prudential value can be distinguished from other kinds of value (such as value 
simpliciter, moral, aesthetic, religious or perfectionist value) in virtue of its 
subject-relativity, or value for a certain subject (Griffin 1989; Sumner 1996; 
Kraut 2009).  A certain state of affairs could have prudential value for me 
while having no such value for you (Taylor 2012).  This may not be the case 
for other kinds of value.  For example, a particular action may be morally bad 
in general, not morally bad for me but morally good for you.     
The subject-relativity of prudential value does not entail a subjective account 
of prudential value, whereby what is good for me is at least partly determined 
by my attitudes.  For example, it may be that friendship is good for someone 
regardless of his or her attitude towards friendship.  Yet, although friendship is 
good for that person, it may not be good for someone else.10  Features of a 
subject ultimately determine whether something is good for the subject, but 
these features need not be the subject’s attitudes.11   
                                            
10  Perhaps because it does not suit someone else’s individual nature, which may be partly 
determined by features of the subject other than their attitudes (Haybron 2008a). 
11 Indeed, the relevant features may not even be particular features of the individual; rather, 
they may be features that the subject shares with other members of their species 
(Hursthouse 1999; Foot 2001).   
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Well-being and prudential value are rarely distinguished in the philosophical 
literature.  Indeed, they are often regarded as synonyms (Crisp 2008).  Yet, 
there is a clear distinction between the two notions that can be made, which I 
will simply stipulate as follows: the notion of well-being describes how well a 
life is going for the subject whose life it is; the things that contribute towards a 
life going well for the subject whose life it is have prudential value.  Something 
is good for you (i.e., has prudential value) if and only if it contributes towards 
your level of well-being, and something is bad for you (i.e., has prudential 
disvalue) if and only if it detracts from your level of well-being.   
We now have a grasp of what well-being is and the way in which we care 
about its promotion.  However, the notion of well-being has recently been 
criticized.  Some theorists argue that the notion of well-being is a fragmented 
one – that there is no unified concept of well-being.  I will consider these 
arguments in the next section, and outline three different concepts of well-
being (what I will refer to as the Wide, Standard and Narrow Concepts of well-
being).  In the following section, I will argue that one of these concepts (the 
Standard Concept) refers to a valuable kind of life that is distinct from both a 
good life and a happy life.  This is the kind of well-being that I will consider in 
this thesis.  Thus, even if well-being is a fragmented concept, the notion of 
well-being that I will consider in this thesis refers to something that we should 
care about, and thereby plays the prominent role in our practical lives outlined 
in this section.     
1.3.2  Well-being as a fragmented concept 
Recently, there have been several arguments that there is no unified concept 
of well-being (Griffin 2007; 2000; Raz 2004; 1988; Scanlon 1998).  For 
instance, after listing the three important roles that well-being plays in our 
practical lives, Scanlon claims that, “it is a mistake to think that there is a 
single notion of well-being that plays all the roles I have mentioned and that 
we need a theory of well-being to clarify this concept.” (Scanlon 1998: p.108) 
In a similar manner, James Griffin gestures that there may be “several 
different fundamental notions” of well-being (Griffin 2000: p.285).  
Of course, it may be that the arguments in favour of the fragmentation of well-
being turn out to carry little weight.  Michael Bishop, for instance, suggests 
that the case for fragmentation may simply rest on the fact that people use the 
expression of “well-being” in diverse ways (Bishop MS: p.14).  Although 
interesting, this linguistic thesis does not necessarily tell us anything about the 
nature of well-being.  If Bishop is correct, I will assume that there is no 
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problem with the analysis of well-being presented above: a person’s well-
being is a life that is good for that person; it is because we care about leading 
lives that are good for us that well-being plays a prominent role in our practical 
deliberation and evaluation.     
However, if Bishop is wrong, and well-being does turn out to be a fragmented 
category, we need to distinguish between different concepts of well-being and 
consider which concept(s) we should care about.  
We can gain an understanding of potentially different concepts of well-being 
by considering a thought-experiment called the “Crib Test” (Feldman 2004; 
Braddock 2010; Kim MS).  The Crib Test asks you to image you are a loving 
parent of a newborn baby.  You want your baby be well off, and thereby ask 
yourself the following kind of question: “Would your desire for your baby to be 
well off be satisfied if your baby grew up to live the life of [someone who lacks 
a particular good, such as virtue, achievement, knowledge, etc.]?”  The Crib 
Test is considered by some theorists to be a reliably method of forming 
correct intuitions about well-being because parents love their children in the 
well-being-promoting sense (Darwall 2004).  Parents tend to unconditionally 
care for the existence of their children, and for what is good for their children.   
However, not all theorists agree that the Crib Test captures our intuitions 
concerning well-being.  Feldman argues that the Crib Test may end up 
reflecting our judgements about what is good (in some sense), and not what is 
good for someone (Feldman 2004; 2010).  He presents the following example 
to illustrate this point: 
“Suppose a religious fanatic looks into his child’s crib. Suppose he 
wants the child to have a wonderful life. Suppose he thinks that the 
best imaginable life for the child is one in which the child becomes a 
martyr for God. This religious fanatic might be filled with love, and he 
might be thinking about the Good Life for his child. But it is not clear 
that he is expressing a hope about what we would normally think of as 
the child’s welfare. Perhaps he is thinking about what he takes to be a 
moral or religious virtue. Perhaps he is thinking about the most 
beneficial life the child could live. So the mere fact that he is a parent 
filled with love, and is looking into his child’s crib, and is saying 
something about ‘the Good Life’, does not absolutely guarantee that he 
is thinking about well-being.” (Feldman 2004: p.10) 
Feldman’s argument rests on the fact that well-being concerns a value (i.e. 
prudential value) that is conceptually distinct from other kinds of value (such 
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as aesthetic value, moral value, religious value, etc.).  As explained in the 
previous section, well-being concerns what is good for someone, not what is 
good in some other kind of respect.  One way of putting this point is that the 
term “well-being” seems to refer to a narrow, non-moral concept.  We may 
want more for our children than for them to have a life of well-being.  We may 
want them to have lives full of meaning and worth.  This would be a good life, 
no doubt, but not necessarily a life that is good for them (Smuts MS). 
In contrast to this position, Aristotelians tend to understand “well-being” as 
referring to a concept closer to eudaimonia, a concept that embraces a wider 
range of values than the narrower concept, and allows for the conceptual 
possibility of moral value to be one of its constitutive elements (Haybron, 
2008: chapter two).  According to this wider concept of well-being, what you 
want for your children may be a number of things, such as lives of happiness, 
meaning and worth.  These things all contribute towards your children’s well-
being, in that they are in your child’s wider interests.  Call this the Wide 
Concept of well-being (WC).  WC refers to the realisation and integration of all 
of the positive values that can enrich a person’s life.  Haybron refers to this 
concept as “A Good Life”: “a life that is good in all respects in which a life can 
be considered good, including morally – a life that is desirable without 
qualification, both enviable and admirable.” (Haybron 2000: p.211) Under a 
wider understanding of well-being, “a good life” may simply be referred to as 
“a life of well-being”.            
The Crib test may elicit judgments about the Wide Concept of well-being or 
about narrower concepts of well-being.  We can further distinguish between 
narrower concepts of well-being.  Kagan (1992) argues that the concept of 
well-being is much narrower in scope that people tend to think.  He provides 
the following argument for thinking that the concept of well-being refers 
merely to our experiential lives:  Something contributes towards a person’s 
well-being if it is good for that person.  Persons are nothing other than a body 
and mind.  Thus, according to Kagan, something can only constitute a 
person’s well-being if it makes a difference to their body or mind.  Being 
genuinely successful, for instance, does not benefit the person except insofar 
as it directly impacts them i.e. through their experiences of being successful.  
Let us call this the Narrow Concept of well-being (NC).   
NC concerns only a person’s body and mind, which, according to Kagan, are 
the intrinsic properties of a person.  It does not concern so-called ‘extrinsic’ 
properties of a person, such as various relational properties (e.g. being in a 
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certain environment, having certain possessions, attributes, friendships, etc.).  
Kagan argues that relational properties may make a person’s life go well, but 
do not necessarily benefit the person.  To benefit a person, according to 
Kagan, it must make a difference in the person i.e. it must make a difference 
to the person’s body or mind.  Being genuinely successful may constitute a 
person’s life going well, but does not benefit the person except insofar as it 
directly impacts them.   
If Kagan is right, there may be two different concepts of well-being: one that 
refers to how well a person is doing (i.e. the Narrow Concept) and another 
that refers to how well a person’s life is going.  How well a person’s life is 
going may include relational properties, such as whether the person is 
genuinely successful or not.  Let us call this concept the Standard Concept of 
well-being (SC).  In contrast to NC, it may include a person’s relational 
properties (e.g. being in a certain environment, having certain possessions, 
attributes, friendships, etc.).  In contrast to WC, it does not necessarily include 
other kinds of positive values that can enrich a person’s life, such as moral, 
aesthetic, perfectionist or religious values.  Both NC and SC are narrower 
concepts of well-being than WC, but, unlike NC, the Standard Concept of 
well-being does not reduce what is good for someone to their body and mind.     
Some well-being theorists have argued that NC and SC essentially refer to a 
person’s well-being over different time-frames.  David Velleman (1991), for 
instance, argues that there are two different kinds of well-being: a person’s 
momentary well-being and a person’s lifetime well-being.  According to 
Velleman, a person’s lifetime well-being is not simply the lifetime sum of their 
momentary well-being.  Velleman argues that a person’s lifetime well-being at 
least partly consists in the “narrative shape”, or “meaningfulness”, of a 
person’s life.  A person whose life is characterised by a plurality of mutually 
supporting goals and chapters seems to have a higher level of lifetime well-
being than a person whose life is characterised by radically disconnected 
chapters despite consisting in the same momentary levels of well-being 
(Kauppinen 2012).  It is possible that NC may refer to a person’s momentary 
well-being, whereas SC may refer to a person’s lifetime well-being.12     
These three different concepts of well-being are illustrated in fig 1.2, ranging 
from highly restricted to unrestricted concepts of well-being: 
                                            
12 I will reconsider the distinction between a person’s momentary well-being and their lifetime 
well-being in chapter five.   
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Fig 1.2 
 
In sum, there may at least three different concepts of well-being, which can be 
categorised in virtue of how restricted or unrestricted they take well-being to 
be.  The most restricted concept (NC) relates to the notion of a happy life – a 
life of enjoyment, engagement, satisfaction, fulfilment, contentment, etc.  In 
contrast, the least restricted concept (WC) relates to the notion of a good life – 
a life of moral virtue, meaningful relationships and activities, aesthetic beauty, 
spiritual depth, and so on.  
1.3.3  Well-being as a distinct concept 
In response to the analysis of the previous section, one could argue that there 
is no distinct notion of well-being that refers to something we should care 
about.  That is, one could be a nihilist about well-being.  Nihilists could argue 
that well-being is a confused concept, which is caught between the concept of 
a good life and a happy life.  The notion of well-being may be a hybrid, “an 
attempt to find a concept which is half one and half the other” (Raz, 2004: 
p.270).  According to such thinking, we should perhaps discard the notion of 
well-being, talk simply about the good life and the happy life, and do well not 
to muddy the waters in-between.      
In this section, I will argue that such nihilism would be going too far.  It 
assumes that the notion of well-being does not do any additional theoretical 
work, beyond taking onboard some parts of the concepts of a good life and a 
happy life.  This is not the case.   
The distinguishing feature of well-being and prudential value is that they are 
both subject-relative.  There are a number of reasons why we might care 
about a life that is good in a subject-relative sense.  I will briefly note four 
ways in which a life of well-being may matter in a way that is distinct from both 
a good life and a happy life.   
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Firstly, something may be good for a subject (i.e. good in a subject-relative 
sense) because it is related in some way to the value of the subject.  For 
instance, Connie Rosati (2006) claims that, because a person is valuable, 
their well-being consists in those things that sustain their own value.  This 
clearly includes meeting one’s basic needs for survival (e.g. water, food, 
shelter, etc.), keeping in good condition and exercising one’s valuable 
capacities and abilities (e.g. being able to form attachments with others, make 
meaningful contributions to the world, etc.).  Similarly, Joseph Raz (2004) 
claims that, as autonomous agents, a life that is good for us is one in which 
we appreciate and respond appropriately to things of value.  According to 
Raz, we can appreciate things of value either by engaging with them (e.g. 
enjoying a good painting, spending time with a friend, etc.) or respecting them 
(e.g. restoring the good painting, protecting the friend from harm, etc.).  It is 
through appreciating and responding appropriately to things of value, Raz 
claims, that we promote our own value (as autonomous agents).     
Secondly, something may be good for a subject because it is related in some 
way to the success of the subject.  This is similar to the previous reason, but 
does not require a view about what makes a subject valuable.  Rather it 
simply views a subject as having certain goals with regards to which it can be 
more or less successful.  For instance, Dan Haybron (2008) notes that 
organisms can be viewed as having goals of some kind; these goals may take 
the form of psychological attitudes, such as aims or desires, or may be 
constituted by tendencies for growth and development. According to Haybron, 
we promote people’s well-being by “helping”, “aiding” or “assisting” their 
success at achieving certain kinds of goals.  In contrast, the good life may not 
be entirely concerned with the goals of the subject.  As Haybron claims, one 
may partly achieve a good life “merely by fulfilling a capacity, even if one 
hasn’t the slightest desire for it, could not be brought to desire it, is in no other 
way orientated to seek it, and even if one responds with nothing but pain and 
revulsion towards it.” (Habyron, 2008: 169) We may not be able to say the 
same about achieving a life of well-being.13          
                                            
13 This may relate to Stephen Darwall’s “rational care theory” of the concept of welfare 
(Darwall, 2004).  According to Darwall, the concept of welfare is the concept of what it is 
rational to want for someone insofar as one cares for her.  He argues that well-being 
ultimately concerns the appropriate objects of sympathetic concern. It seems reasonable 
to presume that we should have sympathetic concern towards others with regards to 
how well they are doing at achieving their goals.     
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Thirdly, something may be good for a subject because it is related in some 
way to the temporal and physical limits of the subject.  Again, this is related to 
the previous reason, but consists in a more nuanced view of how success 
relates towards well-being.  Cheshire Calhoun (MS) has outlined such a view 
with regards to a meaningful life – a concept that is intertwined with the notion 
of well-being (Raz, 2004).  Calhoun argues that one can achieve a good life 
through succeeding in one or more of one’s important goals (such as Mother 
Teresa achieving a good life through succeeding in helping the poor).  In 
contrast, one may only achieve a life of well-being through succeeding in all of 
one’s important goals relative to one’s available time and resources.  Another 
way of putting this point is that well-being may concern how a subject 
distributes their attention and resources among certain goals – a life of well-
being may be a successful life within the bounds of our practical lives.14 15  
Lastly, something may be good for a subject because it can be justified to the 
subject as being good.  For instance, Valerie Tiberius (2007) claims that we 
care about well-being because we care about a life that can be justified as a 
good life to the person whose life it is.  As Tiberius puts it: “To act for your 
sake, as opposed to acting for morality’s sake or the sake of another person, 
is to act in a way that I can justify to you in some sense” (Tiberius 2007: 
p.375) Your life may be justifiably good insofar as it has intrinsic value (e.g. it 
may have aesthetic value) but this does not count as justifying it as good to a 
person whom we are trying to persuade of its value.  Tiberius argues that, 
                                            
14 Haybron comes to a similar conclusion in remarking that well-being, “apparently relates to 
the universal problem of deciding how to distribute resources and attention among those 
we care about including ourselves.  When does a given individual require assistance or 
special care?  Who needs it most (and least)?  Who has more than they need?  Who has 
given up the least, or most?” (Haybron, 2008b: 170)  
15 This also supports two further intuitions about well-being.  Firstly, it seems that a life of 
well-being is, to a certain extent, a balanced life.  A balanced life seems to require some 
meaningful relationships such as friendships, some measure of success or achievement 
in worthwhile projects, and some amount of happiness and (reflective) satisfaction 
(Tiberius 2005a).  A life that does not have some of these things seems to fail as 
succeeding in certain important goals.  
Secondly, it seems that the prudential perspective is the most comprehensive 
perspective from which to judge a life.  Consider, for example, Raz’s (2004: 294) 
example of an ocean-going sailor who judges himself only by his record-breaking 
attempts.  The sailor has friends and family, and other interests, and they too contribute 
towards his well-being (even if less than his sailing).  Sailing matters to him most.  But 
well-being is the most comprehensive perspective on his life, taking account of 
everything of importance (sailing, friends and family, and other interests).  
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with regards to well-being, the person who must be persuaded of the value of 
a life is the person whose life it is.  They must be able to accept or endorse 
their life if they were to follow a certain procedure (that does not itself consist 
in particular prudential values).      
I am unable to consider these four theories in more detail here.  I will assume 
that at least one of them (or a similar kind of theory) is correct, and therefore 
that a life of well-being matters in a way that is distinct from both a good life 
and a happy life.   
The Standard Concept of well-being (SC) outlined in the previous section 
clearly best captures the distinct nature of well-being.  In contrast to the Wide 
Concept of well-being (WC) it does not equate a life of well-being with a good 
life.  And in contrast to the Narrow Concept of well-being (NC) it does not 
equate a life of well-being with a happy life.    
In common with WC, SC can account for the important role that well-being 
plays in our practical lives.  According to SC, our well-being may be 
constituted by the realisation and integration of many of the positive values 
that can enrich our life.  This is why many of our major life decisions concern 
our well-being.   
In addition to WC, SC can account for situations in which we sacrifice our 
well-being for other goods that enrich our life.  For example, it seems possible 
(if not probable) for a single mother of unexpected triplets to sacrifice her well-
being for more important kinds of positive value such as the moral value of 
caring for her children.  These kinds of situations seem to involve trade-offs 
between our well-being and other kinds of positive value that enrich our life.  
The single mother sacrifices her well-being for virtue.16   
In general, SC can account for the fact that well-being is worth caring about, 
but that it may not be the only thing worth caring about.  As Haybron and 
Tiberius put it: “it is perfectly ordinary for individuals to care about things they 
see as having little or no positive bearing on their well-being. Artists, social 
                                            
16 Indeed, cases of self-sacrifice show two important things about the role well-being plays in 
our practical lives.  Firstly, the fact that a person can choose to sacrifice their well-being 
for other kinds of positive value that enrich their life shows that these are two different 
things.  Secondly, as Scanlon notes, the fact that it makes sense to make the opposite 
choice – namely, to not sacrifice one’s well-being in favour of other kinds of goods – 
shows that well-being is an important factor in our major life decisions (Scanlon, 1998: 
p.131).  How well our lives go for us may not be all there is to how well our lives go, but it 
is often the leading factor in our practical deliberation and evaluation.    
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workers, and dissidents, for instance, sometimes choose paths in life that will 
leave them, in their eyes, worse off than other options before them. Similarly, 
people care about things having no relation at all to their own lives, much less 
well-being: the future welfare of a stranger one briefly met, or the state of the 
world’s ecosystems a thousand years hence. And some individuals may be 
depressed, detest themselves, or hold religious doctrines on which they 
actually value their own ill-being." (Haybron & Tiberius MS: p.12) 
Lastly, in addition to NC, SC can account for the things we care about beyond 
our experiential lives.  In our practical deliberation and evaluation, we care 
about the things that increase or decrease our well-being, such as success in 
our personal objectives, goals and projects.  Again, we care about whether we 
are genuinely successful in these endeavours, not just whether we have 
certain experiences of success.  Moreover, this does not seem to be a 
mistake.  Thought-experiments such as Nozick’s experience machine appear 
to support the idea that actual states of affairs may constitute our well-being 
beyond our experiences of them (Nozick 1974).  I will discuss this issue in 
detail in chapter two.    
In sum, the Standard Concept of well-being refers to a valuable kind of life 
that is distinct from both a happy life and a good life.  In the remainder of this 
thesis, I will simply refer to it as “the concept of well-being”.    
 
1.4  Happiness: Concept(s) 
In the previous section on the concept(s) of well-being, I argued that there is a 
concept of well-being that refers to how well a person’s life is going for them, 
and that this notion is distinct from both a happy life and a good life.   
In this section, I will consider the concept(s) of happiness.  For the purpose of 
this thesis, the following analysis of happiness will be much more 
straightforward than the previous analysis of well-being.  This is because I am 
concerned with the measurement of well-being, and measuring well-being 
through measuring happiness in particular.  In the first main section of this 
chapter, I showed that that happiness tends to be used as a formal proxy for 
well-being in the measurement of well-being.  I claimed that this is our primary 
line of evidence in favour of a potential correlation between happiness and 
well-being.  Now, the concept of happiness used by empirical researchers is 
quite clear.  In short, researchers refer to happiness as a broad, relatively 
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long-term positive psychological condition.  This is the concept of happiness 
that I will be concerned with in this thesis.     
However, as mentioned in the first main section of this chapter, one may 
doubt that the study of happiness provides us with sufficient evidence to 
suppose that happiness and well-being tend to be strongly correlated.  In 
response, I outlined two additional lines of evidence that suggest happiness 
and well-being are related in this way.  In particular, I showed that happiness 
tends to be used as an informal proxy for well-being by laypersons is practical 
deliberation and evaluation.   
It is not obvious that the folk use the same concept of happiness as the one 
used by empirical researchers.  In this section, therefore, I will briefly 
considering a number of different concepts of happiness that may be used by 
laypersons in their practical lives.  I will suggest that social scientists and the 
folk do tend to use the same concept of happiness.  This concept of 
happiness can adequately account for the fact that happiness tends to be 
used as both a formal and informal proxy for well-being.  
1.4.1  The fragmentation of happiness 
The term “happiness” is ambiguous.17  It is used to refer to a number of 
different things (Haybron, 2003).  In this section, I will briefly outline eight 
potential referents of the term.18  I will suggest that we only tend to use one of 
them as a proxy for well-being in our practical lives.    
The first concept of happiness that I will consider is what Haybron refers to as 
“Prudential Happiness” (Haybron, 2003).  Prudential Happiness is 
synonymous with well-being – it refers to a life that is good for the person 
whose life it is.19  When we ascribe happiness to someone, in this sense, we 
are making an evaluative judgment about how well his or her life is going, 
namely whether it is going well for him or her.  Thus, Haybron notes that 
people may disagree over whether someone is happy or not if those people 
have different prudential values: “I might think that Genghis Khan has a happy 
                                            
17 Though, see Feldman (2010), for an argument against the ambiguity of the term. 
18 It is worth noting that each notion of happiness has a converse notion of unhappiness.  I 
will focus solely on notions of happiness here, and leave the reader to infer the notions 
of unhappiness. 
19 Recent notable works by theorists that use the term “happiness” in its prudential sense 
include: (Almeder 2000; Annas 1995; McMahon 2006; Noddings 2004; White 2006).   
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life, because I think what matters for well-being is getting what you want; while 
you may deny this because you think a life of evildoing, however “successful,” 
is sad and impoverished.” (Haybron 2011a)20     
It seems clear that we do not tend to be treat happiness synonymously with 
well-being in our practical lives; we tend to treat them as separate things.  It is 
for this reason that we are able to use happiness as a proxy for well-being.  
We can see this in two ways.  First, happiness is often used as a defeasible 
proxy for well-being.  We say things such as, “Even though I was happy, I was 
not doing well”, “Knowing the truth is good for me, even if it doesn’t make me 
happy”, and so on.  Second, we say things such as “I wish my child would be 
happy and healthy”, though we may not say things such as “I wish my child to 
have well-being and be healthy”.  Being healthy may not be valuable beyond 
the well-being that it provides.  However, being healthy may be valuable 
beyond the happiness that it provides.  This shows that the two things – 
happiness and well-being – tend to be distinct.21  
In contrast to Prudential Happiness, the term “happiness” is often used to 
refer to an entirely descriptive psychological state.  I will briefly consider three 
concepts of happiness of this kind.  The first descriptive concept of happiness 
refers to a particular episodic emotion.  Happiness, in this sense, is a 
particular positive emotion, similar to other emotions such as joy and 
excitement.  The emotion of happiness can be viewed as one of the garden-
variety emotions, such as emotions of anger, disgust and fear (Ekman & 
Davidson 1994).  Such emotional episodes are typically fleeting, and 
                                            
20 In the discussion of the concept of well-being above, we saw that there may be at least 
three different concepts of well-being: narrow, wide and standard senses of well-being.  
It follows, therefore, that there may be three different concepts of Prudential Happiness.  
Indeed, Haybron notes that happiness is sometimes used to refer to a life that is most 
choiceworthy – a life that is good overall, or all things considered (Haybron, 2003).  More 
succinctly, we can refer to this kind of life as “the good life”.  Haybron refers to this 
concept of happiness as “Perfectionist Happiness.”  But, it is worth noting that, according 
to the wide sense of well-being discussed above, Perfectionist Happiness is 
synonymous with well-being.  We might think that Genghis Kahn was well-off according 
to the standard sense of well-being, for example, but that we was not truly (or really or 
genuinely) well-off, according to the wide sense of well-being.  Similarly, we might think 
that he had a happy life, but not a truly happy life. 
21 Indeed, the fact that the term “happiness” is sometimes used synonymously with the term 
“well-being” is further evidence that happiness (in its non-prudential sense) may be 
strongly correlated with well-being.  That is, the two notions may be so closely bound up 
with each other that they are sometimes treated as the same thing. 
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correspond to a favourable thought, action, event or situation.  For example, 
one might say that, “eating the ice-cream made me happy.”   
Of course, some emotional episodes of happiness (and, indeed, emotional 
episodes in general) can last for much longer time periods – perhaps days, or 
weeks.  For example, one might say that they have been feeling happy since 
their partner agreed to marry them last week.  Nonetheless, emotional 
episodes are generally short-lived, often occurring in response to a particular 
event or situation that requires us to act in a certain way (Griffiths 1997).  I will 
refer to this concept of happiness as HappinessEpisodic Emotion.       
The second descriptive concept of happiness that I will consider can be 
viewed as an extension of the previous concept.  In contrast to viewing 
happiness as a particular positively valenced episodic emotion, we sometimes 
view happiness as all (or almost all) kinds of positively valenced emotions.  
Thus, experiences of happiness include experiences of joy, contentment, 
satisfaction, fulfilment, tranquillity, peace of mind, stimulation, excitement, 
attachment, love, admiration, interest, and so on.  
All these positively valenced emotions share two features in common.  First, 
they involve representing things as being good in some respect.  For 
example, an episode of satisfaction involves representing the achievement of 
a goal, which is also represented as being good.  Similarly, an episode of 
attachment involves representing a connection with another, which is also 
represented as being good.  The second feature shared by most positively 
valenced emotions is that, as well as representing things as being good in 
some respect, they also tend to feel good.  We often want to experience 
emotions of joy, contentment, satisfaction, etc., because such experiences 
are pleasurable.  In sum, the term “happiness” sometimes refers to all 
positively valenced emotional states: episodic emotions that (a) represent 
things as being good in some way, and (b) tend to feel good. I will refer to this 
concept of happiness as HappinessPositive Emotion.     
The third descriptive concept of happiness can again be viewed as a further 
extension of the previous concept.  This sense of happiness concerns a 
person’s broader psychological state constituted by their balance of 
pleasurable states over displeasurable states.  Being happy, in this respect, 
consists in experiencing a greater amount of positive emotion (or pleasure) 
than negative emotion (or displeasure).  One may be happy momentarily, or 
happy over a longer period of time.  If a person has spent more time in a 
pleasurable state than in a displeasurable state over a certain period of time 
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then we can say that they were happy over that period of time. I will refer to 
this concept of happiness as HappinessPositive State.22     
I take it that this concept is the closest concept so far to the concept that 
refers to something we tend to use as a proxy for well-being in our practical 
lives.  When we think about how well we have been doing, we may tend to 
think about whether we have, in general, been feeling good or bad.  Knowing 
that a person predominantly feels good may give us a fairly good indication 
that their life is going well.  However, the problem with this concept is that it 
may refer to what is sometimes called “smiley-face happiness” – a 
psychological state that may lack both the breadth and depth of something 
that tends to be used as a proxy for well-being.  In contrast to HappinessPositive 
State, we tend to think of happiness as a broad, relatively long-term, positive 
psychological condition.  If a depressed individual happens to experience a 
day of predominantly pleasurable states, this does not tend to indicate that 
they are doing well.  The point is that happiness seems to have “deep, far-
reaching, and typically lasting consequences for a person’s state of mind and 
behaviour.” (Haybron, 2008: p.69)  
Concepts of happiness that are partly descriptive and partly evaluative may 
be able to better account for both the breadth and depth of happiness.  I will 
briefly consider three concepts of happiness that fit this description.       
Firstly, the term “happiness” is sometimes used to refer to a person’s 
preferred mental state.23  This may simply be a person’s balance of 
pleasurable states over displeasurable states.  Or it may be a different kind of 
mental state, such as an overwhelming state of contentment, tranquillity or 
                                            
22 Note that HappinessPositive State is a descriptive concept of happiness.  Some theorists 
(namely quantitative prudential hedonists) hold that a person’s well-being is constituted 
by their overall balance of pleasurable states over displeasurable states (Feldman, 2004; 
2010; Crisp, 2006).  If this were the case, HappinessPositive State would be substantively 
identical to well-being.  However, it is conceptually possible that HappinessPositive State is 
not substantively identical to well-being.  Thus, HappinessPositive State remains a descriptive 
concept.  Our values make no difference to happiness viewed in this sense.  Happiness 
is constituted by a person’s balance of pleasurable states over displeasurable states, 
according to HappinessPositive State, no matter what we think constitutes well-being.        
23 The notion is similar to the idea of preference hedonism put forward by Parfit (1984).  
According to preference hedonism, a person’s well-being is constituted by their desired 
state of consciousness.  As Scanlon puts it: “the experience of living a life is made better 
by the presence of those mental states, whatever they may be, which the person living 
the life wants to have” (Scanlon, 1993: p.186).  In contrast to preference hedonism, the 
concept of happiness in question may have little to do with well-being.  In that, well-being 
may have little to do with a person’s desired state of consciousness. 
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peace of mind.  People may tend to desire states of consciousness that 
cohere with lives that are good for them.  For example, Buddhists tend to 
emphasise the importance of contentment and peace of mind over 
satisfaction and pleasure because they believe that the former mental states 
tend to be beneficial, whereas the latter mental states tend to be harmful 
(Flanagan 2011).  But, this is not a necessary feature of the concept in 
question; this sense of happiness merely refers to the psychological condition 
that people desire to have.  I will refer to this concept of happiness as 
HappinessDesired Positive State.    
The second descriptive/evaluative concept of happiness is similar to 
HappinessDesired Positive State, but subtly different.  According to this concept, 
happiness is the psychological condition that a person believes accompanies 
his or her well-being.  Alternatively put, if well-being is characterised as how 
well one’s life goes, then happiness is characterised as how well one’s life 
goes from the inside (Campbell MS).  Unlike HappinessDesired Positive State, 
happiness in this sense is not necessarily desirable.  It is the states of the 
world that one’s psychological state points towards that are valuable.  This 
concept of happiness, for instance, refers to the psychological state of feeling 
that one’s self and one’s activities, projects, relationships, etc., are worthwhile.  
One need not, in addition, feel that one’s happiness is worthwhile.  The value 
of happiness, in this sense, is derived from its contents.24  It is a psychological 
condition that consists in the (perhaps true) belief that one’s life, activities, 
etc., are worthwhile (Raz, 2004).  I will refer to this concept of happiness as 
HappinessWorthwhile Life.   
Lastly, the term “happiness” is sometimes used to refer to whatever 
psychological condition (at least partly) constitutes well-being.  This is not 
necessarily the psychological condition that people either desire to have or 
the condition that accompanies a worthwhile life.  For example, a person’s 
well-being may be entirely constituted by feelings of life satisfaction caused by 
virtuous activity.  In this case, the psychological condition that constitutes a 
person’s well-being is being satisfied with their life as a result of being 
virtuous.  Yet, it is possible that people desire pleasurable mental states 
beyond such feelings of life satisfaction.  Similarly, it is possible that people 
                                            
24 This kind of happiness may be constituted merely by a person’s beliefs about the value of 
her self and her life.  Alternatively, it may be constituted by a person’s appropriate 
beliefs, namely true beliefs about the value of her self and her life.  This is a debate to be 
had between different conceptions of this kind of happiness. 
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feel their life is going well when they witness the achievement their life-long 
projects.  Thus, HappinessDesired Positive State and HappinessWorthwhile Life can, on a 
conceptual level, come apart from the psychological condition that (at least 
partly) constitutes well-being.  I will refer to this concept of happiness as 
HappinessPrudential Experience.     
All three of these partly descriptive and partly evaluative concepts of 
happiness may refer to psychological conditions that tend to be used as 
proxies for well-being by laypersons in their practical lives.  However, I doubt 
that we primarily use these kinds of happiness as proxies for well-being.  This 
seems doubtful for two reasons. First of all, due to their partly evaluative 
nature, each concept permits to a wide range of variation.  For instance, with 
regards to HappinessDesired Positive State, people from more “collectivist” cultures 
tend to value mental states that occur through the realisation of positive social 
relationships (e.g. compassion), whereas people from more “individualist” 
cultures tend to value mental states that occur through self-achievement (e.g. 
pride).  With regards to HappinessPrudential Experience, people’s happiness will be 
determined by one’s view of what is good for them (which, as I will mention in 
the next section, is far from uncontroversial).  It does not seem that the kind of 
happiness that we tend to use as a proxy for well-being permits of this level of 
variation.  Paradigm cases of happiness are psychological states such as 
being in high spirits, elated, carefree, contented, at ease, self-assured, a 
sense of fulfilment, and so on.  In contrast, paradigm cases of unhappiness 
are states such as being depressed, melancholy, anxious, stressed out, 
lonely, empty, etc. (Haybron, 2008) It seems that these states constitute 
happiness/unhappiness regardless of whether people desire them or whether 
they contribute towards well-being.25   
                                            
25 Against this view is a series of studies by Sven Nyholm investigating the role that moral 
judgements play in folk’s attributions of happiness (Nyholm 2007; Phillips et al. 
forthcoming).  His studies suggest that the folk concept of happiness involves some 
normative or evaluative element such that, of the things that determine whether we take 
somebody to be happy, one is whether we think that person is living a good life or not.  
This suggests, according to the folk concept of happiness, happiness is not entirely 
descriptive.   
On closer inspection, I think that Nyholm’s results may turn out to be entirely compatible 
with the notion of happiness employed by empirical researchers.  It may be that people 
tend to incorporate normative judgements into judgments about happiness because 
being a good person typically results in being happy.  That is, various components of a 
good life (such as being virtuous, having contact with reality, etc.) may be part of a proto-
typical happy life, whereby happiness is an entirely descriptive psychological state.   
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The second reason why we do not tend to use the above three kinds of 
happiness as proxies for well-being is that they are inefficient.  What we want 
from a proxy for well-being is something that is more epistemically accessible 
than well-being itself – otherwise we would simply refer to our well-being in 
our practical deliberation and evaluation.  Partly descriptive and partly 
evaluative concepts of happiness, such as HappinessWorthwhile Life, require us to 
know a considerable amount about how well our lives are going for us in order 
to know whether or not we are happy.  This is inefficient.  An entirely 
descriptive notion of happiness is a much more efficient proxy for well-being.  
A proxy of this kind is more likely to get things wrong – such as in the case of 
the deliriously happy mental patient – but such costs will tend to be 
outweighed by the fact that it is epistemically accessible.  Assessments of 
happiness, according to a purely descriptive notion of happiness, are easier to 
come by: in order to get an idea of how well we are doing, we merely need to 
evaluate our psychological states.    
A purely descriptive notion of happiness is used by empirical researchers in 
the measurement of well-being.  Although social scientists do not consistently 
refer to one psychological condition as “happiness” (more on this below), they 
nonetheless study psychological conditions that are entirely descriptive in 
nature.  They also study psychological conditions that have more breadth and 
depth than states such as HappinessPositive State.  Haybron refers to such 
conditions as “Psychological Happiness” (Haybron, 2003).  Psychological 
Happiness is a broad, relatively long-term positive psychological condition.  I 
suggest that, in-line with empirical researchers, we primarily use this kind of 
happiness as a proxy for well-being in our practical lives.  This is the kind of 
psychological condition that we refer to with phrases such as, “I just want my 
children to be happy and healthy”, “I’ve not been happy since I lost my job”, 
“Did you have a happy childhood?”, and so on.     
The aim of this overview of different concepts of happiness has been to 
support the claim that social scientists and the folk tend to use the same kind 
of happiness as a proxy for well-being.  The term “happiness” may refer to a 
number of different things, but it does not seem that any of these things are 
well suited for us to primarily use as an informal proxy for well-being in our 
practical lives.  In contrast, the concept of happiness used by empirical 
researchers (Psychological Happiness) does seem to be well suited in this 
respect.  It seems reasonable to suppose, therefore, that the same kind of 
happiness is used both by empirical researchers and laypersons as a proxy 
for well-being.     
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Of course, it may turn out that this analysis is incorrect.  Happiness is an 
elusive concept and may refer to a number of things that we use in 
inconsistent ways.  If so, I am happy to drop the term “happiness” and simply 
talk about the kind of broad, relatively long-term psychological conditions that 
are studied by empirical researchers.  Not much rests on the term.  The 
phenomena in question is the psychological condition that we tend to use as a 
proxy for well-being.  If this condition does not turn out to be worthy of the 
term “happiness” then this thesis can be viewed as investigation into how 
successfully we can measure well-being through measuring such a 
psychological condition.    
In sum, I have suggested that happiness – viewed as a broad, relatively long-
term positive psychological condition – can adequately account for the fact 
that happiness tends to be used as both a formal and informal proxy for well-
being.  In the final main section of this chapter I will consider what this 
psychological condition consists in.  I will argue in favour of an “affective state 
account” of happiness, whereby happiness consists in a person’s affective 
state.   
1.4.2  Summing up where we have got to so far 
We now have a clear idea of what well-being and happiness are.  I have 
argued in favour of the Standard Concept of well-being and the concept of 
Psychological Happiness as the primary concepts of happiness and well-
being.  Well-being concerns a life that is good for someone, and its value is 
distinct from both a good life and a happy life.  Happiness is a broad, relatively 
long-term psychological condition that both empirical researchers and 
laypersons use as a proxy for well-being.    
Moving forward, in the next two main sections, I will consider different 
conceptions of both well-being and happiness respectively.  I will not argue in 
favour of a particular substantive theory/conception of well-being.  Instead, I 
will outline a theory-neutral account of well-being.  With regards to happiness, 
I will argue in favour of an affective state account.  According to this theory, 
happiness is constituted by a person’s affective state; this adequately 
accounts for the fact that we tend to use happiness as a proxy for well-being. 
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1.5  Well-being: Conception(s)  
In this section, I will consider different conceptions of well-being.  Crucially, I 
will not argue in favour of one particular conception of well-being.  What 
constitutes well-being is a controversial issue – there are no widely accepted 
substantive theories of well-being (Keller, 2010; Heathwood, 2011).  Instead 
of arguing in favour a particular substantive theory, I will outline a theory-
neutral account of well-being – a set of core features of well-being that are 
consistent with most substantive theories of well-being.  
I will outline the theory-neutral account of well-being as follows.  Firstly, I will 
briefly show that the three main kinds of theories of well-being are 
controversial.  Secondly, I will describe the theory-neutral account.  I will 
consider both of these issues at greater length in chapter two.  In the 
remainder of this section, I will illustrate the theory-neutral account with 
regards to the three main kinds of measures of well-being.   
1.5.1  Different conceptions of well-being 
In chapter two, I will provide a comprehensive overview of substantive 
theories of well-being in order to illustrate that there are currently no widely-
acceptable (in contrast to widely-accepted) theories of well-being.  In this 
section, I will simply show that the three main kinds of substantive theories of 
well-being are controversial – none of the theories are widely accepted.  I will 
assume that this lack of consensus amongst philosophers of well-being 
generalises to all current substantive theories of well-being.26  
Recall from the first main section of this chapter, that the three main kinds of 
substantive theories of well-being (based on Parfit’s influential taxonomy) are 
mental state, desire-satisfaction and objective list theories.  Let us consider 
mental state theories, first.  Mental state theories begin with the intuitive claim 
that for something to be good for me it must make some kind of impact on me.  
In order to make this impact, I must notice it, or be aware of it – it must impact 
my experiences.  The problem with such a view, however, is that it is neutral 
over how my experiences are generated.  I may have genuinely meaningful 
relationships, and feel good about that, or I may merely think that I have 
meaningful relationships, despite the fact that the people I care about talk 
badly about me behind my back.  We intuitively think that the latter situation is 
                                            
26 For overviews, see Keller (2010) and Heathwood (2011) 
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worse than the former, even if I never find out about the things people say 
about me when I’m not around.  Mental state views, however, do not 
distinguish between the two scenarios insofar as I have the same experiences 
in both.   
The second main kind of well-being theory – desire-satisfaction theories – 
make up for the counterintuitive nature of mental states theories by claiming 
that it is the actual satisfaction of our desires that constitute well-being 
whether we are aware of our desires being satisfied or not.  However, such a 
view faces the following problem: we can desire things that do not seem to be 
good for us.  We may have malicious, stupid or self-destructive desires (e.g. 
desires to torture innocent others, count blades of grass, eat gravel, etc.) the 
satisfaction of which does not seem to be of any benefit.  Even the 
satisfaction of our idealised desires (i.e. desires formed under full information 
and rational capacities) may be not be good for us, such as the desire for a 
distant stranger to be healthy or for human life to flourish over the next few 
millennia.  In short, the problem with desire-satisfaction theories is that they 
do not guarantee that the objects of our desires are those things that seem to 
be good for us.      
Objective list theories (the final main theory of well-being) solve this problem 
by simply listing the kinds of goods that do seem to be good for us.  These 
include goods such as love, virtue, knowledge, health, achievement, 
enjoyment, and so on.  According to such theories, the attainment of these 
goods constitutes our well-being.  Yet, despite the fact that these kinds of 
goods tend to be good for us, we can still imagine certain individuals who do 
not benefit from such goods.  For this reason, objective list theories tend to 
consist in only a few, very broad objective goods.  The problem with this 
strategy, however, is that we can imagine certain individuals who benefit from 
certain goods that are not on the list.  An objective list theory must find an 
intuitive balance between these two strategies – something that is yet to have 
been achieved.   
Of course, much more can be said about the merits of each of these three 
kinds of theories, and there are additional theories of well-being that do not fit 
into this traditional tripartite classification.  The aim of this brief overview was 
merely to show that none of the current main theories of well-being are 
widely-accepted.  I will consider in further detail in chapter two, whether any 
current theory of well-being is widely-acceptable.  For now, it is enough to 
show that there is widespread disagreement amongst philosophers of well-
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being – this level of disagreement is nicely illustrated by Simon Keller as 
follows: 
“Intuitions about welfare are firm, but neither consistent nor widely held. If 
your theory of welfare implies that writing a great novel or having a successful 
marriage makes you better off, just in itself, then you can expect someone to 
complain that the theory is obviously ridiculous. (How could it make you better 
off regardless of whether you value or want it?) If your theory does not imply 
that writing a great novel or having a successful marriage in itself advances 
your welfare, then you can expect to hear that that is obviously 
counterintuitive. (Is it not obvious that a life with such things goes better than 
one without them?) Some think it obviously possible to live a good life on the 
experience machine – you just need to want to be on it and know that you are 
on it; and some think it obvious that no life on the experience machine is 
worth living. It is depressing.” (Keller, 2010: 663)   
This level of disagreement motivates the need for an understanding of well-
being that is consistent with most substantive theories of well-being.  In the 
next section, I will briefly outline the theory-neutral account, which I believe 
can provide us with such an understanding.     
1.5.2  The theory-neutral account of well-being  
I will discuss the theory-neutral account at length in chapter two.  For now, it 
will help to briefly outline how it is that the account can provide us with a 
broadly informative understanding of well-being that is consistent with most 
substantive theories of well-being.   
To begin with, we can note that we already know the kinds of things that are 
good for people, even if we don’t know whether or not these things constitute 
people’s well-being.  As Dan Hausman writes: “We need to know something 
about what is good for people…but it does not follow that we need a 
philosophical theory of well-being for this purpose…Platitudes concerning 
what makes people better or worse off like the claims that enjoyment 
contributes towards well-being and illness diminishes it depend on no 
philosophical theory that specifies what things are intrinsically good for people 
and why.” (Hausman 2012: p.7)  
I believe that Hausman is correct in noting that platitudes about well-being are 
broadly informative.  The understanding of well-being that platitudes provide 
us with, however, quickly run into trouble when such platitudes come into 
conflict with each other.  Suppose, for example, that we all agree that material 
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wealth and enjoyment tend to be good for us.  Things start to get complicated 
when we have to evaluate the well-being of two people who are equal in all 
respects, except one has a greater level of material wealth and the other has 
a greater level of enjoyment.  Who is better off?  Without a substantive theory 
of well-being to fall back on, relying on platitudes about well-being does not 
enable us to answer such questions.         
Fortunately, I think there is the potential for a more sophisticated 
understanding of well-being, which remains consistent with most substantive 
theories.  This understanding remains neutral over whether the object of any 
particular platitude about well-being is constitutively or causally related to well-
being.  To continue the example, material wealth may either constitute well-
being or cause well-being; enjoyment may either be caused by well-being or 
constitute well-being.  For the objects of both well-being platitudes, it seems 
as if we can say that they tend to correlate with well-being, even if we cannot 
be sure whether they are constitutively or causally related to well-being.    
We can say this because the objects of different platitudes about well-being 
tend to be causally connected with each other.  This is the key point of the 
theory-neutral account.  It is because of these causal connections that we can 
remain neutral over whether the object of a particular well-being platitude is 
either constitutively or causally related to well-being.  I will call the objects of 
platitudes about well-being that are causally connected with each other in this 
way “well-being ingredients.”  Well-being ingredients are causally connected 
with each other in such a way that we don’t need to know whether any 
particular well-being ingredient constitutes well-being or not.  Returning to the 
example of material wealth and enjoyment, even if material wealth does not 
constitute well-being, it is likely to be causally related to something that does.  
The same goes for enjoyment.  As Michael Bishop points out, we do not need 
to know which well-being ingredients constitute well-being because, “the world 
has already joined them together with causal bonds.” (Bishop, MS: p.1).  
Thus, we can say that both well-being ingredients will tend to be correlated 
with well-being, while remaining neutral over whether either constitutes well-
being.   
I will discuss the theory-neutral account at length in chapter two.  For now, in 
the next section, I will illustrate how we might apply the theory-neutral account 
to the three main kinds of measures of well-being.     
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1.5.3  The theory-neutral account and different measures of well-
being 
How do researchers currently measure well-being?  In the main, measures of 
well-being can be divided into three categories: measures of (a) preference-
satisfaction, (b) capabilities and functionings, and (c) subjective well-being 
(Angner, 2008).  I will very briefly review each kind of measure in turn.   
Let us consider measures of preference-satisfaction, first.  These measures 
aim to measure how well an individual is doing through measuring the 
satisfaction of his or her preferences.  Researchers typically discover people’s 
preferences either by asking them or observing their behaviour.  Stated-
preference measures typically consist in asking subjects how much they are 
willing to pay for a particular good or service.  If a subject is willing to pay 
more for one good than another good, it is assumed that she prefers the 
former good to the latter one.  If the subject attains the preferred good, it is 
assumed that her preference is satisfied.  In contrast to stated-preference 
measures, revealed-preference measures typically consist in observing 
subjects’ consumer behaviour.  If a subject chooses to pay a certain amount 
of money for a particular good or service, it is assumed that she prefers that 
good to other goods that cost the same or less amount of money.  It is also 
assumed that consuming the preferred good satisfies the subject’s 
preference.  In general, a subject’s level of wealth and access to preferable 
non-market goods is taken to be a rough proxy for her level of preference-
satisfaction.       
Now let us consider measures of capabilities and functionings.  The measures 
aim to measure how well an individual is doing through measuring certain 
things that they do or be (i.e., her functionings) and their abilities to do and be 
certain things (i.e., her capabilities). Examples of functionings include being 
secure, nourished, socially connected, having a job, raising a family, having 
self-respect, being happy, and so on.  Capabilities consist in people’s abilities 
to achieve these things.  Researchers typically measure a similar list of 
central capabilities, such as the ability to live a life of normal length, have 
good health, have bodily integrity, have attachments to things and people 
outside ourselves, form a conception of the good, and participate effectively in 
political choices (Nussbaum 2001).  These capabilities are either measured 
subjectivity or objectively.  Subjective measures typically consist in asking 
people about their level of each capability on a set-point scale.  In contrast, 
objective measures tend to measure the material conditions related to each 
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capability, such as measuring a person’s ability to live a life of normal length 
through measuring their life expectancy.    
Lastly, let us consider measures of subjective well-being.  These measures 
aim to measure how well an individual is doing through measuring how well 
they are doing from their own point of view.  This typically includes measures 
of a subject’s (affective and cognitive) evaluations of their own well-being.27  
Researchers measure a person’s subjective well-being in three kinds of ways.  
Measures of affect balance aim to measure a subject’s overall balance of 
positive over negative affective experiences (Kahneman & Krueger 2006; 
Fredrickson & Losada 2005).  Measures of life and domain satisfaction aim to 
measure a subject’s satisfaction with their overall life and particular life 
domains respectively (Diener et al. 1985; Diener et al. 1999).  Measures of 
well-functioning (often referred to as measures of psychological or eudaimonic 
well-being) aim to measure a subject’s attitudes towards particularly important 
aspects of her functioning, such as her sense of growth, purpose, self-
acceptance, mastery, etc. (Keyes et al. 2002; Ryan & Deci 2001).  Typically, 
these different kinds of attitudes are measured using self-reported surveys, 
whereby subjects are asked to report their level of positive and negative 
affect, life or domain satisfaction or specific aspects of well-functioning.   
We now have an idea of the three main kinds of measures of well-being.  I 
think it is clear that each kind of measure nicely maps onto the three main 
substantive theories of well-being reviewed above.  Measures of preference-
satisfaction relate to desire-satisfaction theories of well-being.28  Measures of 
capabilities and functionings relate to objective-list theories of well-being.29  
                                            
27 In addition, researchers may aim to measure certain mental states that can be viewed as 
non-evaluative, such as chronic pleasures and pains.  Such mental states may not 
consist in their subject having some kind of evaluative attitude towards their own well-
being.  Nonetheless, I think we can make the general claim that measures of subjective 
well-being aim to measure a subject’s (affective and cognitive) evaluations of their own 
well-being. 
28 Whereas desires can be aimed at a single good or state of affairs, preferences are 
rankings over alternative bundles of goods or states of affairs.  Thus, satisfying 
preferences often entails the satisfaction of particular desires. 
29 For instance, Martha Nussbaum’s list of central capabilities is based on a normative 
conception of human nature and the capacities that are objectively good for people  
(Nussbaum 1987).  Indeed, measures of capabilities and functionings partly developed 
out of critiques of preference-satisfaction measures.  Proponents of the capability 
approach note that people can often desire things that are not in their interests (Sen 
1999; Nussbaum 2001).  This mirrors the debate between desire-satisfaction and 
objective-list theories of well-being briefly discussed above. 
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And measures of subjective well-being relate to mental state theories of well-
being.30  Due to the controversial nature of each of the three main substantive 
theories of well-being, one might conclude that there will tend to be 
widespread disagreement over the justification of each of the main kinds of 
measures of well-being.   
This need not be the case, however.  After all, empirical researchers continue 
to measure well-being and discover interesting findings without having 
resolved the debate over the nature of well-being.  The theory-neutral account 
can explain why this practice is justified.   
On the basis of the three main kinds of measures of well-being, we can 
develop a version of the theory-neutral account that consists in three main 
well-being ingredients, namely our: 
• actual prudential achievements 
• opportunities for prudential achievements   
• awareness of prudential achievements 
Each of the main kinds of measures of well-being corresponds to one or more 
of these three well-being ingredients.  Measures of subjective well-being are 
measures of our awareness of certain prudential achievements (i.e. the 
objects of our subjective well-being).  We may be happy with our relationship, 
for example, or satisfied with our career success.  Measures of preference-
satisfaction are measures of our certain prudential achievements (i.e. our 
preferred prudential achievements).  When we act to promote our well-being 
we will generally aim to satisfy our preferences.  Similar to such measures, 
measures of functionings are measures of certain prudential achievements; 
though these need not be our preferred prudential achievements.  Lastly, 
measures of capabilities are measures of certain opportunities for prudential 
achievements.  We may have the capacities and opportunities to maintain our 
relationships, achieve success in our career, satisfy our preferences, be well-
nourished, have self-respect, and so on.     
                                            
30 Indeed, subjective well-being researchers often talk about how they are aiming to “directly” 
measure well-being, in contrast to supposedly less direct measures, such as measures 
of preferences satisfaction or capabilities and functionings (Angner 2010).  This kind of 
claim seems to presuppose that well-being is constituted by subjective well-being, which 
is a particular version of a mental state theory.  In other instances, subjective well-being 
researchers explicitly assume a mental state theory of well-being: As Ed Diener and 
Eunkook Suh write: “Subjective well-being research [...] is concerned with individuals’ 
subjective experiences of their lives. The underlying assumption is that well-being can be 
defined by people’s conscious experiences – in terms of hedonic feelings or cognitive 
satisfactions” (Diener & Suh 1997: p.191). 
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These three main well-being ingredients are causally connected to each other 
in such away that we can remain neutral over which well-being ingredient(s) in 
fact constitute well-being.  We are unlikely to have one of these well-being 
ingredients without the others. Opportunities for prudential achievements, 
awareness of prudential achievements and actual prudential achievements 
are causally connected in such a way that, whichever one of these ingredients 
constitutes well-being, the other ingredients are either caused by or cause 
well-being.     
This is perhaps best seen by the fact that each well-being ingredient plays an 
important causal part in our prudential decision-making process.  First, we 
need opportunities to attain certain prudential achievements.  Second, with 
the help of such opportunities, we may in fact have certain prudential 
achievements.  Third, upon attaining certain prudential achievements, we may 
become aware of such achievements. These causal connections are 
illustrated as follows:  
Fig. 1.3 
 
Note that it is only in exceptional cases that these three main well-being 
ingredients do not tend to be causally connected in this way (e.g. in cases of 
blissful ignorance or consistent good luck).  This is why the three main kinds 
of measures of well-being will tend to be justified – in general, the things 
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measured by each kind of measure will tend to be causally connected to the 
things measured by the other kinds of measures.    
Indeed, different measures of well-being may be more or less relevant 
depending on the practical context in which well-being is measured.  In certain 
contexts the causal connections between ingredients may break down or at 
least weaken.  For example, within the context of childcare, a child’s 
opportunities for prudential achievements may be more relevant than their 
awareness of prudential achievements.  A child’s opportunities for prudential 
achievements will have a much greater causal influence on their future well-
being.  Conversely, within the context of elderly care, an elderly person’s 
awareness of prudential achievements may be more important than their 
opportunities for prudential achievements.  An elderly person’s opportunities 
for prudential achievements may have a much weaker causal impact on their 
future well-being.  I believe that variation in the causal connections between 
well-being ingredients accounts for one of the most notable features of the 
measurement of well-being, namely that there is a considerable amount of 
variation between measures used in different contexts (Alexandrova 2013).  I 
think it is because the causal connections between well-being ingredients are 
weaker or stronger in certain contexts that empirical researchers tend to use 
different measures of well-being (e.g. measures of child well-being, subjective 
well-being, physical well-being, etc.) depending on the context in question.       
In sum, I have outlined a theory-neutral account of well-being that is 
consistent with most substantive theories of well-being and different kinds of 
measures of well-being.   The theory-neutral account does not consist in a 
view of the constituents of well-being – such a view would be overly 
controversial.  Rather, it consists in a number of well-being ingredients – the 
objects of platitudes about well-being that tend to be causally connected with 
the objects of other well-being platitudes.  According to the theory-neutral 
account, each well-being ingredient tends to be either constitutively or 
causally related to well-being.  This provides us with a theory-neutral 
understanding of the things that tend to be correlated with well-being.31      
 
                                            
31 It is worth noting that the theory-neutral account is not entirely agnostic over substantive 
theories of well-being.  The account may be inconsistent with some substantive theories, 
such as prudential hedonism.  This, however, is a big issue, and one that I shall leave to 
chapter two. 
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1.6  Happiness: Conception(s)  
In the final main section of this chapter, I will look at different conceptions of 
(psychological) happiness.  Again, for the purpose of this thesis, the following 
analysis of happiness will be much more straightforward than the previous 
analysis of well-being.  This is because I am concerned with the measurement 
of well-being.  In the first main section of this chapter, I showed that 
happiness tends to be used as a formal proxy for well-being in the 
measurement of well-being, and claimed that this is our primary line of 
evidence that suggests happiness tends to be strongly correlated with well-
being.  Although empirical researchers refer to a number of different 
constructs as “happiness”, each of the conceptions of happiness used by 
such researchers is quite clear.  One of the broad, relatively long-term 
psychological conditions that social scientists refer to as “happiness” is a 
person’s affective state.  This is the conception of happiness that I will be 
concerned with in this thesis.       
As with the analysis of the concept(s) of happiness, one may doubt that this 
conception of happiness used by empirical researchers matches up with the 
conception of happiness used by laypersons in their practical lives.  This is 
important insofar as one doubts that the study of happiness provides us with 
sufficient evidence that happiness and well-being may tend to be strongly 
correlated.  In this section, therefore, I will briefly consider a number of 
different conceptions of happiness that may be used by laypersons in their 
practical lives.  I will suggest that social scientists and the folk do tend to use 
the same conception of happiness – the conception that refers to a person’s 
affective state.  This conception of happiness can adequately account for the 
fact that happiness tends to be used as both a formal and informal proxy for 
well-being.   
1.6.1  Different conceptions of psychological happiness  
In the philosophical literature, there are four main accounts of psychological 
happiness, namely (a) hedonism, (b) life satisfaction theories, (c) affective 
state views, and (d) hybrid theories (Brülde 2007).  I will briefly outline each of 
these candidates in turn before arguing in favour of a particular version of the 
affective state theory.   
Hedonism is the view that happiness consists in one’s balance of pleasure 
over displeasure (Feldman, 2010), or enjoyment over suffering (Crisp 2006a).  
Theories of hedonism differ in numerous ways.  For instance, theories differ 
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over their view on the nature of pleasure.  Hedonism Internalism consists in 
the view that pleasure is a distinct feeling or sensation (Crisp, 2006).  In 
contrast, Hedonism Externalism consists in the view that pleasure is a distinct 
pro-attitude towards one’s experience (Feldman, 2006).  Hedonistic theories 
also differ over how one’s balance of pleasure over displeasure is calculated.  
Following Bentham, some hedonists aggregate pleasures in accordance with 
the duration and intensity of each pleasure (Feldman, 2010).  However, 
following Mill, other hedonists aggregate pleasures in accordance with 
additional qualities, such as the complexity and depth, as well as the duration 
and intensity, of each pleasure (Crisp, 2006).  In general, hedonism is largely 
discredited as a theory of well-being but continues to be widely accepted as a 
theory of happiness (Feldman 2010; Morris 2011). 
Life satisfaction theories consist in the view that happiness is constituted by 
one’s judgements of overall life satisfaction.  Theories of life satisfaction differ 
over the particular kind of judgment involved.  For instance, some theorists 
hold that judgments of life satisfaction concern one’s whole life, including 
one’s past, present and (likely) future (Tatarkiewicz 1976; Telfer 1980).  Other 
theorists hold that judgments of life satisfaction concern only some important 
aspect of one’s life (Sumner 1996; Tiberius 2008).  In general, however, 
judgments of life satisfaction involve a global attitude towards one’s life.  Such 
attitudes consist in the assessment of how one is doing with regards to the 
things that one cares about.    
Affective state views emphasise the importance of one’s emotional condition 
in contrast to merely having a favourable balance of pleasant over unpleasant 
experiences (Haybron 2001; Sizer 2010).  Such views differ in respect to the 
kinds of emotional states that constitute happiness, often with an emphasis 
put on moods, or mood-constituting affective states (Haybron 2005; Sizer 
2010).  According to such accounts, a person’s level of happiness is 
determined by the extent to which their emotional state, or mood state, is a 
positive one.  Some accounts further emphasise the importance of one’s 
disposition, or relatively long-term propensity, to have an overall positive 
emotional state (Haybron, 2005).  The general idea is that happiness 
concerns the way in which one emotionally experiences the world.  This 
includes how one typically feels, but also includes how one tends to think and 
act in accordance with one’s perceptions and judgments of how well one’s life 
is going.   
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Affective state views attempt to accommodate the main features of hedonism 
and life satisfaction theories.  Like hedonism, affective state views emphasise 
one’s affective experiences.  Like life satisfaction theories, affective state 
views emphasise the relationship between psychological happiness and the 
things that we care about.  In contrast to this approach, the remaining theory 
of happiness that I will consider – the hybrid view – explicitly combines both 
hedonism and life satisfaction theories (Haybron 2011a).   
Hybrid views consist in the view that happiness is constituted by both affect 
balance and life satisfaction.  Such accounts may also include feelings of well-
functioning, e.g., a sense of relatedness, purpose, growth, mastery, and so 
on.  According to hybrid theories, a person’s level of happiness is determined 
by the combined weighted contribution of their affect balance, life satisfaction 
and well-functioning respectively.  These three constructs are often combined 
to form the construct of subjective well-being outlined above.        
1.6.2  An affective state account of happiness 
In this section I will defend an affective state view of happiness.  The affective 
state account is simply the view that our happiness is constituted by our 
affective state.  Individual affective states are mental states that (a) are 
representational, (b) represent things as being good/bad, and (c) include non-
conscious states.  I will consider each of these features in turn, before 
considering the plausibility of a particular version of this view.   
What are affective states? 
Firstly, affective states are representational mental states.  That is, our 
affective states represent certain kinds of state of affairs.  For example, when 
we fear a dog we represent it as being dangerous.  Almost all theories of 
affect hold that affective states represent certain things in this way.  Indeed, 
one of the major criticisms against “feeling theories” of affect – which maintain 
that affective states are simply constituted by certain feelings – is that such 
views cannot accommodate the fact that affective states represent certain 
kinds of states of affairs (Prinz 2004a; Whiting 2011; Kriegel 2011).  Now, 
feeling theories have well-known responses to this criticism, but almost all of 
these responses consist in explaining how feelings can also be 
representational mental states.  For instance, Prinz (2004a) argues that the 
bodily responses that constitute emotional feelings can represent “organism-
environment relations”.  Alternatively, Kriegel (2011) argues that emotion 
feelings involve a kind of phenomenal intentionality; they are “feelings-
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towards” an object (Goldie 2002).32 Both responses argue in favour of the 
representational nature of affect.   
The representational nature of affective states entails that such states can be 
evaluated with regard to their epistemic correctness.  When I feel fear, an 
aspect of my environment strikes me as threatening, and either that portion of 
the world really is threatening, in which case my fear is epistemically 
adequate, or it only seems threatening to me; in the latter case, my fear 
contains a misconception of reality, a cognitive error.  Note that this does not 
entail that affective states are nothing but cognitive states i.e., beliefs or 
judgements.  So-called cognitivist views of affect may not be able to account 
for the hedonic character of affective states, or the fact that affective states 
often persist even though the person knows better (e.g. my fear can persist 
even after I have recognized that the object of my fear is not dangerous).  I 
will not debate the merits of cognitivist and non-cognitivist theories of affect 
here.  The point is that all plausible views of affect maintain that affective 
states are representational states, which can either fail or succeed at 
representing certain kinds of states of affairs.  I will assume, for now, that 
affective states generally succeed in accurately representing their objects, 
though I will discuss this issue in detail in chapter three.   
What do affective states represent?  Affective states have two 
representational components; affective states represent (a) certain states of 
affairs, and (b) those states of affairs as being (pro tanto) good or bad.  Thus, 
affective states are evaluative states.  An episode of satisfaction, for example, 
involves representing the achievement of a goal, and that the achievement is 
good.  Similarly, an episode of attachment involves representing a connection 
with another, and that the connection is good.  In contrast, an episode of fear 
involves representing danger, and that such danger is bad.  Likewise, an 
episode of sadness involves representing an irreparable loss, and that such 
loss is bad.  The kinds of states of affairs represented as being good or bad 
by our affective states vary considerably in virtue of their breadth.  As an 
example of a very broad affective state, we may feel a general anxiety 
towards our lives, representing our lives as generally being under threat.  In 
contrast, we may feel an itch towards a specific part of our body, representing 
a particular disruption of the skin.  Both states of affairs are represented as 
                                            
32 See also Doring (2007), on affective perceptions, Roberts (2003) on concern-based 
construals and Helm (2009) on felt evaluations. 
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being bad, yet the represented states of affairs vary considerable with regards 
to their level of generality.     
Interestingly, these two representational components of affective states can 
sometimes come apart (Shriver 2014).  For instance, people given morphine 
will often report that they still feel pain but that it no longer feels bad.  
Similarly, lesions to particular brain regions have been shown to diminish the 
unpleasantness of felt pain – again, patients say that they still feel pain but 
that it “is no longer bothersome.”  A particular instance of this is the condition 
known as pain asymbolia, where people report feeling pain but show no 
aversive reaction to painful stimuli.  One way of interpreting such findings is 
that people’s affective states still consist in a representation of a certain state 
of affairs (e.g. a particular bodily dysfunction) but no longer represent that 
state of affairs as being bad (e.g. as something to avoid or prevent).            
The final feature of affective states worth mentioning is that affective states 
can unconsciously represent things as being good or bad.  We can view our 
affective states as a constant monitor of how well we are doing with regards to 
our objectives, goals and projects (Railton 2008).  It is possible that a large 
amount of this monitoring takes place on a non-conscious level (Winkielman & 
Berridge 2004).  This is not to say that affective states are not often conscious 
experiences.  It also does not rule out the possibility that all affective states 
are accessible to consciousness.  The point is merely that affective states are 
wide-ranging phenomena, which constantly represent the evaluative status of 
perceived events, situations, actions, thoughts, etc.  It is reasonable to 
presume that a large amount of this activity takes place beyond a person’s 
level of conscious awareness (Chen & Bargh 1999).          
Towards an affective state account of happiness 
Now that we have an understanding of the nature of affect, we are in a 
position to see what the affective state account of happiness consists in.  
Firstly, according to the version of the account that I will consider in this 
thesis, happiness is a broad psychological condition.  That is, it consists in a 
wide range of affective states, including emotions, moods, pains and 
pleasures.  At any given point in time, a person’s affective state will consist in 
a range of positive and negative affect states; some of these may be 
consciously felt affective experiences, others may be unconscious.  For 
example, at a certain point in time, we may be feeling angry about a particular 
insult, but also satisfied with our response to the insult.  At the same time, we 
may be excited about our evening plans while feeling a bit anxious about 
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running late.  Underlying these conscious or sub-feelings may be states of 
fatigue or irritability, and perhaps further anxiety caused by the combination of 
low energy, the insult and running late.  Together, these affective states (and 
perhaps several more) make up our affective state during this point in time.   
The second feature of this version of the affective state view is that happiness 
is a relatively long-term psychological condition.  As mentioned above, if a 
depressed person has a day in which they predominantly experience positive 
affective states, this does not mean they are happy.  Happiness is constituted 
by our affective state over a relatively long period of time.  I suggest that the 
extent to which happiness is a long-term condition is determined by how 
efficient it is to treat happiness as such when using it as a proxy for well-
being.  In the short-term, our affective state is not an efficient proxy for how 
well we are doing, as the example of the momentarily cheery depressed 
person shows.  However, in the long-term, our affective state may also not be 
an efficient proxy for well-being.  In order to evaluate how well we are doing, 
we do not want to have to consider how we’ve been feeling for the past few 
years (though, in certain contexts, this may make sense, e.g. how well we are 
doing since we moved house a year ago, or changed job, had children, and 
so on).  In general, it may be efficient to view happiness as our affective state 
over a relatively long (but not too long) period of time.       
Putting these two features of the affective state view together, a person’s level 
of happiness consists in their affective state over a relatively long period of 
time.  If our positive affective states outweigh our negative affective states 
(over that period of time) then we have a positive affective state.  Conversely, 
if our negative affective states outweigh our positive affective states then we 
have a negative affective state.  A person’s level of happiness is determined 
by the extent to which their affective state is either positive or negative.33   
                                            
33 This affective state view may resemble hedonism more than it resembles other affective 
state accounts of happiness, such as Haybron’s emotional state account (Haybron, 
2008).  Haybron distinguishes between central and peripheral affective states, arguing 
that only the former constitutes happiness.  In addition, he argues that a person’s 
relatively long-term propensity to experience central affective states may constitute 
happiness.  In response, to the distinction between central and peripheral affective 
states, I believe that Morris (2011) is correct in claiming that this distinction breaks down 
upon further investigation.  I also side with Feldman’s (2010) critique of a person’s 
affective dispositions partly constituting happiness.  The result is that I believe the best 
formulation of Haybron’s emotional state account is effectively the affective state view 
outlined in this section.   
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It is worth noting how two different kinds of affective states – emotions and 
moods – fit into this picture.  I will consider the difference between emotions 
and moods in more detail in chapter five.  For now, I will simply clarify that 
both kinds (indeed, all kinds) of affective states constitute happiness, 
conceived of as a person’s affective state over a relatively long period of time.  
Yet, we should expect that emotions, in contrast to moods, tend to dominate 
our affective state.  This is because emotions tend to be fast-responding, fast-
dissipating affective states needed for moment-to-moment fine-grained action 
guidance (Railton, 2008).  In contrast, moods set the tone for our life.  As 
Laura Sizer puts it: “[mood] is more subtle [than emotion], acting as 
background to our ongoing activities.  [It] has more to do with the way one 
approaches life as a whole than with reactions to particular objects or events.” 
(Sizer, 2010: 147) The result is that moods respond to general changes in our 
circumstances, in contrast to emotions, which occur at a frequent rate to meet 
our current needs of the moment.  Moods may influence our general outlook 
on life, but emotions will primarily constitute our affective state.34   
Assessing the account  
According to this version of the affective state account, a person’s level of 
happiness consists in their affective state over a relatively long period of time.  
This is one of the main constructs of happiness used by empirical researchers 
in the measurement of well-being.  As mentioned above, social scientists aim 
to measure well-being through measuring happiness, whereby happiness is 
often (though not always35) defined as a subject’s affective state, or “affect 
balance.”  For instance, in a major review of the benefits of happiness, Sonia 
Lyubomirsky et al., refer to happiness as a person’s balance of positive over 
negative affective states (Lyubomirsky et al. 2005).  In addition, Daniel 
Kahneman’s construct of “Objective Happiness” consists in a subject’s 
affective state as measured by either real-time self-reports or physiological 
and neurological responses (Kahneman 1999; Davidson 2004).  The fact that 
                                            
34 It is also worth noting that moods and emotions will tend to interact in the following two 
ways: (a) moods dispose us to experience mood-congruent emotions, and (b) repeated 
or intense emotions can contribute to the onset of a mood (Sizer, 2010; Prinz, 2004).  
35 Empirical researchers sometimes define happiness as a subject’s life satisfaction.  At 
other times, the term “happiness” is used to refer to a subject’s subjective well-being, 
consisting of their affect balance, life satisfaction, and maybe also their feelings of well-
functioning. 
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happiness tends to be used as a formal proxy for well-being in this way is 
evidence that happiness may be strongly correlated with well-being.  
In addition, I believe that this version of the affective state theory adequately 
accounts for the way in which laypersons tend to use happiness as an 
informal proxy for well-being.  Firstly of all, the account fits with many of our 
intuitions over happiness.  It adequately accounts for what Haybron (2005) 
claims are the paradigmatic cases of happiness/unhappiness.  On the positive 
side, Haybron lists feeling elated, carefree, contented, at peace and delighted 
with one’s life.  On the negative side, Haybron lists feeling worried, lonely, 
empty, low, worthless and deeply dissatisfied with life.  These are all affective 
states.   
More importantly, however, is that our affective state may tend to be strongly 
correlated with our well-being in the following two ways.  First, as mentioned 
above, affective states represent aspects of our lives that are good or bad.  
We tend to feel sad when we are separated from loved ones, satisfied when 
we achieve a goal, proud when we live up to our values, and so on.  Thus, 
when our lives are going well, we can assume that we will experience a range 
of positive affective states.  Conversely, when our lives are going badly, we 
are likely to feel consistently bad.  In chapters three and four, I will discuss the 
thesis that affective states tend to indicate well-being.  For now, it is enough to 
note that our affective state may tend to indicate how well our life is going.   
Second, affective states have far-reaching consequences for a person’s state 
of mind and behaviour – they have what Haybron calls causal depth 
(Haybron, 2003).  Affective states cause us to attend, think and act in certain 
ways.  This is because our affective states motivate us to think and act in 
response to the good or bad things that they represent.  We are motivated to 
avoid or prevent the things that we represent as being bad, and are motivated 
to sustain or seek out the things that we represent as being good.  These 
attentive, cognitive and motivational features of affective states can have 
profound effects.  Consider the difference between an overwhelmingly 
negative affective state and its opposite.  As Haybron notes: “Depression 
strips pleasure from life, diminishing our functioning in myriad respects, and 
makes our projects, plans and relationships go worse; Severe anxiety 
similarly undermines our well-being in many ways.” (Haybron, forthcoming: 
p.11) In contrast, an overwhelmingly positive affective state tends to have the 
opposite effects.  
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Lastly, the affective state view defended here adequately accounts for the 
efficiency with which we use happy as an informal proxy for well-being in our 
practical lives (Haybron, 2003).  People have limited cognitive resources and 
information.  Yet, they still need to assess various aspects of their lives, such 
as how well they have been doing recently, the benefits of a particular 
decision, and so on.  Referring to our affective states is an efficient way of 
determining how well we are doing.  Rather than gathering a large amount of 
data and performing complicated equations to determine how well we are 
doing, we can simply recall how we have been feeling recently.  It is 
presumably for this reason that subjective well-being researchers aim to 
measure well-being through measuring people’s affective state – because it is 
something that we tend to do already in our practical lives.    
Again, as mentioned in the main section above on the concept(s) of 
happiness, it may turn out that this account of happiness is incorrect.  If so, I 
am happy to drop the term “happiness” and simply talk about a person’s 
affective state.  Not much rests on the term.  The phenomenon in question is 
our affective state, which we tend to use as a proxy for well-being.  If our 
affective state does not turn out to be worthy of the term “happiness” then this 
thesis can be viewed as investigation into how successfully we can measure 
well-being through measuring our affective state.   
In sum, I have suggested that social scientists and the folk do tend to use the 
same conception of (psychological) happiness – the conception that refers to 
a person’s affective state.  I believe that this conception of happiness 
adequately accounts for the fact that happiness tends to be used as both a 
formal and informal proxy for well-being.   
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that we have good reason to suppose that there 
tends to be a strong correlation between happiness and well-being.  This 
potential correlation provides us with reason to investigate how successfully 
we can measure well-being through measuring happiness.   
I have clarified the concepts and conceptions of well-being and happiness that 
I will be using throughout this thesis.  I have argued that a person’s well-being 
is how well that person’s life is going for them, and that this notion is distinct 
from both a happy life and a good life.  Rather than arguing in favour of any 
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particular (controversial) substantive theory of well-being, I outlined a theory-
neutral account.  This account provides us with a broadly informative 
understanding of well-being that is consistent with most substantive theories 
of well-being.       
With regards to happiness, I am interested in the broad, relatively long-term 
psychological condition that empirical researchers often use as a formal proxy 
for well-being.  In particular, I am interested in the psychological condition 
constituted by a person’s affective state.  I have argued that this concept and 
conception of happiness adequately accounts for the way in which laypersons 
tend to use happiness as an informal proxy for well-being.  We have sufficient 
evidence, therefore, to suppose that happiness (conceived of as one’s 
affective state) tends to be strongly correlated with well-being.     
 55 
Chapter 2 
The Relationship Between Happiness and Well-being 
 
Abstract 
In this chapter, I will consider how we can further investigate the correlation 
between happiness and well-being.  I will argue that we can do so without a 
substantive theory of well-being.  I will develop the theory-neutral account of 
well-being outlined in chapter one.  The theory-neutral account provides us 
with an understanding of well-being that is consistent with most substantive 
theories of well-being.        
In the first section of the chapter, I will show why we need an understanding of 
well-being that is consistent with most theories of well-being.  The reason is 
that there are no widely acceptable substantive theories of well-being.  I will 
show that we need a widely acceptable account of well-being in order to 
investigate the correlation between happiness and well-being.  
In the second section of the chapter, I will consider how we can investigate 
the correlation between happiness and well-being without a substantive 
theory of well-being.  I will consider three different kinds of methods for 
developing a theory-neutral understanding of well-being.  I will argue that only 
one method results in an understanding of well-being that is both consistent 
with most substantive theories of well-being and broadly informative.  I will 
use this theory-neutral account in the remainder of the thesis to investigate 
how successfully we can measure well-being through measuring happiness.   
In the third section of the chapter, I will consider a particularly influential 
substantive theory that is not consistent with the theory-neutral account, 
namely prudential hedonism.  Prudential hedonism maintains that happiness 
correlates with well-being to a greater extent than the theory-neutral account.  
I will argue that such a substantive theory is implausible.  In the fourth section 
of the chapter, I will use a similar argument to claim that the opposite kind of 
substantive theory – one that maintains happiness correlates with well-being 
to a lesser extent than the theory-neutral account – is also implausible.  The 
upshot is that the theory-neutral account is consistent with all plausible 
substantive theories of well-being. 
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2.1  Introduction 
Perhaps the most straightforward way of investigating how successfully we 
can measure well-being through measuring happiness would be to do the 
following: (a) provide an account of what happiness is, (b) provide an account 
of what well-being is, (c) show how the two things are related, and (d) assess 
the implications of this relationship for the measurement of happiness.  In 
chapter one, I covered step (a).  First of all, I argued that happiness refers to a 
(broad, relatively long-term) positive psychological condition that empirical 
researchers and laypersons tend to use as a proxy for well-being.  I then 
argued that this psychological condition could plausibly be viewed as a 
person’s affective state.  This thesis, therefore, can be viewed as an 
investigation into how successfully we can measure well-being through 
measuring a person’s affective state.  
Unfortunately, however, covering step (b) is less straightforward.  This is 
because the nature of well-being is controversial.  There are no widely 
accepted substantive theories of well-being in the philosophical literature.  
Although well-being theorists agree on the things that tend to cause well-
being (such as intimate relationships, friendships, professional and academic 
success, etc.) such theorists disagree over the constituents of well-being.     
In this chapter, therefore, I will aim to provide an adequate understanding of 
well-being while saying as little as possible about what well-being consists in.  
I will do this by further outlining the theory-neutral account of well-being 
introduced in chapter one.    
2.2  Substantive theories of well-being 
In this section, I will provide a brief overview of substantive theories of well-
being to give an idea of the disagreement that pervades the philosophical 
literature.  I will classify theories of well-being on the basis of two widespread 
disagreements in particular, namely disagreements over the existence of the 
experience requirement and the pro-attitude requirement.  I will then consider 
the implications of such widespread disagreement.  
2.2.1  A brief overview of substantive theories of well-being 
There are two different kinds of philosophical theories of well-being, namely 
enumerative and explanatory theories of well-being (Crisp 2006b; Woodard 
2013; Taylor 2012; Fletcher 2013).  Enumerative theories attempt to answer 
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the following question: what are the constituents of (a person’s) well-being?  
In contrast, explanatory theories attempt to answer the following question: in 
virtue of what is any given item supposed to be a constituent of (a person’s) 
well-being?  For example, an enumerative theory might hold that pleasure is a 
constituent of well-being; a complementary explanatory theory might hold that 
pleasure is a constituent of well-being in virtue of its pleasurableness, or 
because it satisfies a subject’s desires (Woodard, 2013: p.5).   
I will not focus on explanatory theories of well-being in this chapter.  For the 
purposes of measuring well-being we need to have an idea of the constituents 
of well-being.  A complete understanding of well-being would include an 
explanation of why these constituents are good for us.  But such an 
explanation is not necessary for the measurement of well-being.  Instead, I 
will focus solely on enumerative theories of well-being – what well-being 
consists in. 
As mentioned in chapter one, enumerative theories of well-being are largely 
divided by two kinds of disagreements, namely disagreements over the 
experience requirement and the pro-attitude requirement (Woodard, 2013: 
p.8-9).  I will very briefly consider each requirement.   
Consider the experience requirement, first.  Those in favour of the experience 
requirement argue that the only constituent of a subject’s well-being are their 
experiences (Griffin, 1986: 13, 16-19; Scanlon, 1993: 186-187; Sumner, 1996: 
127-128).  According to such theories, if some fact about your life does not 
affect your experience, it cannot affect your well-being. 
There are intuitively strong arguments both in favour of and against the 
experience requirement.  Kagan (1992) makes the following argument in 
favour of accepting the requirement.  Something contributes towards a 
person’s well-being if it is good for that person.  According to Kagan, persons 
are nothing other than a body and mind.  Thus, something can only constitute 
a person’s well-being if makes a difference to their body or mind.  Being 
genuinely successful, for instance, does not benefit the person except insofar 
as it directly impacts them i.e. through their experiences of being successful.   
In response, theorists who reject the experience requirement argue that we 
care about whether we are genuinely successful in such endeavours, not just 
 58 
whether we have certain experiences of success.36  Moreover, we do not 
seem to be mistaken in this respect.  Thought-experiments such as Nozick’s 
experience machine appear to support the idea that actual states of affairs 
may constitute our well-being as well as our experiences (Nozick, 1974).  We 
do not seem to think that a life divorced from reality would be a life of well-
being.      
Now consider the pro-attitude requirement.  Those in favour of the pro-attitude 
requirement argue that the only constituents of a subject’s well-being are the 
satisfactions of some (actual or hypothetical) pro-attitude.  According to such 
theories, if I do not have a certain kind of (actual or hypothetical) pro-attitude 
towards some fact about my life, it cannot affect my well-being.         
As with the experience requirement, there are intuitively strong arguments 
both in favour of and against the pro-attitude requirement.  In favour of 
accepting the requirement, it does not seem that certain goods (such as 
contact with reality, health or long-term relationships) constitute a person’s 
well-being when that person is (actually or hypothetically) averse to those 
goods.  The goods in question may be good in some other respect, such as 
morally or aesthetically good, but it seems objectionably paternalistic to insist 
that they are also good for someone who lacks (or would lack) certain pro-
attitudes towards them.  Alternatively put, it does not seem that we can justify 
the value of such goods to people who do not have certain pro-attitudes 
towards those goods (Tiberius, 2007).   
In response, theorists who reject the pro-attitude requirement argue that 
certain goods constitute people’s well-being regardless of their attitudes 
towards them.  It seems that goods such as achievements, knowledge, virtue, 
etc., are valued because they are good for people, rather than being good for 
people because they are valued (Hausman, 2011).  Moreover, people’s 
attitudes are systematically prone to error or bias.  Desires and values are 
formed with limited information, overly influenced by the present, emotionally 
salient stimuli, and so on (Kahneman 2011).  Appealing to the attitudes that 
people would have with full information or full rational capacities seems to be 
either ad-hoc or incoherent with the intuitions behind endorsing the pro-
attitude requirement (Rosati 1995; Hawkins 2010).           
                                            
36 Of course, the fact that we care about something (e.g. being genuinely successful) does 
not necessarily mean that it is good for us (Baber 2008).  I will discuss this issue in more 
detail below. 
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The experience and pro-attitude requirements divide theorists of well-being 
because of the strong intuitions in favour of both their acceptance and 
rejection (Keller 2009).  It is further worth noting that the acceptance/rejection 
of one requirement does not necessarily entail anything about the 
acceptance/rejection of the other.  One may accept the experience 
requirement yet reject the pro-attitude requirement, or vice versa.  Or one may 
either accept both requirements or reject both requirements.  Any of these 
theories of well-being are possible (though, of course, some may be more 
plausible than others).  In the remainder of this section, I will outline the 
different kinds of theories of well-being possible based on the 
rejection/acceptance of the experience and pro-attitude requirements 
(Woodard, 2013: p.10).   
Firstly, a theory of well-being may accept both the experience requirement 
and the pro-attitude requirement.  Such theories would hold that a subject’s 
well-being is constituted by experiences of states of affairs that he or she has 
certain pro-attitudes towards.  There are several influential theories of well-
being that meet this description.  For instance, Heathwood’s Subjective Desire 
Satisfaction theory of well-being is the view that well-being is constituted by 
pleasure, which Healthwood views as the believing that one’s present desires 
are being satisfied (Heathwood 2006).  Similarly, Feldman’s Attitudinal 
Hedonism theory is the view that well-being is constituted by instances of 
attitudinal pleasure, which Feldman views as a pro-attitude towards some 
state of affairs (Feldman 2002).  Sumner’s Authentic Happiness theory also 
fits into this category (Sumner, 1996).  Sumner views well-being as 
constituted by authentic (i.e. informed and autonomous) attitudes of life 
satisfaction.37    
Secondly, a theory of well-being may accept the experience requirement and 
reject the pro-attitude requirement.  Such theories would view a subject’s well-
being as constituted by certain experiences, but these experience needn’t be 
                                            
37 Of course, this introduces additional requirements into a theory of well-being, namely that 
experiences of states of affairs that one has a pro-attitude towards must also be 
“authentic.”  Sumner states that these additional requirements are a positive feature of 
his account, in that they make up for the problems of mental states theories that reduce 
well-being entirely to experiences.  He claims that, “since [the Authentic Happiness 
theory] incorporates an information requirement (as part of its conditions of authenticity), 
it is a state-of-the-world theory.  That I experience a state of affairs is necessary in order 
for it to benefit me, but (since the experience may be illusory or deceptive) it is not 
sufficient.” (Sumner, 1996: p.175)      
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directed at states of affairs that he or she has certain pro-attitudes towards.  
Classical hedonism is a case in point.  It is the view that well-being is 
constituted by experiences of pleasure, whether a subject cares about the 
objects of pleasure or not (Bradley 2009).  Hedonistic theories can be further 
divided by the kinds or varieties of pleasure that they view as constitutive of 
well-being (Crisp 2006a; Bramble, MS).  Another kind of theory that falls into 
this second category description is Kagan’s Enjoyment of the Good theory 
(Kagan 2009).  Kagan views well-being as constituted by enjoyable 
experiences caused by the attainment of certain objective goods, such as 
achievement, virtue, knowledge, etc.   
Thirdly, a theory of well-being may reject the experience requirement and 
accept the pro-attitude requirement.  Such theories would view a subject’s 
well-being as constituted by states of affairs that he or she has certain pro-
attitudes towards.  These states of affairs need not have an impact on the 
subject’s experiences.38  Perhaps the most standard version of this kind of 
account is the Simple Desire-Satisfaction theory of well-being, which is the 
view that well-being is constituted by the satisfaction of a subject’s desires 
(Murphy 1999; Heathwood 2005).  Other theories maintain that different kinds 
of pro-attitudes (other than desires) matter.  Aim-Achievement theories 
consist in the view that well-being is constituted by the achievements of a 
subject’s goals (Keller 2004; Scanlon 1998; Raz 1988; Portmore 2007).  
Value-Fulfilment theories consist in the view that well-being is constituted by 
the realization of a subject’s values (Raibley 2010; Tiberius 2013a).  Theories 
in this category also differ with regards to additional requirements that they 
may accept or reject.  The Ideal Desire-Satisfaction theory of well-being is the 
view that well-being is constituted by the satisfaction of a subject’s desires 
under certain conditions, such as full information and rationality (Griffin, 1986: 
p.26-34; Brandt 1998; Railton 2003).  Lastly, another kind of theory that falls 
into this third category is the Hybrid Desire-Satisfaction theory of well-being.  
It is the view that well-being is constituted by the attainment of certain 
objective goods (achievement, virtue, knowledge, etc.) that a subject desires 
(Lauinger 2013; Olsaretti 2006).   
Fourthly, a theory of well-being may reject both the experience requirement 
and the pro-attitude requirement.  Such theories would view a subject’s well-
                                            
38 Unless, of course, a subject had a pro-attitude towards having a certain kind of 
experience, such as desiring a pleasurable life.  
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being as constituted by certain states of affairs; he or she needn’t have certain 
pro-attitudes towards them, nor need these states of affairs have an impact on 
the subject’s experiences.39  Objective-List theories (Fletcher 2013; Sarch 
2009; Arneson 2009; Brink 1989: p.231-240) consist in the view that well-
being is constituted by the attainment of certain goods, such as achievement, 
knowledge, virtue, quality relationships, health, etc.  Similarly, Nature-
Fulfilment theories consists in the view that well-being is constituted by the 
exercise of a person’s (cognitive, affective, sensory and social) capacities 
(Haybron 2008a; Kraut 2009; Nussbaum 2001).  Such theories differ in virtue 
of their focus on either individual or species-specific capacities (Haybron, 
MS).  Lastly, another kind of hybrid theory that falls into this fourth category is 
the Disjunctive Hybrid theory of well-being (Woodard, 2012: p.11).  It is the 
view that well-being is constituted by either certain experiences or the 
satisfaction of certain pro-attitudes (or something else, such as the attainment 
of certain goods).  Such theories thereby reject both the experience and pro-
attitude requirement, yet maintain that experiences and the satisfaction of pro-
attitudes are central to well-being (Hawkins, 2010).    
2.2.2  Implications of widespread disagreement  
In the previous section, I provided a brief overview of the kinds of substantive 
theories of well-being that are possible, categorized on the basis of the 
acceptance/rejection of the experience requirement and the pro-attitude 
requirement.  I hope to have shown that there is widespread disagreement 
within the philosophy of well-being literature.  In this section, I will consider the 
implications of such disagreement.   
One might be tempted to conclude, on the basis of widespread disagreement 
over substantive theories of well-being, that there is something dubious about 
the concept of well-being.  Perhaps there is no unified notion of well-being 
that can account for all of the important roles that well-being plays in our 
practical lives.  I considered this possibility in chapter one, and argued that 
there is at least one concept of well-being (what I called the Standard 
Concept) that plays a prominent role in both our self- and other-interested 
practical deliberation and evaluation.  This concept of well-being does not 
necessarily entail the acceptance/rejection of either the experience 
requirement or pro-attitude requirement.  Thus, narrowing our focus to this 
                                            
39 Unless, of course, the kinds of states of affairs that matter include either having certain 
experiences (e.g. pleasure) or satisfying certain pro-attitudes (e.g. value-fulfilment).    
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concept of well-being does not help us resolve the widespread disagreement 
discussed above.   
Instead, one might think that such widespread disagreement is the result of 
the philosophical methodology used to generate substantive theories of well-
being.  For instance, philosophers tend to rely heavily on thought-experiments 
in order to argue either in favour or against particular theories of well-being.  
These thought-experiments are often outlandish or unrealistic, requiring us to 
imaging, for example, individuals who only care about counting blades of 
grass (Rawls 2005) or who are plugged into a machine that perfectly 
simulates reality (Nozick, 1974).  Our intuitions towards such scenarios may 
be influenced by a number of biases, thereby rendering them unreliable 
guides to the nature of well-being (Elster 2011).   
I think that this methodological point is reasonable.  However, recognizing the 
unreliability of our intuitions towards outlandish thought-experiments does not 
straightforwardly resolve the disagreement that pervades the philosophical 
literature.  For, all substantive theories of well-being tend to rely heavily on 
thought-experiments.  A ban on unrealistic thought-experiments may not 
achieve the effect of rendering certain kinds of theories of well-being 
implausible, leaving only a few plausible kinds of substantive theories behind.  
This is not to say that methodological changes in philosophical theorising over 
well-being could not have this effect.  The point is that such changes would 
still require considerable argument in order to resolve the disagreements over 
the acceptance/rejection of the experience requirement and the pro-attitude 
requirement.     
The upshot is that there is no easy way in which the widespread 
disagreement discussed above might be resolved.  We should conclude that 
no current substantive theories of well-being are widely acceptable, at least 
not without considerable argument.  In the remainder of this section, I will 
show that this matters for investigating how successfully we can measure 
well-being through measuring happiness.      
We need a widely acceptable understanding of well-being in order to further 
investigate the relationship between happiness and well-being.  This is 
illustrated by the current debate surrounding a set of findings from the study of 
happiness referred to as the “Easterlin Paradox” (Easterlin 1974; 2001).  
These findings show that, although significant increases in average income 
correlate with significant increases in happiness in the short-term, increases in 
income do not correlate with changes in happiness in the long-term (>10 
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years).40  Simply put, the Easterlin Paradox suggests that income makes little 
difference to lasting happiness.   
Now, the validity of the findings that make up the Easterlin Paradox has been 
challenged.  For instance, Inglehart et al. (2008) have shown that significant 
increases in income make little difference to life satisfaction in the long-run, 
but do make a difference to lasting happiness.  Additionally, Sacks et al. 
(2010) have shown that relative increases in income correlate with lasting 
increases in subjective well-being.41 Of course, these challenges have also 
been challenged themselves (see Easterlin et al. 2010 for some replies). 
However, assuming that the findings that make up the Easterlin Paradox are 
valid, we need to interpret the prudential relevance of these findings.  That is, 
we need to assess the implications of the Easterlin Paradox for the 
relationship between income, happiness and well-being.  On this issue, there 
is considerable disagreement.  On the one hand, some theorists argue that 
such findings show income does not correlate with well-being; on the other 
hand, some theorists argue that such findings show the opposite result: 
namely, that it is happiness that does not correlate with well-being.           
For instance, one of the most prominent “happiness economists”, Andrew 
Oswald, in his article in the Financial Times entitled, “The Hippies Were Right 
all Along about Happiness”, ends his discussion of the Easterlin Paradox 
saying as follows: “Happiness, not economic growth, ought to be the next and 
more sensible target for the next and more sensible generation.” (Oswald, 
2006) These sentiments are echoed throughout the happiness economics 
literature.  For example, economists Richard Layard (2005) and Robert Frank 
(2001) have both proposed that, on the basis of the Easterlin Paradox, 
governments should increase or introduce new taxes to discourage people 
pursuing wealth over goods that do bring lasting happiness, such as 
relationships, volunteering, leisure, and so on.  All of these interpretations 
presume that happiness strongly correlates with well-being, and that income 
                                            
40 These seemingly paradoxical results are supported by two different kinds of findings: (a) 
the correlation between income and happiness within countries (whereby increases in 
average income correlate with significant increases in happiness in the short-term) and 
(b) the correlation between income and happiness between countries (whereby 
increases in national income do not correlate with significant increases in happiness in 
the long-term). 
41 See also Deaton (2010), Hagerty & Veenhoven (2006) and Stevenson & Wolfers (2008) for 
further critiques of the Easterlin Paradox. 
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does not (or at least that happiness correlates with well-being to a greater 
extent than income does).              
In response, other theorists have (not surprisingly) hit back at the prudential 
relevance of happiness (for an overview see Booth et al., 2012).  Theorists 
who view economic growth as an effective way of improving people’s welfare, 
such as through alleviating poverty, tend to therefore argue that income 
strongly correlates with well-being.  Such theorists often say something along 
the lines of, “there are more important things to life than happiness.”  If people 
can be doing badly, such as being in poverty, but remain happy all the same, 
then it seems that happiness does not correlate with well-being to the extent 
that happiness economists tend to make out (Sen, 1999; Nussbaum, 2000).  
This interpretation presumes that income strongly correlates with well-being, 
and that happiness does not (or at least that income correlates with well-being 
to a greater extent than happiness does).                   
These kinds of disagreements are problematic for investigating how 
successfully we can measure well-being through measuring happiness.  In the 
contexts in which happiness does not correlate with certain goods that may be 
prudentially relevant, we need to make a judgment: either happiness or the 
good in question correlates with well-being.  For example, who is better off: 
the unhappy rich person or the happy poor person?  The debate over the 
implications of the Easterlin Paradox shows that such judgements depend on 
our understanding of well-being.  In order to make judgements that are widely 
acceptable, we need an understanding of well-being that is not based on any 
particular (controversial) substantive theory of well-being.  In short, we need 
an understanding of well-being that is consistent with most substantive 
theories of well-being. 
This is not to say that there is a problem with attempting to determine the 
correct substantive theory well-being.  The problem is that attempts to do so 
have not as yet been successful at being widely acceptable.  For the purpose 
of measuring well-being through measuring happiness, we need an 
understanding of well-being that is widely acceptable in order to make 
judgements about the contexts in which happiness does and does not 
correlate with well-being.  Thus, for the purpose of this thesis, it will be helpful 
to start from an understanding of well-being that is consistent with most 
substantive theories of well-being. 
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2.3  The theory-neutral account of well-being 
In this section, I will consider how we can investigate the correlation between 
happiness and well-being without a substantive theory of well-being.  I begin 
by considering two potential methods.  Firstly, we can construct a list of all the 
goods that have prudential value according to any plausible substantive 
theory of well-being.  What we are left with is a number of platitudes about 
what is good for people (e.g. positive experiences, the satisfaction of pro-
attitudes, objectively valuable goods, etc).  Secondly, we can construct a list 
of all the goods that have prudential value according to all plausible 
substantive theories of well-being.  What we are left with is a consensus over 
what is good for people (e.g. positive experiences of the satisfaction of pro-
attitudes towards objectively valuable goods).   
I will argue that the list of goods generated by the first method is too 
unrestricted to be consistent with most substantive theories of well-being.  For 
example, if both income and happiness are goods on the list, theorists may 
reasonably disagree over who is better off: a rich unhappy person or a poor 
happy person.  In contrast, I will argue that the list of goods generated by the 
second method is too restricted to be broadly informative.  For example, 
neither income nor happiness may be goods on this list – neither good may 
be causally related to the goods that have prudential value according to all 
plausible substantive theories of well-being.  
I will then consider a third method that is neither too unrestricted nor too 
restricted, and is therefore both consistent with most substantive theories of 
well-being and broadly informative.  According to this method, we can 
construct a list of all the goods that (a) have prudential value according to any 
plausible substantive theory of well-being and (b) tend to be causally 
connected to other goods that meet condition (a).  What we are left with is a 
number of platitudes about what is good for people, the objects of which are 
causally connected to each other (e.g. positive experiences, which tend to be 
caused by the satisfaction of pro-attitudes, which tend to be caused by 
objectively valuable goods, etc.).  I will refer to these goods as well-being 
ingredients.  
This method provides us with a theory-neutral account of well-being.  For any 
particular well-being ingredient, it remains neutral over whether it is either 
constitutively or causally related to well-being.  For example, insofar as 
positive experiences and the satisfaction of pro-attitudes are causally related, 
it may either be that (a) positive experiences constitute well-being and the 
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satisfaction of pro-attitudes are causally related to well-being, or (b) the 
satisfaction of pro-attitudes constitute well-being and positive experiences are 
causally related to well-being.  Either way, we can say that a particular well-
being ingredient correlates with well-being to the extent that it is causally 
related to other well-being ingredients.  I will use this theory-neutral account in 
the remainder of the thesis to investigate the correlation between happiness 
and well-being.    
2.3.1  Platitudes about well-being 
In this section, I will discuss one way in which we can develop a theory-
neutral account of well-being.  It involves constructing a list of all the goods 
that have prudential value according to any plausible theory of well-being.  For 
example, mental state theories maintain that certain positive experiences, 
such as pleasure, have prudential value.  Pleasure tends to be caused by 
certain goods and activities, such as intimate relationships, skill-development, 
good health, and so on.  These things will be on the list.  Similarly, objective 
list theories maintain that certain goods and activities, such as quality 
friendships, meaningful achievements, knowledge, virtue, etc., have 
prudential value.  These goods tend to cause certain mental states or states 
of affairs, such as enjoyment, interest, engagement, and so on.  These things 
will also be on the list.         
At the end of this process, we will be left with a list of platitudes about what is 
good for people.  We know that the objects of these platitudes are good for 
people without knowing whether or not they constitute well-being.  As Daniel 
Hausman notes: 
“We need to know something about what is good for people … but it does not 
follow that we need a philosophical theory of well-being for this purpose.  For 
example, urban economists can easily see that a new community swimming 
pool contributes to individual welfare because they know that people enjoy 
swimming and socialising at swimming pools.  This conclusion assumes that 
enjoyment contributes towards well-being.  Similarly, economists can 
conclude that the prevalence of malaria-carrying mosquitoes diminishes well-
being, if they assume that sickness and death diminish well-being.  Platitudes 
concerning what makes people better or worse off like the claims that 
enjoyment contributes towards well-being and illness diminishes it depend on 
no philosophical theory that specifies what things are intrinsically good for 
people and why.” (Hausman, 2011: p.7) 
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I think Hausman is right to note that platitudes about well-being can provide 
us with a list of prudential goods that is broadly informative.  However, the 
problem with this method is that the list generated is unlikely to be robust to 
most substantive theories of well-being.  To see why, let us reconsider the 
relationship between income, happiness and well-being.  
I will assume that, according to certain plausible theories of well-being, 
income helps cause some things that constitute well-being.  In addition, I will 
assume that, according to certain other plausible theories of well-being, 
happiness is caused by some things that constitute well-being (and perhaps 
constitutes well-being itself).  The facts that income and happiness are good 
for people are platitudes about well-being – we know that these things are 
good for us without having to know what constitutes our well-being.  However, 
in the contexts in which income and happiness come apart, these platitudes 
do not enable us to determine which of the two goods correlates with well-
being (or, at least, correlates with well-being to a larger extent).  For example, 
if we were to compare one poor but happy individual with one rich but 
unhappy individual, we would have no way of knowing which individual is 
better off, all other things being equal.  Simply knowing that income and 
happiness tend to be good for people does not help us determine which good 
correlates with well-being to a greater extent.   
In the context in which income and happiness come apart, the platitude 
method is likely to lead to disagreements over how successfully we can 
measure well-being through measuring either good.  Indeed, this is what we 
saw in the debate over the Easterlin Paradox, discussed briefly in the 
previous section.  On the basis of different substantive theories of well-being, 
some theorists claim that happiness correlates with well-being to a larger 
extent than income does, while other theorists claim the opposite.  A list of 
goods derived from platitudes about well-being does not provide us with a 
way of resolving such dilemmas.  In short, in certain contexts, theorists may 
reasonably disagree over which goods on the list matter for well-being – in 
such contexts, such a list will not be consistent with most substantive theories 
of well-being.   
2.3.2  Consensus over well-being 
In the previous section, I considered a theory-neutral account of well-being 
that consists in a list of goods that have prudential value according to any 
plausible theory of well-being. In contrast, in this section, I will consider a 
method that involves constructing a list of goods that have prudential value 
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according to all plausible theory of well-being.  For example, mental state and 
objective list theories may both maintain that pleasure caused by certain 
goods and activities, such as quality friendships, meaningful achievements, 
knowledge, virtue, etc., have prudential value.  If so, these things may be on 
the list.       
At the end of this process, we will be left with a consensus over what is good 
for people.  We need not adjudicate between plausible substantive theories of 
well-being if there is a broadly informative overlap between those theories.  
That is, substantive theories of well-being may tend to agree over the kinds of 
things that have prudential value.    
Tim Taylor (forthcoming) explicitly adopts this method in developing a theory-
neutral account of well-being for the purposes of measuring well-being.  He 
considers the areas of overlap between four kinds of substantive theories of 
well-being: (a) mental states theories, (b) desire-satisfaction theories, (c) 
Aristotelian (or nature-fulfilment) theories, and (d) objective list theories.  For 
instance, he shows that both Aristotelian theories and mental states theories 
hold that well-being is constituted by pleasure caused by the development 
and exercise of human capabilities.  He further claims that identifying the 
objects of a person’s idealised desires is likely to lead to “a significant area of 
overlap with Aristotelian theories.” (Taylor, forthcoming: p.8) If we consider 
only the four kinds of substantive theories of well-being that Taylor does, we 
can develop something like the following consensus of things that have 
prudential value: a person’s (a) positive experiences of (b) actually satisfying 
their idealized desires towards (c) the development and exercise of human 
capabilities that (d) are objectively good.  
Like Hausman, I think Taylor is correct to emphasise that we can develop an 
account of well-being without having to rely on any particular substantive 
theory.  Discovering the areas of overlap between theories of well-being is 
certainly likely to be consistent with most substantive theories.  However, the 
problem with this method is that the list of goods generated is unlikely to be 
broadly informative.  Whereas a list of goods derived from platitudes about 
well-being is broadly informative but unlikely to be consistent with most 
substantive theories of well-being, a list of goods derived from consensus 
over well-being is likely to be the opposite.  To illustrate this, let us again 
consider the relationship between income, happiness and well-being.   
Recall that the platitude method included both income and happiness as 
things on the list, but was unable to distinguish between them when they 
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came into conflict.  In contrast, the consensus method may not include 
anything as broad as happiness or income on the list.  Happiness will only be 
on the list insofar as it is caused by (b) the actual satisfaction of idealised 
desires towards (c) the development and exercise of human capabilities that 
(d) are objectively good.  Income will only be on the list insofar as it is causes 
these things.  We cannot say whether or not a rich/poor person, or a 
happy/unhappy person, is doing well unless we know more about how they 
use their income or how they receive their happiness. 
In response, Taylor might reply that we can generally assume that happiness 
is caused by (b), (c) and (d), or that income causes (a), (b), (c) and (d).  That 
is, Taylor could claim that (a) is likely to overlap with (b), (b) is likely to overlap 
with (c), and (c) is likely to overlap with (d).  Thus, we can generally assume 
that any good (such as happiness or income) related to either (a), (b), (c) or 
(d) contributes towards well-being.  This amounts to saying that, in practice, 
there is not much difference between substantive theories of well-being.  
Indeed, at various points, Taylor states that the prescriptions of different well-
being theories only tend to come apart in atypical circumstances, such as in 
the case of delusional pleasures or “whimsical, idiosyncratic or culpable ones” 
(Taylor, forthcoming: p.10).   
I think there are two problems with this response.  First, it may not simply be 
the case that there is a significant overlap between any two plausible 
substantive theories of well-being.  For instance, in chapter five, I will argue 
that, in general, happiness does not tend to correlate with how well we are 
doing in our long-term goals and projects.  This is a large area in which 
certain positive experiences (i.e. positive affective states) do not overlap with 
the satisfaction of certain idealized desires (i.e. life-long projects).  It does not 
seem unreasonable to suspect that similar-sized differences exist between 
other plausible substantive theories of well-being.   
The second problem with Taylor’s claim that there is likely to be a significant 
overlap between plausible substantive theories of well-being is as follows.  
Even if there is a significant overlap between any two plausible theories, the 
more theories we consider, the less overlap we are likely to find.  That is, 
even if (a) is likely to overlap with (b), (b) is likely to overlap with (c), and (c) is 
likely to overlap with (d), it may end up unlikely that (a) overlaps with (d).42  
                                            
42 For example: 0.8*0.8*0.8*0.8=0.41. 
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The result is that there may not be a significant overlap between most 
substantive theories of well-being.  
In sum, the problem with the consensus platitudes method is that, in 
generating a list of prudential goods that all theorists can agree on, we end up 
with a list that is too restricted to be broadly informative.       
2.3.3  Well-being ingredients  
In the previous two sections, I have discussed two methods for developing a 
theory-neutral account of well-being.  The first method consists in generating 
a list of goods that have prudential value according to any plausible theory of 
well-being.  The problem with this method is that, although the list would be 
broadly informative, it would not be consistent with most substantive theories 
of well-being.  In contrast, the second method consists in generating a list of 
goods that have prudential value according to all plausible theories of well-
being.  The problem with this method is that, although the list would be 
consistent with most substantive theories of well-being, it would not be 
broadly informative.  It seems, then, that we have a dilemma – we either 
generate a list of prudential goods that is informative but not consistent with 
substantive theories or vice versa.     
In this section, I will argue in favour of a third method, which I believe 
manages to avoid this dilemma.  It involves constructing a list of all the goods 
that (a) have prudential value according to any plausible theory of well-being 
and (b) tend to be causally connected with other goods that meet condition 
(a).  For example, mental state theories maintain that certain positive 
experiences, such as pleasure, have prudential value.  Objective list theories 
maintain that certain goods and activities, such as quality friendships, have 
prudential value.  Now, insofar as pleasure and quality friendships are 
causally connected, both pleasure and quality friendship will be on the list.     
At the end of this process, we will be left with a number of platitudes about 
what is good for people, the objects of which are causally connected to each 
other.  I will refer to these goods as well-being ingredients.  Well-being 
ingredients are likely to be consistent with most substantive theories of well-
being.  For any well-being ingredient (e.g. pleasure, quality friendships, etc.) 
we can maintain that it either constitutes well-being or is causally connected 
to a good that constitutes well-being.  For example, mental state theories of 
well-being may be correct in maintaining that pleasure constitutes well-being, 
in which case quality friendships correlate with well-being insofar as they 
either are caused by or cause pleasure.  Alternatively, objective list theories of 
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well-being may be correct in maintaining that quality friendships constitute 
well-being, in which case pleasure correlates with well-being insofar as it is 
either causes or is caused by quality friendships.  We can make the same 
claims about any well-being ingredient.     
The list of goods generated by this method will be more restricted than the 
one generated by the platitudes method and less restricted than the one 
generated by the consensus method.  I will briefly compare and contrast these 
methods in turn.    
In common with the platitudes method discussed above, a list of well-being 
ingredients consists in goods that have prudential value according to any 
plausible theory of well-being i.e. the objects of platitudes about well-being.  
However, in contrast to the platitude method, the list consists only in the 
objects of platitudes about well-being that are causally connected to the 
objects of other well-being platitudes.   
To illustrate this difference, consider two substantive theories of well-being: a 
mental state theory that maintains pleasure constitutes well-being, and an 
objective list theory that maintains quality friendships, intimate relationships, 
meaningful achievements, and virtue constitute well-being.  According to the 
platitude method, all of these goods are part of our theory-neutral account of 
well-being.  However, let us further suppose that, although there are strong 
causal connections between pleasure, quality friendships, intimate 
relationships and meaningful achievements, there are no causal connections 
between those goods and virtue.  In such a case, virtue would not be a well-
being ingredient.  Thus, according to the method outlined in this section, we 
cannot say that an unhappy virtuous person is doing better than a happy non-
virtuous person – such a judgement would not be consistent with most 
theories of well-being.  Although the objective list theorists may agree with this 
judgement, the mental state theorist would not.  The only way in which a list of 
platitudes about well-being can be consistent with most substantive theories 
of well-being is if it were restricted to a list of well-being platitudes, the objects 
of which were causally connected to each other; that is, if it were restricted to 
a list of well-being ingredients.     
In common with the consensus method discussed in the previous section, a 
list of well-being ingredients will include the goods that have prudential value 
according to all plausible theories of well-being.  However, in contrast to the 
consensus method, the list will be broader in scope.  It will also include the 
kinds of goods mentioned in the previous two paragraphs: the objects of 
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platitudes about well-being that are causally connected to the objects of other 
well-being platitudes.   
To illustrate this difference, consider again the relationship between income, 
happiness and well-being.  Recall that, according to the consensus method 
(outlined by Taylor), happiness will only be on the list insofar as it is caused 
by (b) the actual satisfaction of idealized desires towards (c) the development 
and exercise of human capabilities that (d) are objectively good.  Income will 
only be on the list insofar as it is causes these things.  We cannot say that 
whether or not a rich/poor person, or a happy/unhappy person, is doing well 
unless we know more about how they use their income or how they receive 
their happiness.  This is not broadly informative.  In contrast, the method 
outlined in this section will include happiness and income as things on the list 
insofar as they are causally connected with the objects of other platitudes 
about well-being, such as pleasure, quality friendships, intimate relationships 
and meaningful achievements.  We can say that a rich person is doing well 
insofar as income tends to be causally connected to the objects of other well-
being platitudes.  Likewise, we can say that a happy person is doing well 
insofar as happiness tends to be causally connected to such goods.            
The list generated by this method is, therefore, both broadly informative and 
consistent with most substantive theories of well-being.  It provides us with a 
way of resolving disagreements over how successfully we can measure well-
being through measuring any particular prudential good.  For example, when 
income and happiness come apart, we can determine how successfully we 
can measure well-being through measuring either good in the following way.  
We can investigate the causal relations between each good and other well-
being ingredients.  If happiness tends to be caused by (or cause) other well-
being ingredients (e.g. quality friendships, intimate relationships and 
meaningful achievements) whereas income does not, we can conclude that 
happiness tends to correlate with well-being to a greater extent than income 
does, and vice versa. 
In the remainder of this thesis, I will simply refer to this understanding of well-
being as the “theory-neutral account of well-being”.  The theory-neutral 
account provides us with a list of well-being ingredients that tend to be 
correlated with well-being.  It remains neutral over whether each well-being 
ingredient is either constitutively or causally related to well-being.   
It is important to note that the strength of correlations and causal relations are 
a matter of degree.  The theory-neutral account is only able to maintain that a 
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particular well-being ingredient (e.g. income, happiness, etc.) tends to be 
correlated with well-being because it tends to be causally connected to other 
well-being ingredients.  It follows that it is only able to maintain that a 
particular well-being ingredient tends to be correlated with well-being to a 
certain extent because it tends to be causally connected to other well-being 
ingredients to that extent.  For example, happiness may be strongly correlated 
with well-being insofar as it may be causally connected to a number of well-
being ingredients, such as a person’s quality friendships, intimate 
relationships, meaningful achievements, and so on.  If happiness were not 
causally connected to a number of well-being ingredients, the claim that 
happiness strongly correlates with well-being would not be consistent with 
most substantive theories of well-being.   
According to the theory-neutral account, therefore, well-being ingredients 
correlate with well-being to the extent that they are causally connected with 
other well-being ingredients.  Lastly, it is worth noting that, in certain contexts, 
the causal connections between different well-being ingredients can break 
down.  For example, happiness may tend to be caused by meaningful 
achievements, but may not be in contexts with limited information.  The 
theory-neutral account consists merely in general causal connections 
between well-being ingredients (e.g. happiness may generally be caused by 
meaningful achievements), accepting that, in certain contexts, such 
connections can break down.  Thus, if happiness were causally connected to 
a number of well-being ingredients, we would only be able to claim that 
happiness generally strongly correlates with well-being.  In the following 
diagram, arrows represent general causal connections between well-being 
ingredients (whereby the direction of the arrows represent the direction of 
causation between different ingredients): 
Fig. 2.1 
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We are now in a position to sum up the method outlined in this section.  The 
theory-neutral account of well-being provides us with a list of well-ingredients 
– objects of platitudes about well-being that are causally connected to the 
objects of other well-being platitudes.  For any particular well-being ingredient 
we can remain theory-neutral over whether it is either constitutively or 
causally related to well-being.  For example, insofar as happiness is causally 
related to certain well-being ingredients, it may either constitute well-being or 
be caused by well-being.  Either way, we can say that happiness correlates 
with well-being to the extent that it is causally related to other well-being 
ingredients – we can remain neutral over which of these ingredients in fact 
constitute well-being. 
2.3.4  Summing up and looking forward 
In the second section of this chapter, I showed that there are no widely 
acceptable substantive theories of well-being.  Thus, for the purpose of 
investigating how successful we can measure well-being through measuring 
happiness, we cannot rely on any particular substantive theory of well-being.  
We need an understanding of well-being that is consistent with most 
substantive theories of well-being. 
In the third section of this chapter, I considered ways in which we can 
understand well-being without having to rely on a particular substantive 
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theory.  I outlined a theory-neutral account of well-being that is both consistent 
with most substantive theories of well-being and broadly informative.  
According to this account, we can understand well-being in virtue of “well-
being ingredients” – list of well-being platitudes, the objects of which are 
causally connected to each other.  Well-being ingredients correlate with well-
being to the extent that they are causally connected to other well-being 
ingredients.    
Despite the fact that the theory-neutral account is consistent with most 
substantive theories of well-being, some substantive theories are inconsistent 
with it.  The substantive theories of well-being that are inconsistent with the 
theory-neutral account are simply those that entail certain well-being 
ingredients are correlated with well-being either to a greater or lesser extent.  
For example, an objective list theory may consist in the view that virtue 
constitutes well-being, even if virtue does not tend to be causally connected to 
other well-being ingredients.  This would be inconsistent with the theory-
neutral account.     
In the remainder of this chapter, I will focus on happiness in particular.  I will 
assume that happiness is a well-being ingredient.  Happiness tends to be 
caused by a number of other well-being ingredients, such as the quality of 
one’s relationship and health.   
According to the theory-neutral account, happiness correlates with well-being 
to the extent that it tends to be caused by other well-being ingredients.  This is 
inconsistent with substantive theories of well-being that consist in the view 
that happiness is correlated with well-being either to a greater or lesser 
extent. For example, prudential hedonism entails that happiness perfectly 
correlates with well-being.  But it is very unlikely to be the case that happiness 
tends to be causally connected to all well-being ingredients.  Thus, prudential 
hedonism entails that happiness correlates with well-being to a greater extent 
than is likely according to the theory-neutral account.  
For the purposes of this thesis, additional attention is merited by substantive 
theories of well-being that are inconsistent with the theory-neutral account in 
this way.  Although such substantive theories are not widely acceptable (for 
the reasons given in the second section of this chapter) if we have some good 
reasons for believing that such theories may be correct, we also have some 
good reasons to doubt the theory-neutral account.        
In the remainder of this chapter, I will argue that the substantive theories of 
well-being inconsistent with the theory-neutral account are implausible.  I will 
 76 
consider prudential hedonism in particular, in that it is the most influential 
substantive theory of well-being inconsistent with the theory-neutral account.  
Prudential hedonism maintains that happiness correlates with well-being to a 
greater extent than the theory-neutral account.  I will argue that such a theory 
is implausible because it fails to adequately account for some of the things 
that we most care about.  
I will then use a similar argument to claim that the opposite kind of substantive 
theory – one that maintains happiness correlates with well-being to a lesser 
extent than the theory-neutral account – is also implausible.  
In contrast, I will argue that the theory-neutral account of well-being is likely to 
adequately account for things we most care about (e.g. one’s level of income 
and educational attainment, the quality of one’s health and relationships, etc.).  
The things we most care about typically coincide with well-being ingredients.  
The upshot is that the theory-neutral account is consistent with all plausible 
substantive theories of well-being.    
2.4  Prudential Hedonism 
Hedonism about well-being (what I will refer to as “prudential hedonism”) and 
the theory-neutral account of well-being are inconsistent in the contexts in 
which happiness does not tend to be causally connected with other well-being 
ingredients.  For example, a severely deluded patient may be deliriously 
happy despite lacking certain well-being ingredients (such as intimate 
relationships, health, autonomy, virtue, knowledge, etc.).  In such contexts, 
the hedonist will maintain that the patient’s happiness nonetheless (perfectly) 
correlates with the patient’s well-being.  The proponent of the theory-neutral 
account will maintain the opposite.  In this section, I will argue that the 
hedonistic position is implausible.    
I will argue against the plausibility of prudential hedonism as follows.  First of 
all, I will consider its merits.  I will show that the plausibility of prudential 
hedonism does not rest on either the acceptance or rejection of the pro-
attitude requirement.  In addition, I will show that hedonism has a reasonable 
rationale for accepting the experience requirement.  However, I will then 
argue that, despite these merits, prudential hedonism is implausible because 
it does not adequately account for some of the things we most care about.  
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2.4.1  Prudential Hedonism and the Pro-Attitude Requirement 
Hedonism about well-being is the view that a person’s well-being is entirely 
constituted by their balance of pleasure over pain.  According to prudential 
hedonism, insofar as someone is happy, they are well-off.  Hedonism involves 
the acceptance of the experience requirement, namely that, for something to 
matter to our well-being, it must impact our experiential lives.   
Different versions of hedonism emphasise the different kinds of experiences 
or mental states that matter to well-being.  For ‘quantitative hedonists’, well-
being is constituted by all experiences of pleasure and pain, which are 
differentiated simply by their intensity and duration.  In contrast, for ‘qualitative 
hedonists’, pleasures and pains are further differentiated in virtue of their 
‘quality’.  Further requirements may be added in determining the kinds of 
experiences that constitute well-being.  For instance, ‘veridical hedonism’ is 
the view that only true or accurate pleasures constitute well-being.  For the 
purposes of this thesis, I will only consider what I will call ‘affective state 
hedonism’.  Affective state hedonism is the view that a person’s affective 
experiences constitute their well-being.  According to affective state 
hedonism, researchers who accurately measure a subject’s affective state will 
thereby measure the constituents of well-being (which, from now on, I will 
simply refer to as “hedonism”).         
How plausible is hedonism as a theory of well-being?  First of all, it consists in 
the acceptance of the experience requirement, which is controversial.  Many 
theorists have argued that our well-being is constituted by things beyond our 
experiential lives, thereby rejecting the experience requirement.  I will discuss 
these arguments in detail below.   
The second point worth making about the plausibility of hedonism is that, 
depending on how the theory is formulated, it may consist either in the 
acceptance or rejection of the pro-attitude requirement (Dorsey 2011b).  I will 
refer to these different forms of hedonism as Attitude-Dependent Hedonism 
(ADH) and Attitude-Independent Hedonism (AIH) respectively.  
According to ADH, a person’s experiences of pleasure and pain constitute 
their well-being because (a) they are caused by the satisfactions of certain 
pro-attitudes, and (b) it is only the satisfactions of certain pro-attitudes that 
impact our experiential lives that constitute well-being.  Thus, ADH restricts 
the satisfactions of certain pro-attitudes that constitute well-being to those that 
make a difference to a person’s experiences.   
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According to AIH, a person’s experiences of pleasure and pain constitute their 
well-being because they have intrinsic prudential value, and indeed are the 
only things that have intrinsic prudential value.  All other prudential values, 
such as knowledge, achievement, virtue, etc., have merely instrumental value, 
in that they tend to bring about experiences of pleasure (or prevent 
experiences of pain).  Thus, AIH also restricts the things that constitute well-
being to a person’s experiences.    
The fact that hedonism can be formulated in these two different ways is a 
point in favour of the theory.  If the acceptance of the pro-attitude requirement 
proves to be implausible, this does not necessarily rule out the plausibility of 
AIH.  Conversely, if the rejection of the pro-attitude requirement proves to be 
implausible, this does not rule out the plausibility of ADH.  In short, the 
plausibility of hedonism does not rest on whether or not constituents of well-
being must satisfy a person’s certain pro-attitudes.   
However, both ADH and AIH rely on similar arguments in favour of restricting 
the constituents of well-being to a person’s experiences.  That is, both 
versions of hedonism accept the experience requirement and provide similar 
arguments in favour of doing so.  In the next section, I will outline what I take 
to be the most plausible argument put forward by hedonists in favour of 
accepting the experience requirement.  
2.4.2  Prudential Hedonism and the Experience Requirement 
Both ADH and AIH restrict the constituents of well-being to a person’s 
experiences.  What arguments can the hedonist provide for doing this?  Let us 
consider ADH, first.  According to ADH, for something to matter to a person’s 
well-being, it must (a) impact their experience and (b) be the satisfaction of a 
certain pro-attitude.  There are two ways in which this may be the case.  First, 
it may be that people ultimately only desire one thing: happiness.  By 
“ultimately,” I mean that all other desires people have are instrumental – they 
are desired merely as a mean towards attaining happiness.  If this were the 
case, we would desire things such as friendship, health and security solely in 
order to be happier (through the attainment of such things).  This claim 
constitutes the theory of Psychological Hedonism, which I will not consider 
here.43  Psychological hedonism has been widely refuted in both the 
                                            
43 There are, however, some key points in the theory’s favour, which presumably explain its 
ongoing attraction.  In the main, pleasure and pain may be the mechanisms we use to 
value certain states of affairs.  Thus, we may have certain pro-attitudes towards things 
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philosophical and empirical literature.44  I will assume that we intrinsically care 
about things beyond our own experiential lives.   
Assuming that we intrinsically care about things beyond our experiences, 
ADH needs an alternative argument for restricting the satisfactions of pro-
attitudes that constitute well-being to those that impact our experiential lives 
(Heathwood, 2006).  One point in favour of ADH is that it seems plausible that 
the satisfactions of pro-attitudes that constitute well-being should be restricted 
in some way or another.  Proponents of the pro-attitude requirement often 
refer to this issue as the “problem of remote desires.” (Parfit, 1984; Griffin, 
1986) We have desires (or other kinds of pro-attitudes, such as preferences 
or values) that extend in time and space far beyond our awareness.  
Examples of remote desires include the desire for posthumous fame, the 
desire for a stranger to flourish, the desire for some distant future scenario 
(e.g. the prevention of run-away climate change), or some quirky desire 
whose satisfaction is epistemically inaccessible (e.g. a prime number of atoms 
in the universe).  The satisfaction of such desires does not seem to constitute 
well-being.45   
Well-being theorists have failed to reach any kind of agreement over how the 
desire-satisfactions that constitute well-being can be restricted in a way that 
adequately captures our intuitions about remote desires.46  This leaves the 
                                            
insofar as we take pleasure in them (though see Schroeder 2004 for a critique of this 
view).  Alternatively put, we may only be able to value something insofar as that thing 
causes pleasure in us.  It is perhaps for this reason that people say things such as, “I just 
want my children to be happy”, or “There is in reality nothing desired except happiness” 
(Mill 2002: chapter two).   
44 For a philosophical example see Rachels (2010).  For an empirical example see Berridge 
(1996).   
45 Though see Lukas et al. (2010) for an exception.  Lukas et al. argue that the satisfaction of 
every actual desire, including remote desires, promotes well-being, although they seem 
to readily admit that this requires that one “embrace the absurdity and simply deny the 
intuition that some desires are irrelevant to well-being” (Lukas et al. 2010: p.21). 
46 For instance, Mark Overvold argues that the only desires whose satisfaction promote a 
person’s well-being are those whose satisfaction require that person’s existence; remote 
desires do not, therefore, promote well-being (Overvold 1980).  Other philosophers, 
however, argue that satisfaction or frustration of posthumous desires can affect a 
person’s well-being (Brandt 1979, Portmore 2007).  Griffin distinguishes between 
informed satisfied desires that can and cannot count towards a person’s well-being as 
follows: “What counts for me, therefore, is what enters my life with no doing from me, 
what I bring into my life, and what I do with my life” (Griffin, 1986: p.22).  I agree with 
Bishop (MS: chapter two) in interpreting this to mean that as long as a remote informed 
desire is properly connected to one’s life plan or narrative, its satisfaction promotes the 
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kind of restriction offered by the proponent of ADH (namely, to restrict the 
desire-satisfactions that constitute well-being to those that a person is aware 
of) as a live option.   
The argument in favour of this kind of restriction has been stated clearly by 
Shelly Kagan (1992). (This is the same argument outlined in chapter one, in 
favour of a narrow concept of well-being.) Kagan provides the following 
rationale for the view that desire-satisfactions must impact a person’s 
experiential life in order to constitute his or her well-being.  He begins by 
noting that something contributes towards a person’s well-being if it is good 
for that person.  Kagan then claims that persons are nothing other than a 
body and mind.  Thus, according to Kagan, something can only constitute a 
person’s well-being if it makes a difference to their body or mind.  The 
satisfactions of desires that do not impact on a person’s body or mind, 
therefore, do not constitute their well-being.  Such desire-satisfaction is too 
remote.  It is only the satisfactions of desires that do impact on a person’s 
body or mind that constitute their well-being.  Being genuinely successful, or 
having desires fulfilled in actual fact, does not benefit the person except 
insofar as it directly impacts them i.e., through the happiness they feel when 
they perceive their desires to be satisfied. 
Kagan further distinguishes between a person and a person’s life.  Whereas 
Kagan argues that a person is nothing more than a body and mind, he claims 
that things beyond a body and mind may constitute a person’s life, such as 
various relational properties (e.g., being in a certain environment, having 
certain possessions, attributes, friendships, etc.).  Thus, it may be one thing 
for a person to be well off, and another thing for a person’s life to go well.  
According to Kagan, well-being concerns what is good for a person, not what 
is good for a person’s life.  For something to be of benefit to a person, 
according to Kagan, it must affect the person; it must make a difference in the 
person.  That is, it must make a difference to the person’s body or mind.  
Being genuinely successful, or having desires fulfilled in actual fact, may 
constitute a person’s life going well, but does not benefit the person except 
insofar as it directly impacts them.     
Kagan’s argument provides a clear rationale for restricting the kinds of desire-
satisfactions that constitute well-being.  According to Kagan, it is only the 
                                            
person’s well-being.  Griffin’s restriction rules out some remote desires (e.g. the prime 
number of atoms in the universe), but not all of them (e.g. the desire for posthumous 
fame).  
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desire-satisfactions that a person is aware of that constitute his or her well-
being. Kagan’s argument rests on a plausible distinction between a person 
and a person’s life, and the claim that well-being concerns the former.  I will 
take this to be the most plausible rationale for restricting the kinds of desire-
satisfaction that constitute well-being in the way that ADH prescribes.     
Let us now consider AIH.  In contrast to ADH, AIH rejects the pro-attitude 
requirement.  It does not maintain that something must satisfy a person’s 
certain pro-attitude in order to constitute his or her well-being.  Rather, 
according to AIH, pleasure constitutes well-being because certain properties 
of pleasure have intrinsic prudential value.  
Tomas Hurka notes that, due to its phenomenal quality, happiness is “the 
most commonly recognised intrinsic good” (Hurka, 2011: 9).  He further notes 
that, although different theorists refer to this good in different ways, using 
names such as pleasure, enjoyment, contentment, satisfaction, etc., they all 
refer to “a good feeling with positive tone” or with a positive “buzz” (Hurka, 
2011: 10).  It is this phenomenal quality, or feel, that has intrinsic prudential 
value, according to AIH.  Happiness is unique in this respect – no other good 
seems to have a similar kind of phenomenal quality.  Thus, according to AIH, 
pleasure is the only thing of intrinsic prudential value.  Other goods, such as 
knowledge, achievement, virtue, etc., have merely instrumental value, in that 
they tend to bring about experiences of pleasure (or prevent experiences of 
pain).47       
AIH rests on restricting the kinds of goods that constitute well-being in a 
similar way that ADH rests on restricting the kinds of satisfactions of desires 
that constitute well-being.  Indeed, we might call this the problem of “remote 
goods” – not all goods contribute towards well-being.  Virtue may be morally 
                                            
47 One objection to AIH is that happiness/pleasure is not in fact unified by a common 
phenomenal quality.  There are many different kinds of pleasant experiences.  There are 
sensory pleasures, like the pleasure of tasting delicious food or receiving a massage.  
There are the pleasures caused by having our desires are satisfied, like the pleasure of 
winning a game or getting a promotion.  I will not deal with this objection here, in that I 
think it is ultimately unproblematic for AIH.  I agree with Crisp that, despite this variety in 
the phenomenal qualities of happiness, such experiences all have “a certain common 
quality – feeling good” (Crisp, 2006: p.109).  This does not entail that we can compare 
the prudential value of different pleasant experience on the basis of this common quality 
i.e. on how good they feel.  There may be different kinds of intrinsic prudential value, 
whereby each kind is determined by the different kinds of phenomenal qualities of 
pleasant experiences – we can nonetheless maintain that all these experiences have 
intrinsic prudential value, and that nothing other than such experiences has intrinsic 
prudential value.     
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good, for instance, but may not be good for someone.  It is because some 
goods are more prudentially valuable than others that we can sacrifice our 
well-being for the attainment of certain (non-prudential) goods.48  Mother 
Teresa, for example, may have lead a very good life, but not necessarily a life 
that was good for her.  It seems right to say that she sacrificed her own well-
being in favour of helping the poor.  Her efforts to help the poor may have 
resulted in her cultivating virtue, but such virtue did not result in high levels of 
well-being.  In comparison to other goods, such as enjoyment, intimate 
relationships, skill-development, etc., virtue does not seem to be very 
prudentially valuable.  In short, some goods are more prudentially valuable 
than others.  Any theory of well-being that rejects the pro-attitude requirement 
must provide us with an account of which goods are prudentially valuable, or 
at least more prudentially valuable than others.   
AIH provides us with a simple answer to this question: happiness is the only 
prudential good that constitutes well-being.  This clearly accounts for the 
Mother Teresa case.  Being virtuous may have provided Mother Teresa with 
some amount of pleasure – indeed, at times, it may have resulted in a 
profound form of happiness – but probably not as much pleasure as she 
would have received from certain alternative, less admirable, forms of life.   
However, is it the case that pleasure is the only good that constitutes well-
being?  What about other goods, such as meaningful achievements, intimate 
relationships, skill-development, and so on?  I think that the most plausible 
rationale for pleasure being the only good that constitutes well-being is the 
one provided by Kagan, reviewed above.  Recall that Kagan argues that well-
being concerns how well a person is doing, and that a person is constituted 
entirely by a body and mind.  Thus, for something to constitute well-being, it 
must make a difference to a person’s body or mind (Kagan, 1992).  In other 
words, for something to constitute well-being, it must impact a person’s 
experiences.  Pleasure may be the only thing that constitutes well-being in 
this respect.   
2.4.3  The Problem with Prudential Hedonism 
We are now in a position to review Kagan’s argument, and thereby the 
plausibility of both versions of hedonism (ADH and AIH).  Perhaps the most 
                                            
48 Although most well-being theorists accept this view (Smuts, MS), see Rosati (2009) for an 
alternative view.  
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obvious counter-argument to accepting the experience requirement is that it 
goes against our intuitions regarding the constituents of well-being.  These 
intuitions are best illustrated by Robert Nozick’s famous “experience machine” 
thought experiment.  Nozick (1974) asks us if we would spend the rest of our 
lives plugged into an experience machine.  The machine will stimulate our 
brains such that we will experience ourselves as engaging in a lifetime of 
certain activities, and have no recollection of us having chosen to plug in.  
Most philosophers of well-being assume that, along with Nozick himself, we 
will not choose to plug into the machine.  The reason for not doing so is that 
there are things besides our experiences that matter for well-being.  Those 
who plug in would gain in pleasure or enjoyment, but they would also miss out 
on (a) a great deal of knowledge (since they would have so many false 
beliefs), (b) really being with their friends and family, (c) really accomplishing 
things, etc. (Hurka 2011) In short, Nozick’s thought-experiment seems to 
show us that we care about certain goods beyond the impact that such goods 
have on our experiential lives.  
I think that our intuitions around the experience machine reflect a major 
problem with prudential hedonism.  The problem is that it does not do justice 
to the phenomenology of prudential value.  We intrinsically care about our 
intimate relationships, friendships, career, education, health, etc.  These are 
the things that guide our action – they are the things that we directly pursue in 
our practical lives.  These things guide our action because we care about 
them; we see them as being good for us.  For example, someone who values 
their children’s welfare tends to take pleasure from fulfilling their parental role.  
Attaining a certain level of welfare for their child does not just guide their 
action; in addition, it is what seems to be good for them.  The problem with 
hedonism is that it insists that such things are valuable only because of the 
experiences that they afford.  But this is not how things seem to those who 
have such experiences.  This is the fundamental tension with hedonism 
(Barber 2011).  
In response to this problem, several theorists have recently challenged our 
intuitions regarding the constituents of well-being, and have criticized the 
utility of Nozick’s influential thought-experiment in particular (Tännsjö 2007; 
Crisp 2006a; Kolber, 1994; Kawall 1999; Barber 2011; Baber 2008; Feldman 
2012; Hewitt 2010; Weijers 2011; De Brigard 2010; Belshaw 2012; Bramble, 
MS; Sizer, 2010).  
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Many of these theorists have argued that the experience machine thought-
experiment is invalid, largely due to its outlandish or unrealistic nature (Elster, 
2011).  Such theorists argue that we cannot trust our intuitions over whether 
to plug into the machine or not because such intuitions are inevitably 
influenced by irrelevant factors (i.e. factors other than information about what 
constitutes our well-being).  For instance, Roger Crisp argues that people’s 
choices over whether or not to plug in are likely to be affected by “differing 
attitudes to risk.” (Crisp, 2006: p.635).49  In a similar vein, Adam Kolber 
(1994), Joseph Mendola (2006) and Dan Weijers (MS) all note that we have a 
general fear of the unfamiliar.  Perhaps most convincingly, De Brigard (2010) 
presents empirical evidence in favour of the hypothesis that subjects’ choices 
over whether or not to plug in to the experience machine are largely based on 
the “status-quo bias”.  That is, insofar as subjects are averse to abandoning 
the life they have been experiencing so far, they will tend to choose not to 
plug in.   
Rather than taking a stand on these issues, I believe that we can largely 
ignore them by considering more realistic versions of Nozick’s thought-
experiment. Other well-being theorists, such as Griffin (1986) and Sumner 
(1996), have offered more realistic thought-experiments that seemingly count 
against the plausibility of prudential hedonism in the same way as the 
experience machine.  Alex Baber (2011) summarizes these kinds of thought-
experiments as follows: 
“You find out that the ‘homemade’ cookies you just ate were really baked from 
store-bought dough; that they have been letting you win at poker; that your 
lover in fact hates you; that the wilderness you have made your home 
contains the world’s largest call centre, cunningly disguised by artificial trees; 
that your best friend is paid out of a trust-fund set up by your parents; that the 
children you have taken hard-won but profound joy from helping to raise are 
in fact remotely-controlled robots; and so on.  In each case you are happy 
until you discover what a chump you have been, at which point your 
happiness evaporates.” (Baber, 2011: p.272) 
In response to these kinds of thought-experiments, people tend to have 
similar reactions to those that they have in response to the experience 
machine.  That is, people tend to choose to stay in contact with reality rather 
                                            
49 See also Belshaw (2012). 
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than being a “chump.”  This suggests that we care about being in touch with 
reality more than we care about being happy and deluded.  We care about 
things beyond our experiential lives.50   
However, other well-being theorists accept that we care about things beyond 
our pleasurable experiences, while challenging the implications that this has 
for the plausibility of prudential hedonism.  Such theorists do not think that we 
need to do justice to the phenomenology of prudential value, in that, what we 
see as being good for us is not necessarily what is good for us.  For instance, 
Harriet Baber (2008) argues that our choices over whether or not to be a 
chump tell us nothing about well-being unless we assume the truth of the 
revealed preference-satisfaction view of well-being (i.e. that the things we 
choose to do make us better off).  Similarly, Fred Feldman (2012) notes that 
“what matters to us” is not the same thing as “what matters”.51  The point is 
that the above kinds of thought-experiments are not direct arguments against 
prudential hedonism.  They rely on the assumption that what we care about 
reflects what in fact has intrinsic prudential value.  This assumption may not 
be true – it could be that the things we think intrinsically matter do not in fact 
have intrinsic prudential value.52       
But why doubt that our considered preferences over what is good for us 
reflect what is in fact good for us?  The fact that some things matter 
intrinsically to people seems to be good evidence of their intrinsic prudential 
                                            
50 Though, some well-being theorists have recently criticized even this conclusion.  For 
instance, Tännsjö (2007) claims that he would not choose reality over being a chump, 
along with many people who choose to frequently take mind-altering drugs.  Similarly, 
Belshaw (2012) argues that people with extremely poor standards of living (such as 
those facing an excruciatingly painful end of life) may choose the life of a chump rather 
than staying in touch with reality.          
51 See also Hewitt (2009) and Kawall (1999). 
52 There may also be things that do intrinsically matter that are not good for us simply 
because there may be things with intrinsic value that have nothing to do with our well-
being.  This relates to the problem of remote desires discussed above.  We may care 
about the flourishing of a stranger, or some distant future scenario (e.g. the prevention of 
run-away climate change), and these things may indeed have intrinsic value.  Yet, even 
if these things intrinsically matter, they may not have any intrinsic prudential value.   
Smuts (MS) argues that our desire to stay in contact with reality reflects something that 
intrinsic matters, but does not have intrinsic prudential value.  Indeed, he argues that the 
only things of intrinsic prudential value are our experiences.  For reasons mentioned in 
the previous section, I believe this is inadequate in that it reduces well-being to a notion 
that is too narrow to be able to play the important role that well-being has in our practical 
lives.   
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value.  Alternatively put, surely the best explanation that some things matter 
intrinsically to people is that they have intrinsic prudential value?  Not so, 
according to the hedonist.  Our intrinsic values may be best explained by 
evolutionary or psychological mechanisms, and not the fact that they are 
things that have intrinsic prudential value.  As Chris Heathwood puts it: “It is a 
common mistake to attribute intrinsic value to highly reliable instrumental 
values. If we get pleasure every time we appreciate great art, perhaps this 
causes us to mistakenly judge that appreciating great art is itself of intrinsic 
value.” (Heathwood, MS: p.10)  
According to Crisp, the things we care about are simply those that have 
reliably provided us with pleasure in the past.  In a similar vein, Matthew 
Silverstein gives the following explanation of our intrinsic desire to be in 
contact with reality:   
‘‘[Our intuitions against prudential hedonism] reflect our desire to remain 
connected to the real world, to track reality. But…the desire to track reality 
owes its hold upon us to the role it has played in the creation of happiness. 
We acquire our powerful attachment to reality after finding again and again 
that deception almost always ends in suffering. We develop a desire to track 
reality because, in almost all cases, the connection to reality is conducive to 
happiness. Our intuitive views about what is prudentially good…owe their 
existence to happiness.’’ (Silverstein 2000: p.296). 
We have, then, the following two views.  According to critiques of prudential 
hedonism, the theory fails to account for the fact that we care about things 
beyond our experiential lives.  This matters because we see these as being 
good for us.  However, according to hedonists, prudential hedonism can 
account for the things we care about – we care about these things because 
they have reliably caused us pleasure (and presumably are likely to continue 
to cause us pleasure).  It is not obvious how to decide which view provides us 
with the best explanation of why some things matter intrinsically to people.  
The explanation offered by hedonism certainly seems wrong to me – it seems 
that I intrinsically care about my loved ones, for example, because they are 
valuable.  However, the hedonist does not deny that this seems to be the 
case; they merely contend that, on closer inspection, there is a plausible 
reason why this seems to be the case, and that is because my loved ones (to 
continue the example) have repeatedly made me happy.  In the absence of 
any further argument against this explanation, the counterintuitive nature of 
prudential hedonism does not render it an implausible theory of well-being. 
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2.4.4  Another Problem with Prudential Hedonism 
In the previous section, I argued that the major problem with hedonism is that 
it does not do justice to the phenomenology of prudential value.  We care 
about things beyond our experiential lives – we see certain things, such as 
our health and our loved ones as being good for us.  In response, however, 
the hedonist can argue that we should not trust such intuitions.  The things we 
see as being good for us, according to the hedonist, are simply those things 
that reliably cause pleasure in us; it is the pleasure that we receive from such 
things that is good for us, not the things themselves.   
In this section, I will argue that there is another major problem with hedonism, 
which is related to this response.  Simply put, hedonism does not provide us 
with an account of well-being as something that we can promote.  This is 
because the things we care about (i.e. the things we see as being good for 
us) guide our action.  When our experiences of pleasure and the things we 
care about come apart, hedonism is implausible.      
In our practical lives, we cannot directly act to attain experiences of pleasure 
or desire-satisfaction.  We can only attain such experiences indirectly.  We 
must act to attain the objects or causes of pleasure.  These objects will tend 
to be relational properties, rather than states of body or mind.  For example, 
we cannot directly attain the experience of satisfying our desire for an intimate 
relationship.  Instead, we must attain an intimate relationship, which would 
satisfy our desire.  It is the objects or causes of our pro-attitudes that are 
action-guiding, not the satisfaction of the pro-attitudes themselves.  As 
Tiberius puts it, the satisfaction of pro-attitudes “cannot be produced without 
attending to their objects and causes. We cannot act to secure …desire 
satisfaction directly; rather, we have to bring about the conditions that give 
rise to them.” (Tiberius, 2007: p.382)     
In our practical deliberation and evaluation, we have to focus on things 
beyond our experiential lives, such as our intimate relationships, friendships, 
career, education, health, etc.  These are the things we care about.  
Moreover, these are the things that we think of when considering our own 
well-being or the well-being of others.  As a result, well-being plays an 
important role in our practical lives.  For example, we think of our own well-
being when considering what career path to go down, or who to be in a long-
term relationship with.  Likewise, we think of the well-being of others when 
considering how best to help or punish them.     
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In restricting well-being to our experiential lives, hedonism cannot account for 
the fact that well-being is something that we need to be able to promote.  The 
important role that well-being plays in our practical lives may be one of its 
defining features.  Caregivers, developmental organisations and public policy 
practitioners tend to ask whether certain actions or policies will make people 
better off.  The moral theory of Utilitarianism consists in evaluating the 
goodness of actions, rules or motives entirely on the basis of whether they 
maximize people’s well-being.  In short, we use the notion of well-being in a 
wide-range of practical deliberation and evaluation.  This is not to say that 
well-being is the only thing that we appeal to in our practical lives – we can 
sacrifice our well-being, for instance, in favour of things that we deem to be 
more important (such as moral virtue, beauty, perfection, and so on).  
Nonetheless, it seems clear that well-being plays a prominent practical role. 
Hedonism fails to do justice to the practical importance of well-being. With 
regards to the different concepts of well-being discussed in chapter one, 
hedonism reduces well-being to the narrow concept of well-being.  This 
concept only refers to a person’s non-relational properties, such as their 
experiences.  As Kagan puts it, it concerns how well a person is doing, rather 
than how well a person’s life is going (Kagan, 1992).   The problem is that this 
is not how we use the notion of well-being.  We use the notion of well-being in 
a wider sense, in a way that includes both our experiences and states of the 
world.53  
Interestingly, Kagan explicitly notes this limitation of a narrow concept of well-
being.  He states the implications of his argument as follows: 
                                            
53 Note that this does not necessarily mean that well-being concerns how well a person’s life 
is going, rather than how well the person is doing.  We can take issue with Kagan’s 
distinction between a between a person and a person’s life.  Kagan argues that a person 
is nothing more than a body and mind, whereas a person’s life is constituted by 
additional relational properties, such as having certain possessions, attributes, 
friendships, etc.  Yet, we can claim, contra Kagan, that relational properties, as well as a 
body and mind, also constitute a person.  Another way of putting this is that Kagan may 
make the mistake of equivocating two difference senses of ‘affecting’ someone.  Kagan 
argues that nothing can affect your well-being without affecting your intrinsic properties 
(i.e., your experiences).  But it seems that something can affect you in the sense of being 
an event that you have self-interested reasons to care about (Scanlon, 1998).  For 
example, the experience of being subtly mocked (without realizing it) does not affect your 
body or mind, but it does seem to affect you in another sense.  That is, you (and others 
who care about you) generally have reason to hope that no such event actually happens 
to you.  The notion of well-being more plausibly fits the latter sense of a person, rather 
than the former.    
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“If this is right, then the importance of well-being might be less than we often 
take it to be. In many cases, the pursuit of external personal goods will be far 
more important than the pursuit of the internal goods that happen to comprise 
well-being. The more narrowly we understand well-being, the more likely that 
this is the case. If well-being is limited in its extent, then it may also be limited 
in its significance.” (Kagan, 1992: p.189) 
The problem with this position, however, is that well-being plays an important 
role in our practical lives for a reason.  Well-being guides our action.  A 
plausible substantive theory of well-being should provide us with an account 
of the things that are good for us that we can pursue in our practical lives.  
One way of putting this point is that hedonism is objectionably self-effacing.  It 
maintains that the thing that justifies something as having prudential value 
(i.e. pleasure) should not play a part in our practical deliberation (Williams 
2013; Keller 2013).  
However, proponents of a more “sophisticated” form of hedonism may 
challenge these assumptions.54  The sophisticated hedonist may argue that, 
even though we cannot pursue experiences of pleasure directly, we can 
indirectly pursue pleasure through the pursuit of the things that reliably cause 
pleasure in us.  As Peter Railton notes, the sophisticated hedonist’s 
motivational structure should meet a counterfactual condition; according to 
Railton, “[the sophisticated hedonist] need not always act for the sake of 
happiness, since he may do various things for their own sake or for the sake 
of others, but he would not act as he does if it were not compatible with his 
leading [a life that reliably causes him to experience pleasure].” (Railton, 
1984: 145) According to sophisticated hedonism, once we realize that certain 
things in our lives reliably cause us to experience pleasure then we can 
pursue those things directly, even though they are merely good for us 
instrumentally.  
Thus, the sophisticated hedonist might claim that it is extremely unlikely for 
experiences of pleasure to become significantly divorced from the wide range 
of things that we consider in our practical lives (e.g. our intimate relationships, 
friendships, professional and academic success, health, etc.).  As mentioned 
in the previous section, hedonists can maintain that the wide range of things 
                                            
54 I will use the label “sophisticated hedonism” to refer to the theory of prudential hedonism 
that is justified in the ways outlined in this section.  The label is influenced by Peter 
Railton’s seminal paper on sophisticated consequentialism (Railton 1984).     
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that we consider in our practical deliberation and evaluation are the things that 
reliably cause us pleasure – it may be for this reason that we have come to 
care about them, directly pursue them, and deliberate and evaluate them.     
Indeed, the sophisticated hedonist might argue that it is only in extreme cases 
(such as the case presented by Nozick’s experience machine thought-
experiment, or Hollywood films such as The Matrix or The Truman Show55) 
that the objects of our practical deliberation and evaluation reliably come apart 
from our pleasurable experiences.  Thus, in reducing well-being to our 
experiential lives, hedonism may still be able to adequately guide our action.  
It is possible that the continued popularity of prudential hedonism, despite 
numerous critiques throughout the history of moral philosophy, is due to the 
fact that the ways of living that make us feel good also tend to be ways of 
living that we desire and aim for: helping others and engaging in meaningful 
activities, good relationships, and exercising our capacities.56 In this way, the 
sophisticated hedonist can seemingly provide us with a view of well-being that 
accounts for the important role that well-being plays in our practical lives.      
However, I do not think that a more sophisticated form of hedonism can 
account for the things we most care about.  This is because the empirical 
                                            
55 Indeed, some theorists have recently argued that even extreme cases, such as the 
experience machine, cannot replicate the hedonic consequences of being in touch with 
reality.   
For instance, Bramble (MS) argues that the reason continued contact with real people is 
so essential to our well-being is that any life without it could not be hedonically adequate 
in the long run.  In particular, he argues that a machine could not simulate one’s close 
friends and loved ones in a satisfactory way in the long run: “Only real, conscious selves 
who understand and have genuine affection and concern for one can know just the right 
things to say, and the right ways to behave more generally (right down to subtle facial 
expressions and bodily gestures), in one’s company, in enough of the many emotionally 
complex situations friends confront over the course of a life-long relationship to allow one 
the full range of highly pleasurable pleasures that are available through such 
relationships.” (Bramble, MS: p.12)  
Similarly, Sizer (2010) argues that subjective aspects of happiness are so closely 
intertwined with and attuned to objective facts about the world that pulling off the kind of 
a deceit portrayed in the film “The Truman Show” is practically impossible. She points 
out that we have evolved sophisticated emotion detection systems that are exquisitely 
attuned to subtleties in the actions and affects of others: “Even though we are not 
consciously aware of them, we are sensitive to automatic emotion microexpressions that 
can betray deception or insincerity. We perceive and react to these subtleties largely 
unconsciously, so their effects can be magnified and ramify throughout our interactions 
and relationships.” (Sizer, 2010: p.157)  
56 See, for instance, Rawls’ “Aristotelian Principle” with regards to how exercising our 
capacities reliably causes us to feel good (Rawls, 1971).     
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claims made by the sophisticated hedonist are incorrect.  The sophisticated 
hedonist claims that the things that we care about (i.e. the things that guide 
our action) as a matter of fact tend to reliably cause us pleasure.  Thus, 
hedonism accounts for the important role that well-being plays in our practical 
lives – it maintains that we should pursue well-being indirectly through the 
pursuit of the things we care about.       
The problem is that these empirical claims are only half right.  On the one 
hand, the sophisticated hedonist is right in claiming that many of the things we 
value are things that reliably cause us pleasure (even if we do not value them 
for that reason).  Empirical researchers have shown that happiness reliably 
correlates with conditions such as helping others, and engaging in meaningful 
activities, good relationships, and exercising our capacities (Haybron 2013).  
On the other hand, however, the sophisticated hedonist is wrong in claiming 
that all (or even most) of the things we care about are things that reliably 
cause us pleasure.  For instance, researchers have shown that happiness 
does not reliably correlate with conditions such as income or education 
(Kahneman & Deaton 2010).  Yet, we tend to care about these conditions – 
they are the things that guide our action.  Hedonism is unable to account for 
this fact.57   
In response, the sophisticated hedonist may object that such empirical 
findings do not concern happiness in the long-term.  It may be that, in the 
long-run, conditions such as income or education reliably cause us pleasure.  
Consider, for instance, going to the dentist.  Going to the dentist is 
unpleasant, but people still do such things because they anticipate that doing 
so will be better for them than allowing their teeth to decay.  They anticipate 
that some pain now will lead to less pain later.  As Daniel Hausman succinctly 
puts it: “There is such a thing as prudence.” (Hausman 2010: p.330) Prudence 
often consists in our delaying pleasurable experiences in order to invest in 
some future positive state.  Attaining such things as higher levels of income 
and educational attainment are clear examples of things that require our 
prudence.  They require us to put in (displeasurable) hard work and effort in 
order to attain a much greater (pleasurable) reward.  Thus, the sophisticated 
hedonist may claim that the things we care about that require prudence will 
tend to reliably cause us pleasure in the long-run.   
                                            
57 For a similar argument, see Angner (forthcoming). 
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Note that, if this is correct, prudential hedonism may not be inconsistent with 
the theory-neutral account of well-being.  Recall that the theory-neutral 
account concerns general causal connections between well-being ingredients.  
According to the theory-neutral account, happiness correlates with well-being 
to the extent that it tends to be caused by other well-being ingredients.  Now, 
the sophisticated hedonist claims that happiness tends to be caused by the 
things we care about (at least in the long-run).  Assuming that the things we 
care about tend to be well-being ingredients, this suggests that the theory-
neutral account and prudential hedonism will tend to be consistent.        
Unfortunately, however, I think there are two problems with this response.  
Firstly, if these empirical claims are true, hedonism may be inadequate for the 
purposes of measuring well-being.  In order to know whether someone is well 
off, according to hedonism, we would need to measure that person’s 
happiness over a long period of time.  Consider, for example, the debate in 
the subjective well-being literature over whether having children tends to 
make people happy.  Researchers have found that the impact that having 
children have on people’s happiness tends to change over the life course.  
Very roughly, having children does not tend to make people happier when the 
children are growing up (i.e. when parents have to do all the work), but does 
tend to make people happier after they have left home (Hansen 2012; 
Umberson et al. 2010; Dolan et al. 2008).  A similar story can be told about 
getting an education (Kahneman & Deaton 2010).  In order to know whether 
having children tends to make people happier (and therefore, according to 
hedonism, better off) overall, researchers would need to measure people’s 
happiness throughout their entire lives, or at least over a very long period of 
time.  This may be practically infeasible.  Yet, answering these kinds of 
questions (i.e. does having children, or getting an education, make me better 
off?) is what we want to measure well-being for. 
The second problem with the sophisticated hedonist’s response is that it 
simply may not be true that the things we care about that require prudence 
will tend to reliably cause us pleasure in the long-run.  Consider, for example, 
a mountaineer who judges that it would be good for them to partake in an 
extremely difficult (and dangerous) climb.  During the climb we can assume 
that their level of happiness is low – the climb requires considerable amounts 
of effort, risk-taking, uncomfortable conditions, and so on.  Yet, despite being 
unhappy, we can assume that the mountaineer is satisfied, as they are 
predicting that they will successfully climb the mountain.  Indeed, upon 
completion of the climb, we can further assume that the mountaineer is very 
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happy and very satisfied.  However, it is not obvious that the total amount of 
happiness experienced by the mountaineer throughout the climb (or, indeed, 
before and after the climb) was very high.  The climb may have provided them 
with a sense of life satisfaction, but it does not seem to have made them 
happy in the long-run. 
It seems that we can tell a similar story about the kinds of conditions that do 
not tend to reliably cause pleasure in us, such as our level of income or 
educational attainment (Kahneman & Deaton, 2010).  The things we care 
about that require prudence may not tend to provide us with pleasure in the 
long-run because the function of pleasure may not be to detect such things.  
Pleasure may predominantly have the function of being reliably caused by 
how well we are doing from moment-to-moment, with regards to our short-
term goals and objectives.  Completing a difficult climb may feel good, as 
does receiving a promotion or a degree, but getting to that stage may require 
a considerable amount of hard work.  The function of pleasure (and 
displeasure) may largely be to steer us through such difficult processes, 
rather than to register the eventual achievement.  From this point of view, we 
should not expect some (or perhaps many) of the things we care about to 
reliably cause us pleasure in the long-run.58   
In sum, happiness and the things we care about can come apart.  The 
sophisticated hedonist aims to show that, in practice, this is unlikely.  In this 
section, I have argued that these empirical claims are false.  Happiness and 
our long-term conditions (such as our level of income or educational 
attainment) may tend to come apart.  In such contexts, hedonism maintains 
that happiness, rather than the things we care about, correlate with well-
being.  Yet, it is the things we care about that guide our action.  Insofar we 
have reasons to promote our well-being, this renders hedonism an 
implausible substantive theory of well-being.         
2.4.5  What is Right and Wrong about Hedonism 
I think the underlying problem with hedonism is that it seeks to elucidate well-
being at the wrong level of explanation.  In chapter one, I showed that well-
being plays an important role in our practical lives – in deliberating over major 
life decisions, for example, or in evaluating the help that we give to others.  A 
                                            
58 I will consider this kind of case, as well as the distinction between happiness and life 
satisfaction, in more detail in chapter five.   
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large amount of our practical deliberation and evaluation concerns well-being: 
choosing the right career is good for us; effectively helping the people we care 
about is good for them; and so on.  A plausible theory of well-being, therefore, 
must provide us with an account of well-being at this level – the level of 
practical deliberation and evaluation.  In our practical lives, we consider the 
things that we care about – our relationships, our professional and academic 
success, our health, etc.  These are the things that we see as having 
prudential value, and are the things that we can directly pursue.  A theory of 
well-being that strays too far from these things will cease to be a theory about 
well-being.   
In reducing the things we care about to their effects on our experiential lives, 
hedonism attempts to elucidate well-being at a level of explanation that is too 
abstract, too far removed from our practical lives and the things we care 
about.  At this level of abstraction, it is not surprising that hedonism is an 
inadequate theory of well-being for the purposes of measuring well-being.  
Our practical deliberation and evaluation takes place at the level it does 
because that is the most effective way of promoting well-being with limited 
information.  We do not need to know whether a particular career path will 
make us happier in the long-run, for example, in order to assess whether it 
would be good for us.  We merely need to consider various attributes that it 
has over alternative career paths, such as more autonomy, a greater salary, a 
more co-operative working community, etc.  To a large extent, the effective 
measurement of well-being will need to also take place at this level.  At a 
greater level of abstraction contextual information is lost, and the 
measurement of well-being becomes more practically infeasible.  
However, the above discussion also helps us to understand what is right 
about prudential hedonism.  To a certain extent, the things we care about 
(and that make a difference to our well-being) are closely connected to our 
experiential lives.  As mentioned above, the continued popularity of hedonism 
is perhaps largely due to the fact that a life of pleasure tends to correlate with 
many aspects of a life that are generally thought to be good for us (such as a 
life that consists in intimate relationships, good friendships, health, exercising 
our capacities, altruistic activities, etc.).  As Laura Sizer puts it: “the subjective 
aspects of happiness are so closely intertwined with and attuned to objective 
facts about the world that…[normally], happiness is a reliable barometer of 
well-being.” (Sizer, 2010: p.156) In chapter three, I will suggest that we have 
good reason to treat happiness as an indicator of well-being in this respect.  
Hedonism may be an implausible theory of well-being, but I think it is right to 
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emphasise that a life of well-being will tend to be closely bound up with a life 
of happiness.   
2.5  Adaptive Preferences  
In the previous main section, I argued that prudential hedonism is implausible, 
in that it entails happiness perfectly correlates with well-being.  This fails to 
account for the prudential value of some of the things we most care about.  
We see the things we intrinsically care about as having intrinsic prudential 
value, and we directly pursue such things in our practical lives.  Prudential 
hedonism fails to account for the things we care about that do not tend to 
cause happiness, such as one’s level of income or educational attainment.  
In this section, I will use a similar argument to claim that the opposite kind of 
substantive theory – one that maintains happiness correlates with well-being 
to a lesser extent than the theory-neutral account – is also implausible. Such 
a theory fails to account for some of the things we most care about.  In 
particular, it fails to account for the things we care about that do tend to cause 
happiness, such as the quality of one’s health and relationships (Kahneman & 
Deaton 2010).   
Why would one think the opposite to that of prudential hedonism, namely that 
happiness is very weakly (rather than perfectly) correlated with well-being?  
One reason to question the extent to which happiness correlates with well-
being is the phenomenon of adaptive preferences.  Amartya Sen (1999) and 
Martha Nussbaum (2000), for instance, on the basis of cases of adaptive 
preferences, have influentially criticised substantive theories of well-being that 
maintain happiness (or preference-satisfaction) constitutes well-being.  Cases 
of adaptive preferences consist in circumstances in which people adapt to 
unfavourable conditions to such an extent that they are still able to be happy 
or satisfied.  Thus, people can be happy despite having extremely poor 
standards of living.  As Sen puts it: 
“[P]eople living under tyranny may lack the courage to desire freedom, and 
may come to terms with the deprivations of liberty, taking whatever pleasure 
they can in small reliefs, so that in the scale of utility (measured either in 
terms of mental satisfaction, or in terms of intensities of desire), the 
deprivations may be muffled and muted…Tyrannies operate not just by 
violating freedoms, but often by making collaborators out of victims.” (Sen 
2004: p.634) 
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The kinds of cases Sen describes all involve people who lack certain central 
capabilities (Nussbaum, 2001: p.139).  Sen writes of “perennially oppressed 
minorities in intolerant communities” and “hopelessly subdued housewives in 
severely sexist cultures” (Sen, 1999: p.62-63).  Such people lack central 
capabilities such as being able to be treated as a dignified human being.  I will 
assume that such central capabilities are important well-being ingredients 
(that is, we tend to think of them as being good for people, and they tend to be 
strongly causally connected to many other well-being ingredients).  The kinds 
of cases Sen describes aim to show that, despite the absence of important 
well-being ingredients, individuals are still able to be happy.             
Cases of adaptive preferences suggest that happiness may be very weakly 
correlated with well-being.  It is important to note that this, in itself, would not 
necessarily be inconsistent with the theory-neutral account.  The theory-
neutral account merely maintains that happiness tends to be correlated with 
well-being to the extent that it tends to be caused by (or cause) other well-
being ingredients.  Cases of adaptive preferences may show that happiness 
does not tend to be causally related to other well-being ingredients, and 
thereby is very weakly correlated with well-being.  This is entirely consistent 
with the theory-neutral account developed in this chapter.  As Sen claims, 
happiness may tend to be caused by “small mercies” rather than important 
well-being ingredients.  
As it happens, I think that the kind of cases Sen describes do not convincingly 
show that happiness fails to be caused by other well-being ingredients.  First 
of all, it is not obvious that the people Sen describes as having successfully 
adapted to their circumstances are in fact as happy as Sen makes out.  As 
Haybron notes, “while it is easy to imagine people becoming resigned to 
oppressive circumstances, even registering satisfaction with their lives or 
showing the world a happy face, it is not so easy to imagine the enslaved, the 
solitary homeless, and the brownbeater sweatshop laborer leading 
emotionally fulfilling lives.” (Haybron, 2008: p.124)59  
Secondly, assuming that the people Sen describes are happy, it seems 
reasonable to assume that their happiness tends to be caused by certain well-
                                            
59 Haybron goes on to suggest that adaptation is unlikely to occur for certain kinds of 
affective states, such as anxiety or stress.  He notes that, “if you are living under threat, 
and things stay that way for a long time, it makes little sense to let your defenses down 
and cease responding as if you are under threat.  So long as they are out to get you, you 
had best stay prepared.” (Haybron, 2008: p.124)  
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being ingredients, such as the quality of their relationships and health.  
Researchers have shown these things to be key determinants of happiness, 
as well as other potential well-being ingredients, such as meaningful activity, 
skill development, autonomy, and so on (Diener & Biswas-Diener 2008).  
Insofar as the people Sen describes are happy, it seems reasonable to 
assume that it is because their lives contain some of these ingredients, in 
addition to the small mercies.60      
Thus, cases of adaptive preferences may not show, as Sen is sometimes 
taken to claim, that happiness fails to be caused by other well-being 
ingredients.  Happiness tends to be caused by certain well-being ingredients, 
such as the quality of one’s relationships and health (Kahneman & Deaton 
2010).   
However, one could still argue that cases of adaptive preferences show the 
following.  People may be able to adapt to their circumstances to such an 
extent that their happiness does not tend to be caused by the most important 
well-being ingredients, such as central capabilities.  Even if we assume that 
happiness does tend to be caused by certain well-being ingredients, such as 
the quality of one’s health and relationships, we can doubt the importance of 
these things.  We could argue that, in contrast to central capabilities, health 
and relationships are not as important for well-being.  Alternatively put, we 
could argue that, in contrast to the things that do not tend to cause happiness, 
the things that do tend to cause happiness are relatively unimportant.   
The upshot of this argument would be that happiness tends to be correlated 
with well-being to a lesser extent than is maintained by the theory-neutral 
account.  According to the theory-neutral account, happiness is correlated 
with well-being to the extent that it is causally connected to other well-being 
ingredients.  This is likely to include well-being ingredients such as the quality 
of one’s health and relationships.  In contrast, according to the substantive 
theory of well-being in question, these well-being ingredients may not 
(significantly) contribute towards well-being.      
The problem with this argument is similar to the problem faced by prudential 
hedonism, discussed above.  That is, it does not adequately take into account 
the things we most care about.  In this case, it does not take into account the 
                                            
60 I will consider the relationship between happiness, well-being and adaptive preferences in 
further detail in chapter four. 
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value of the well-being ingredients that tend to cause happiness, such as 
relationships, health, engagement, autonomy, etc.  It claims that these things 
are relatively unimportant in contrast to the well-being ingredients that do not 
tend to cause happiness, such as one’s level of income and educational 
attainment.  The problem with such a claim is that it fails to do justice to the 
phenomenology of prudential value.  When we care about certain things, we 
see them as being good for us.  Alternatively put, the fact that we care about 
the well-being ingredients that tend to cause happiness is evidence that these 
things matter for well-being.   
Any substantive theory of well-being that maintains the things we most care 
are not in fact good for us is implausible.  Recall from our discussion of 
prudential hedonism above that hedonists have a potential reason for 
doubting the phenomenology of prudential value.  According to hedonism, the 
things we most care about may simply be the things that reliably cause us 
pleasure.  This option, however, is not available to the substantive theory in 
question.  The well-being ingredients that tend to cause happiness are those 
things that such an account denies have (significant) prudential value.  In the 
absence of any reason to go against our intuitions of what is good for us in 
this way, such a substantive theory of well-being is implausible.   
In sum, I believe that substantive theories of well-being inspired by cases of 
adaptive preferences – which maintain that happiness correlates with well-
being to a lesser extent than the theory-neutral account – are implausible.  I 
have argued that such theories are implausible in a similar way to prudential 
hedonism, in that, they fail to account for some of the things we most care 
about.  In particular, such theories fail to account for the things we care about 
that do tend to cause happiness, such as the quality of one’s health and 
relationships. 
2.6  The Theory-Neutral Account Revisited 
In the previous two main sections, I have considered substantive theories of 
well-being that are inconsistent with the theory-neutral account – those that 
maintain happiness correlates with well-being to either a greater or lesser 
extent than the theory-neutral account.  I have argued that such substantive 
theories are implausible in that they fail to take into account some of the 
things we care about.  It remains to be seen, however, whether the theory-
neutral account of well-being fairs better in this respect.  In the final main 
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section of this chapter, I will show that it does, and is thereby consistent with 
all plausible substantive theories of well-being.            
2.6.1  The theory-neutral account and the things we care about 
The theory-neutral account maintains that well-being ingredients tend to be 
correlated with well-being.  Well-being ingredients are goods that (a) have 
prudential value according to any substantive theory of well-being (i.e. are the 
objects of platitudes about well-being) and (b) are causally connected to other 
goods that meet condition (a).  So far, I have implicitly assumed that the 
objects of well-being platitudes coincide with the things that we tend to care 
about.  For example, the claims that income, education, relationships and 
health contribute towards well-being are all platitudes about well-being.  We 
also care about these things.  But do we have any reason for thinking that this 
will tend to be the case?      
I think we do.  In formulating substantive theories of well-being, philosophers 
cannot stray too far away from the things that people tend to care about, such 
as security, achieving major goals, developing and exercising your capacities, 
pleasure, and so on (Tiberius 2013b).  This is because such theories aim to 
provide an adequate description of well-being (Sumner, 1996).  Providing 
such a description requires accommodating people’s intuitions about the 
things that are good for them.  Without accommodation our intuitions in this 
way, it is not obvious that philosophers are providing a description of well-
being, rather than a description of an altogether different notion.   
The result is that the things that are good for people, according to substantive 
theories of well-being, tend to also be things that ordinary people tend to care 
about.  As Haybron and Tiberius note, this result, “is not surprising given that 
theories of well-being are standardly defended through the method of 
reflective equilibrium, which relies heavily on intuitions about cases." (Haybron 
& Tiberius, MS: p.9) Thus, the objects of platitudes about well-being and the 
things people care about will tend to coincide.  This means that the theory-
neutral account will tend to provide us with a plausible understanding of well-
being.    
Note that the arguments in this chapter support the stronger claim that the 
theory-neutral account of well-being is consistent with all plausible substantive 
theories of well-being.  I have argued that the substantive theories of well-
being that are inconsistent with the theory-neutral account (in that they 
maintain happiness correlates with well-being to either a greater or lesser 
extent) are implausible.  Such theories fail to account for some of the things 
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we most care about.  In contrast, the theory-neutral account of well-being 
does tend to take into account the things we most care about.  The 
substantive theories of well-being that are consistent with the theory-neutral 
account (in that they maintain happiness correlates with well-being to the 
same extent) are plausible theories of well-being in this respect.     
2.6.2  Is the theory-neutral account a substantive theory of well-
being? 
The theory-neutral account is not a substantive theory of well-being, in that it 
remains neutral over whether any particular well-being ingredient is either 
constitutively or causally related to well-being.  We cannot know which well-
being ingredients in fact constitute well-being without a correct substantive 
theory of well-being.   
However, it is worth noting that a substantive theory of well-being has recently 
been developed, which has much in common with the theory-neutral account.  
Michael Bishop’s Network Theory (NT) is the view that well-being is 
constituted by positive causal networks of feelings, attitudes, traits and 
outcomes (Bishop, MS).  According to this view, any particular feeling, 
attitude, trait or outcome contributes towards well-being to the extent that it is 
part of a positive causal network; that is, to the extent that it tends to be 
causally connected to other feelings, attitudes, traits or outcomes (what 
Bishop calls “nodes”).   
For instance, according to NT, happiness contributes towards well-being to 
the extent that it is causally connected to certain attitudes, traits or outcomes.  
Thus, happiness contributes to well-being insofar as it is caused by certain 
outcomes, such as quality relationships, meaningful activity, health, etc.  It 
also contributes to well-being insofar as it caused certain attitudes or traits, 
such as being more optimistic, sociable, having more energy, etc.  The more 
these nodes are causally connected to other nodes, the more happiness 
contributes towards well-being.  In short, the extent to which happiness 
contributes towards well-being is determined by the extent to which it is a part 
of positive causal networks.   
NT is effectively the theory-neutral account of well-being developed in this 
chapter without the theory-neutral part.  The theory-neutral account maintains 
that any particular well-being ingredient tends to be correlated with well-being 
to the extent that it is causally related to other well-being ingredients.  As 
mentioned above, it remains neutral over whether this correlation is due to a 
constitutive or causal relationship.  In contrast, NT maintains that any 
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particular node (i.e. feeling, attitude, trait or outcome) tends to constitute well-
being to the extent that it is causally related to other nodes.  For Bishop, the 
causal networks that bond together different aspects of our lives have 
prudential value.  For the theory-neutral account, these causal relations 
merely enable us to gain a broad understanding of well-being without having 
to commit to a particular view about what well-being consists in.   
There is, however, one difference between Bishop’s substantive theory and 
the theory-neutral account of well-being developed in this chapter.  The aim of 
developing the theory-neutral account was to gain a broad understanding of 
well-being that is consistent with most substantive theories of well-being.  
Thus, I focused on generating a list of goods that have prudential value 
according to any substantive theory of well-being – the objects of platitudes 
about well-being.  In contrast, Bishop’s aim is partly to develop a substantive 
theory of well-being that accommodates empirical research from the field of 
positive psychology.  Thus, he focuses on generating a list of goods that 
positive psychologists study – feelings, attitudes, traits and outcomes.  In 
doing so, Bishop may inadvertently miss out some important well-being 
ingredients from his theory, such as certain resources or capabilities.61  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that we can investigate the correlation between 
happiness and well-being without a substantive theory of well-being.  There 
are no widely acceptable substantive theories of well-being.  Yet, we need a 
widely acceptable understanding of well-being in order to investigate how 
successfully we can measure well-being through measuring happiness.  I 
have argued in favour of a theory-neutral account of well-being, which is both 
broadly informative and consistent with most substantive theories of well-
being.  
According to the theory-neutral account, we can understand well-being with 
regard to a number of “well-being ingredients.”  Well-being ingredients are the 
objects of platitudes about well-being that are causally connected to the 
objects of other well-being platitudes.  The theory-neutral account remains 
neutral over whether any particular well-being ingredient is constitutively or 
                                            
61 In contrast, in focusing on substantive theories of well-being, the theory-neutral account 
may miss out on some of the things that contribute towards well-being that philosophical 
accounts, and people’s intuitions about well-being, have failed to acknowledge.   
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causally related to well-being.  For example, insofar as happiness is caused 
by friendship, it may be that either happiness constitutes well-being and 
friendship causes well-being, or vice versa.  The theory-neutral account 
merely maintains that both well-being ingredients tend to be correlated with 
well-being.  The extent to which any particular well-being ingredient correlates 
with well-being is determined by the extent to which it is causally connected to 
other well-being ingredients.  In the remainder of this thesis, I will investigate 
the extent to which happiness is caused by well-being ingredients, and 
thereby correlates with well-being.  
 103 
Chapter 3 
Happiness as an Indicator of Well-being 
 
Abstract 
In this chapter, I will argue in favour of the Indicator View – the view that 
happiness is a defeasible indicator of well-being.  According to the Indicator 
View, it is appropriate for us to take happiness as an indicator of well-being 
unless we have reason to do otherwise.     
In the first main section of the chapter, I will argue that we have reason to 
believe that happiness tends to be reliably caused by well-being ingredients.  
This is because the function of affective states is to inform and guide our 
action, which they do partly by detecting evaluative features of our 
environment that bear on our well-being.  It is reasonable to presume that 
affective states are not generally dysfunctional and thereby that they reliably 
perform this function.  Thus, we have reason to believe that happiness tends 
to be correlated with well-being; we should, in an important range of cases, 
treat happiness as an indicator of well-being.    
In the second section of the chapter, I will argue against a stronger claim, 
namely that it is appropriate to take happiness as a general indicator of well-
being.  We have reason to believe that happiness tends to be reliably caused 
by things other than well-being ingredients.  Affective states partly perform 
their function by detecting evaluative features of our environment that do not 
bear on our well-being, such as moral or aesthetic features.  In addition, our 
affective states can be systematically dysfunctional.  The Indicator View 
should be sensitive to the empirical possibility that happiness does not tend to 
be generally correlated with well-being; we should treat happiness as a 
defeasible indicator of well-being.   
In the third section of the chapter, I will consider the kinds of evidence that are 
required to defeat the evidence about well-being provided by happiness.  I will 
distinguish between two kinds of defeaters, namely undercutting and rebutting 
defeaters.  I will argue that, in practice, we need evidence of both kinds of 
defeaters in order to conclude that a particular defeater is present, and 
thereby not treat happiness as an indicator of well-being. 
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3.1  Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I outlined a theory-neutral account of well-being that 
is both broadly informative and consistent with most substantive theories of 
well-being.  According to the theory-neutral account, happiness correlates 
with well-being to the extent that it is causally connected to other well-being 
ingredients.  This may either be because happiness is constitutively or 
causally related to well-being; on this, the account remains neutral.  For 
example, we might find that happiness is caused by certain well-being 
ingredients (such as the quality of one’s health or relationships) but not by 
others (such as one’s level of income or educational attainment).  If this were 
the case, happiness would correlate with certain aspects of well-being (e.g. 
those aspects that are either constituted by or causally related to health and 
relationships) but not others (e.g. those aspects that are either constituted by 
or causally related to income and education).  We can therefore, investigate 
the extent to which happiness correlates with well-being by considering the 
extent to which happiness is causally connected to other well-being 
ingredients.    
This is the topic of this chapter.  I will argue that we have reason to believe 
that happiness tends to be reliably caused by well-being ingredients.  
According to the theory-neutral account outlined in the previous chapter, we 
therefore have reason to believe that happiness tends to be correlated with 
well-being.  Insofar as we have reason to believe that happiness correlates 
with well-being, we should treat happiness as an indicator of well-being.  I will 
call this the Indicator View.  
The Indicator View seems fairly straightforward.  It may seem obvious, for 
instance, to sophisticated hedonists – the main substantive theory of well-
being discussed in detail in chapter two.  Recall that sophisticated hedonists 
support their view by claiming that happiness tends to be reliably caused by 
well-being ingredients, such as our relationships, achievements, health, 
opportunities, etc.  I suggested that such theorists might be right in this 
respect – happiness and well-being do not tend to come apart; hence the 
need for outlandish thought experiments to separate the two, such as Robert 
Nozick’s experience machine thought-experiment (or the scenarios presented 
in Hollywood films such as The Matrix and The Truman Show).   
However, despite the initiative plausibility of such claims, I argued in chapter 
two that they require further justification.  Indeed, there may be certain kinds 
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of well-being ingredients that do not tend to reliably cause happiness, such as 
income and education (Kahneman & Deaton, 2010).  According to the theory-
neutral account of well-being developed in the previous chapter, if happiness 
is not causally connected to certain well-being ingredients then we have 
reason to believe that happiness does not correlate with certain aspects of 
well-being (i.e. the aspects of well-being that are either causally related to or 
constituted by those well-being ingredients).  In the contexts in which 
happiness is not reliably caused by certain well-being ingredients, therefore, 
we have reason to believe that happiness does not correlate with well-being.  
In such contexts, we should not treat happiness as an indicator of well-being.   
Thus, the Indicator View may be less straightforward than it at first seems.  
On the one hand, the view should reflect the insights of the sophisticated 
hedonist, namely that happiness and well-being do not tend to come apart.  
On the other hand, the view should account for the contexts in which 
happiness and well-being do (perhaps significantly) come apart.       
I will argue in favour of this view as follows.  Firstly, I will argue that we have 
reason to believe that happiness tends to be reliably caused by well-being 
ingredients.  This is because the function of affective states is to inform and 
guide our action, which they do partly by detecting evaluative features of our 
environment that bear on our well-being.  It is reasonable to presume that 
affective states are not generally dysfunctional and thereby that they reliably 
perform this function.  Thus, we have reason to believe that happiness tends 
to be correlated with well-being, and should thereby, in an important range of 
cases, treat happiness as an indicator of well-being.    
Secondly, I will argue against a stronger claim (such as those maintained by 
sophisticated hedonists) namely that it is appropriate to take happiness as a 
general indicator of well-being.  We have reason to believe that happiness 
tends to be reliably caused by things other than well-being ingredients.  
Affective states partly perform their function by detecting evaluative features 
of our environment that do not bear on our well-being, such as moral or 
aesthetic features.  In addition, our affective states can be systematically 
dysfunctional.  The Indicator View should be sensitive to the empirical 
possibility that happiness does not tend to be generally correlated with well-
being; we should treat happiness as a defeasible indicator of well-being.   
Lastly, I will consider the kinds of evidence that are required to defeat the 
evidence about well-being provided by happiness.  I will distinguish between 
two kinds of defeaters, namely undercutting and rebutting defeaters.  I will 
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argue that, in practice, we need evidence of both kinds of defeaters in order to 
conclude that a particular defeater is present, and thereby not treat happiness 
as an indicator of well-being.  
3.2  Happiness indicates well-being  
In this section, I will argue that we have reason to believe that happiness 
tends to be correlated with well-being.  Thus, we should, in an important 
range of cases, treat happiness as an indicator of well-being.  We can 
reasonably infer the causal connections that exist between happiness and 
well-being ingredients from the function of affective states.  I will argue that 
the function of affective states is to inform and guide our action, which they do 
partly by detecting evaluative features of our environment that bear on our 
well-being.  It is reasonable to presume that affective states are not generally 
dysfunctional and thereby that they reliably perform this function.  
3.2.1  The function of affective states  
In chapter one, I claimed that affective states represent certain things as 
being good or bad.  That is, affective states represent evaluative features of 
our environment.  When we feel guilty, for example, we do not merely register 
the fact that we have transgressed a moral rule.  In addition, we register the 
fact that such a transgression is bad.  When we feel satisfied, we both register 
that we have achieved a goal and that such an achievement is good.  
Affective states can be viewed as positive or negative insofar as they 
represent features of our environment that are good or bad respectively.  This 
is the informational function of affective states – to reliably detect the things in 
our environment that are good or bad.          
However, affective states do not merely have the function of being reliably 
caused by evaluative features of our environment.  Although it is true that fear 
is associated with danger, for example, not every danger in our environment 
causes fear.  We can say the same for sadness with loss, joy with success, 
anxiety with a potential threat, and so on.  Affective states do not have the 
function of being reliably caused by every loss, success or potential threat that 
we experience.  As Carolyn Price notes, “the loss of a hair or headache is not 
usually a sad loss…[sadness] is concerned with only significant losses or 
harms.” (Price 2012) The function of affective states entails that they detect 
significant evaluative features of our environment.   
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An evaluative feature of our environment is significant insofar as it is relevant 
for action.  Affective states do not just provide us with evaluative information; 
their function is to both inform and guide us.  The significant evaluative 
features of our environment are those that we should attend to, think about or 
react towards.  We need to avoid/prevent the things in our environment that 
are bad; and we need to sustain/seek out the things that are good.  Affective 
states should only provide us with information about the features of our 
environment that we need to guide our behaviour.  For example, if we are 
hungry, it does not help to know the opening times of all the shops nearby – 
we only need to know about the shops that sell food.  Information about shops 
that sell clothes, electronic products or garden equipment may be useful in 
others situations, but not in the context of needing to eat something nutritious.  
In short, affective states have the function of providing us with context-
relevant information that enables us to meet our current objectives, goals and 
concerns.62        
Some theorists of affect simply assume that the practically relevant evaluative 
features of our environment are those that are good or bad for us, rather than 
good or bad in some other sense (e.g. aesthetically, morally, epistemically 
etc.).  Paradigmatic affective states, such as sadness, satisfaction, frustration, 
fear, disgust, interest, joy, attachment, pride, contentment, etc., seem to 
clearly concern our self-interests.  It seems natural, therefore, to claim that the 
function of affective states entails that they detect prudential features of our 
environment (and thereby well-being ingredients63).  For instance, Jesse Prinz 
states: “An [affective] appraisal is a representation of the relation between an 
                                            
62 One might object that the function of affective states is not merely to inform and guide 
action.  Affective states may detect facts about mathematics, for example, or facts about 
what happened in the past.  These kinds of states of affairs, although desired, may not 
be practical in that there is nothing we can do to alter whether or not the state of affairs 
obtains.  In response, I think that such states of affairs may end up being practical in the 
long-term.  However, even if this is not the case, I think that it is reasonable to claim that 
the primary function of affect states is to inform and guide action.      
63 When talking of prudential features, I remain neutral over what constitutes well-being.  I 
take prudential features of our environment to be those things that are causally related to 
well-being ingredients.  In chapter two, I argued that well-being ingredients are goods 
that are correlated with well-being, either because they are constitutively or causally 
related to well-being.  A list of such goods is likely to include such things as intimate 
relationships, meaningful achievements, health, leisure, knowledge, etc.  In talking of 
prudential features, I mean to refer to the things that are causally related to these kinds 
of goods.  For example, making progress in one’s goals may partly cause a meaningful 
achievement, or an improvement in a particular well-being ingredient such as one’s 
health, knowledge, etc.     
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organism and its environment that bears on well-being.” (Prinz, 2004: p.51) 
Similarly, Paul Griffiths argues that basic emotions are “affect programs” – a 
number of correlated psychophysical reactions – which are “adaptive 
responses to events that have a particular ecological significance for the 
organism.” (Griffiths, 1997: p.89; emphasis added) Such theorists do not deny 
that affective states can end up detecting evaluative features of our 
environment that do not bear on our well-being.  For example, when watching 
a film, we may experience the plight of the main character as if we ourselves 
were in such a situation, or as if we care about the fictional character as one 
of our nearest and dearest, both of which are untrue.  The theorists mentioned 
above can account for such cases (as misrepresentations, say) while 
maintaining that the function of affective states entails that they detect 
prudential features of our environment. 
Unlike such theorists, however, I do not think it is obvious that the practically 
relevant evaluative features of our environment are always prudential, or even 
typically prudential.  I agree that prudential features of our environment may 
tend to be relevant for action.  However, I believe the extent to which affect 
states are reliably caused by prudential features as a result of their function 
requires further investigation.  
There are two different reasons why the function of affective states might tend 
to entail that they detect prudential features of our environment.  Firstly, it may 
be the case that the practically relevant features of our environment in fact 
tend to be prudential.  Secondly, it may be that the function of affective states 
entails that they are reliably caused by particular kinds of practically relevant 
features of our environment, and that these kinds of features tend to be 
prudential.  I will briefly consider the first reason, and then consider the 
second reason in more detail.    
The first argument is that the practically relevant features of our environment 
tend to be prudential.  This argument supposes that, although there may be 
many evaluative features of our environment that are non-prudential (e.g. 
moral features, aesthetic features, epistemic features, etc.), the ones that 
provide us with reasons for action tend to be prudential.  This may be for a 
variety of reasons.  Perhaps, on consequentialist grounds, good overall 
outcomes are attained through people acting in their own interests, such as 
pursuing personal projects, maintaining intimate relationships, looking after 
their health, and so on.  Alternatively, it may be that it is too demanding to 
respond mostly to non-prudential features of our environment.  As agents, we 
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may need to act on the basis of things we care about and are in our interests 
(Williams 2013).  Or, perhaps we are in a better position to see or appreciate 
the prudential features of our environment.  The evaluative features of our 
environment relevant for action may simply be those that we manage to 
appreciate (Keller, 2013).       
Although these normative arguments all have some truth to them, they are 
very controversial.  Some ethical theories, for instance, maintain that many of 
the evaluative features of our environment that are relevant for action are 
moral, rather than prudential.  Such theorists argue that we should devote a 
significant amount of our personal resources to helping others, being virtuous, 
and so on.  Consider, for example, Singer’s famous thought-experiment about 
a child drowning in a pond.  Singer rightly notes that, if we were to walk past a 
child drowning in a pond (and no-one else were around, we were a competent 
swimmer, etc.) we should stop and save the child from drowning, even if it 
means ruining our expensive new pair of shoes.  Singer then goes on to note 
that we are faced with a similar situation everyday with children dying of 
preventable diseases around the world.  Singer argues that, even if helping 
such children is not an evaluative feature of our nearby environment, it is still 
a feature of our (albeit distant) environment that provides us with reasons for 
action.  We should, according to Singer, be less self-interested and thereby 
devote more of our personal resources towards helping distant others than we 
tend to.                   
I will not attempt to adjudicate between different ethical theories here.  
Instead, I will focus on the second argument, namely that the function of 
affective states entails that they are reliably caused by particular kinds of 
practically relevant features of our environment, and that these kinds of 
features may tend to be prudential.  Alternatively put, the argument is that 
affective states have been set up (either through evolution or culture) in such 
a way that they are reliably caused by the practically relevant features of our 
environment that bear on our well-being.  This does not suppose that the 
practically relevant features of our environment in fact tend to be prudential.  
Rather, it supposes that, historically, the function of affective states entailed 
that they were reliably caused by features of our environment that tended to 
be prudential.  This (historical) function of affective states may turn out to be 
normatively legitimate or illegitimate depending on the outcome of the kinds of 
ethical considerations noted in the previous two paragraphs (i.e. the general 
consequences of self-interested action, the demandingness of moral 
behaviour, and so on).  Nonetheless, in the next section, I will argue that the 
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function that affective states have historically served may have entailed that 
they were reliably caused by prudential features of our environment.     
 
3.2.2  The historical function of affective states 
In this section, I will consider two mutually reinforcing arguments in favour of 
this view that affective states partly perform their function by detecting 
evaluative features of our environment that bear on our well-being.  The first 
argument involves appealing to the evolutionarily adaptive nature of affective 
states.64 Affective states evolved because they enabled us to survive and 
increase our fitness in certain ways (e.g. to form attachments, gain status, 
procreate, etc.).  The second argument involves appealing to the culturally 
adaptive nature of affective states.  Affective states develop through learning 
because they enable us to successfully live within a cultural environment (e.g. 
to be respectable, productive, enjoy particular activities, etc.).  If we assume 
that a person’s biological and cultural fitness and well-being ingredients tend 
to coincide, we have reason to believe that affective states, in an important 
range of cases, correlate with well-being.   
Let us consider the evolutionary argument, first.  It seems clear that our 
affective capacities evolved largely because they enabled us to be better off.  
Consider, for example, the case of fear.  Fear reliably represents the dangers 
for an organism in its immediate environment, and motivates the organism to 
avoid those dangers.  Fear increases the chances that the organism survives, 
thereby increasing the probability that it has lots of offspring, spreading its 
genes.  The important point is that, in order to increase an organism’s 
biological fitness, fear must reliably represent dangers for an organism.  
Other evolved affective states are similar to fear in this respect.  Paul Ekman’s 
famous Big Six basic emotions (namely, happiness, sadness, fear, surprise, 
anger and disgust) can all be viewed as having evolved from representing 
features of our ancestry environment that were crucial for our biological 
fitness.  Fear, anger and disgust, for example, all arise in contexts where life 
is potentially at state (Prinz 2004a).  This explains why such affective states 
may be universal amongst humans (Ekman 1999).  Recall Griffiths’ notion of 
                                            
64 Or, more precisely, “basic” affective states (that is, affective states that are, to some 
extent, genetically pre-determined). 
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“affect programs” mentioned above: it seems plausible that affective states 
reliably represent things in an organism’s ecology that bear on its well-being.  
The idea is that our affective capacities evolved because such capacities 
gave us an advantage regarding our biological fitness; in order to be 
advantageous, our affective states must have been reliably caused by 
features of our ecology that were important for our survival and reproductive 
success. These features of our ecology may tend to have an impact on our 
well-being. 
This argument is limited, however, to basic affective states – that is, affective 
states that have developed as a result of their evolutionarily adaptive nature. 
Affective states such as love, joy, contentment, pride, admiration, gratitude, 
wonder, embarrassment, shame, guilt, jealousy, envy, resentment, 
indignation, etc., may not be basic affective states – they may not have 
evolved by increasing our biological fitness; rather, such affective states may 
be largely a product of culture.  If this is the case, we cannot claim that such 
affective states generally reliably represent important features of our ecology 
on the basis of their adaptive nature.  The appeal to the adaptive nature of 
affective states is restricted to a small class of “basic” affective states.   
In response, one could argue that most of our affective states are in fact 
evolutionary adaptations (and thus largely detect prudential features of our 
environment).  Indeed, Ekman (1999) expanded his basic emotion list to 
include: amusement, contempt, contentment, embarrassment, excitement, 
guilt, pride, relief, satisfaction, sensory pleasure, and shame.  The problem 
with this option, however, is that it may simply not be the case that most of our 
affective states are biologically basic.  Is shame biologically basic, for 
example, or is it an instance of sadness re-calibrated towards one’s self or 
one’s identity?  Similarly, is love basic, or is it a form of attachment coupled 
with lust?  These kinds of questions can be asked of all so-called “basic” 
affective states (Prinz 2004b).  For each kind of affective state, those who 
defend the claim that it is an evolutionary adaptation must show how that 
explanation is more plausible than the affective state developing in an 
alternative way (i.e., through learning).  I cannot consider this issue in detail 
here.  However, I think it is unlikely that this can be done for the large majority 
of affective states.     
It is more plausible to presume that many of our affective states have 
developed through learning, rather than as a result of adaptive evolutionary 
processes (Prinz, 2004b).  This brings us to the second argument in favour of 
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the view that affective states have historically been set up in such a way that 
they are reliably caused by prudential features of our environment.  The 
argument involves appealing to the culturally adaptive nature of affective 
states.  Affective states develop through learning because they enable us to 
successfully live within a cultural environment (e.g. to be respectable, 
productive, enjoy particular activities, etc.).  This is effectively the evolutionary 
argument applied to cultural (in contrast to biological) evolution.  The idea is 
that (non-basic) affective states have developed insofar as they reliably 
detected evaluative features of our environment that bear on our “cultural 
fitness”.  Affective states have developed through learning because they have 
enabled us to successfully function within our cultural environment (e.g. to be 
respectable, productive, enjoy particular activities, etc.). 
For example, guilt is plausibly a culturally developed emotion – a form of 
separation distress or sadness that has been re-calibrated towards moral 
transgressions (Prinz, 2004a: p.124-129).  When we do something wrong, we 
feel guilty, and thereby feel motivated to make up for it.  Indeed, the 
anticipation of feeling guilt may often prevent us from harming others in the 
first place.  In doing so, guilt enables us to delay instant gratification and 
maintain our reputation as a trustworthy individual.  In the long-run, having a 
good reputation is likely to be in our self-interest (Snow 2008; Besser-Jones, 
MS; Kauppinen, MS).       
The idea is that our affective capacities partly developed through learning 
because such capacities gave us an advantage regarding our cultural fitness; 
in order to be advantageous, our affective states must have been reliably 
caused by features of our ecology that were important for our well-functioning 
within our cultural environment.  These features of our environment may tend 
to have an impact on our well-being. 
The appeal to both the culturally and biologically adaptive nature of affective 
states supports the view that affective states have historically been set up in 
such a way that they are reliably caused by features of our environment that 
tend to be prudential.  This function gives us reason to believe that happiness 
tends to be correlated with well-being.  Insofar as we have reason to believe 
that happiness tends to be correlated with well-being, we should, in an 
important range of cases, treat happiness as an indicator of well-being. 
The Indicator View, however, is more complicated than this.  In the next main 
section, I will argue against the claim that it is appropriate to take happiness 
as a general indicator of well-being.  I will argue that the Indicator View should 
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be sensitive to the empirical possibility that happiness does not tend to be 
generally correlated with well-being; we should, therefore, treat happiness as 
a defeasible indicator of well-being.   
3.3  Happiness as a defeasible indicator of well-being 
So far, I have argued that it is appropriate to take happiness as an indicator of 
well-being on the basis of the function of affective states.  The function of 
affective states is to inform and guide action, which they do partly by detecting 
prudential features of our environment.  Those impressed by this argument 
might be tempted to claim that happiness generally indicates well-being – a 
claim that has been endorsed by well-being theorists such Martha Nussbaum 
(2003) Laura Sizer (2010).  In this section, I will argue that this generality 
claim is mistaken.  I believe that we should maintain that, in an important 
range of cases, happiness indicates well-being, while leaving room for the 
empirical possibility that it does not generally do so.   
I will argue for this view as follows.  Firstly, I will argue that we have reason to 
believe that happiness tends to be reliably caused by things other than well-
being ingredients.  Affective states partly perform their function by detecting 
evaluative features of our environment that do not bear on our well-being, 
such as moral or aesthetic features (I will call these affective states “non-
prudential affective states”).  Secondly, I will argue that affective states can be 
systematically dysfunctional.  Lastly, I will claim that the contexts in which 
affective states are either systematically dysfunctional or reliably detect non-
prudential features of our environment are readily identifiable.  The upshot is 
that we can treat happiness as a defeasible indicator of well-being.     
3.3.1  Non-prudential affective states  
In this section, I will argue that, in certain contexts, we have reason to believe 
that affective states may reliably detect evaluative features of our environment 
that do not bear on our well-being.  In such contexts, happiness may not tend 
to be correlated with well-being.    
I argued in the previous main section that the (historical) function of affective 
states entails that they reliably detect prudential features of our environment.  
This is because affective states have been set up to detect evaluative 
features that bear on our biological and cultural interests, which may, in turn, 
bear on our self-interests.  However, both our biological and cultural fitness 
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can come apart from our self-interests.  That is, in certain contexts, what is in 
our biological or cultural interests may not be good for us.  
Let us consider what is in our biological interests, first.  The problem with the 
appeal to the evolutionarily adaptive nature of affective states is that biological 
fitness and well-being can significantly come apart.  Features of our 
environment that are relevant to our biological fitness may not be relevant to 
our well-being.  The appeal to the adaptive nature of affective states assumes 
that what is in an organism’s evolutionary interest is also in its self-interest.  
But this conclusion does not follow.  Natural selection does not have the same 
“aim” as the organism.  What promotes the spreading of your genes may have 
little to do with what is in your interest.   
Having motivations that threaten your self-interest may nonetheless promote 
the survival and spreading of your genes.  For example, it may be an 
advantage from the point of view of genes that you are inclined to sacrifice 
yourself for your offspring.  But this is extremely unlikely to be an advantage 
from the point of view of your well-being.  In short, survival and the spreading 
of genes do not necessarily coincide with well-being.     
We can say a similar thing about what is in our cultural interests.  Cultural 
selection also does not have the same “aim” as the organism.  Particular 
cultural practices, norms and values may have little to do with what is in your 
interest.  For example, it may be an advantage from the point of view of a 
particular culture that you are inclined to sacrifice yourself for your nation.  
But, again, this is extremely unlikely to be an advantage from the point of view 
of your well-being.  Cultural practices, norms and values do not necessarily 
coincide with well-being.           
We can accept that either our biological or cultural fitness can significantly 
come apart from our well-being, while maintaining that the two things often 
coincide.  For instance, insofar as basic affective states (such as hunger, fear, 
disgust, satisfaction, stimulation, attachment, etc.) have evolved to help us 
survive and maintain a state of well-functioning, it is likely that such affective 
states will be reliably caused by well-being ingredients.  Similarly, insofar as 
non-basic affective states (such as love, pride, shame, embarrassment, etc.) 
have evolved to help us function well within a cooperative society, it is likely 
that such affective states will be reliably caused by well-being ingredients.  A 
succinct way of putting this point is that the ultimate function of our affective 
states may be to increase either our biological or cultural fitness, but this is 
often achieved through the proximate function of promoting our well-being.    
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Indeed, we might think that the impact culture has on the development of 
affective states partly “corrects for” affective states that have evolved to detect 
features of our environment that are no longer (or never were) in our self-
interests.65  For example, we may be biological pre-disposed towards violent 
behaviour (insofar as such behaviour increases our biological fitness).  
Cultural norms and rules, however, prevent these aspects of our biological 
nature from dominating our action (Pinker 2012).  One instance of this is that 
children internalize values of kindness and not doing harm at a very early age 
as a result of instruction and pressure from caregivers (Hoffman 2001).  
Cultural norms and rules steer us away from our biological pre-dispositions 
towards ways of life in which we can live well in cooperation with others (Prinz 
2007a).  This shift may tend to bring our emotions in-line with certain well-
being ingredients (e.g. good relationships, healthy communities, etc.). 
However, even if our combined biological and cultural fitness tends to 
coincide with our self-interests, this may not be the case in some contexts.  In 
oppressive cultures, for instance, people internalize norms such as “You are 
not good enough”, “You do not deserve to be included in the group”, “You do 
not deserve to participate”, and “Your voice does not matter” (Cudd 2006).  
These norms clearly do not promote our well-being.  This is likely to be the 
case even if internalizing such norms means that we are able to live a better 
life from fitting into the oppressive culture that we are apart of. 
Again, one could emphasise that this is an extreme example, and that 
generally such cases are unlikely to occur.  It may be that our affective 
dispositions, as a whole, constrain the development of affective states that are 
reliably caused by things that are not in our self-interests.  Indeed, this can be 
seen in the affective consequences of internalizing oppressive cultural norms.  
The individual who has internalized the norm “I am not good enough” is likely 
to feel a lack of competence as a result of not exercising their skills, and 
boredom as a result of not seeking out challenges (Besser-Jones, MS).  The 
individual who has internalized the norm “I do not deserve to be included in 
the group” is likely to feel a lack of belongingness as a result of not engaging 
meaningfully with others (Besser-Jones, forthcoming).  The point is that 
                                            
65 On this view, non-basic affective states are developmentally altered versions of basic 
affective states (Prinz, 2004b).  For example, the emotion of guilt may be a version of 
sadness that has been “re-calibrated” to reliably detect a loss of moral status (as a result 
of violating a moral norm, say) in contrast to a loss in general.  This framework entails 
that emotions are neither entirely biologically basic nor entirely socially constructed.       
 116 
oppressive norms often stand in conflict with other well-being ingredients that 
are reliably caused by our affective states (such as a sense of competence 
and belongingness).  Thus, the internalization of such norms may be unlikely; 
our self-interests may constrain the extent to which both our biological and 
cultural fitness can come apart from our well-being. 
This is not to deny that, in certain contexts, the things that promote our 
biological or cultural fitness may be in conflict with well-being ingredients.  In 
the remainder of this section, I will consider certain affective states that have 
been set up to detect things that may have no impact on our well-being.  I will 
briefly outline three different kinds of affective states, namely moral, empathic 
and aesthetic emotions.  The function of all three kinds of affective states 
entail that they detect environmental features that are good or bad, but not 
necessarily good or bad for us.        
Moral emotions concern other-related emotions, such as resentment, 
contempt, indignation, admiration, sympathy and compassion.  For example, 
the compassion we have towards another reliably represents their suffering as 
something that is bad.  It is not obvious that such suffering concerns our own 
well-being.  It may do so in the context of the compassion we feel towards our 
loved ones: for such people, our own well-being depends partly on how well 
they are doing.  But this does not seem to be the case with the compassion 
we can feel towards strangers.  Tappolet gives the example of seeing a 
stranger from a distance about to get run over by a speeding truck (Tappolet 
2010: p.343).  She argues that you are likely to feel fear for that person even 
though they are a stranger, but that your reaction does not mean that your 
own well-being momentarily depends on their well-being.       
In contrast to moral emotions, empathic emotions concern feeling what 
another person is feeling.  We are able to ‘catch’ other people’s emotional 
states through simulating a similar kind of emotional state in ourselves.  Such 
emotions do not concern our own well-being, but rather concern another 
person’s well-being.  Likewise, putting ourselves in “another person’s shoes” 
often causes affective states that represent our own well-being as views from 
another person’s standpoint – such emotions are likely to have no bearing on 
our well-being.  We may gain insight into how other people’s lives are going 
for them, but this insight may not bear any direct relationship to our own well-
being.   
Lastly, aesthetic emotions may not represent features of our environment that 
concern our well-being.  Some aesthetic emotions represent the well-being of 
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fictional events and characters (or perhaps represent our own well-being as 
viewed from within the respective fictional world) which is likely to have no 
bearing on how well our lives are going.  Musical emotions may accurately 
represent certain positive and negative properties, but, again, these properties 
do not bear on well-being ingredients.66   
In sum, moral, empathic and aesthetic emotions may reliably represent their 
respective objects, but those objects may not be related to our self-interests.  
These kinds of affective states (and perhaps others, such as epistemic, 
narrative, and transcendental emotions) show that the function of affective 
states does not solely entail that they detect prudential features of our 
environment.   
Again, as with the example of oppression discussed above, one could argue 
that moral, empathic and aesthetic emotions do not generally play prominent 
roles in our lives (in comparison to clearly self-interested emotions, such as 
satisfaction, frustration, attachment, fear, etc.).  For example, an artist who 
devotes all his life to his art, ignoring self-interested pursuits, such as being 
healthy, having good friendships and engaging in enjoyable activities, may be 
unlikely to sustain such a lifestyle.  We may be able to say a similar thing 
about the moral saint who spends all of their time and resources helping 
others without helping herself (people like Mother Teresa may be the 
exception to the rule). The idea is that, if our actions become significantly 
divorced from our self-interests then it may be unlikely that we will be able to 
function reasonably well (both within our biological limits and our particular 
culture).  
I think the extent to which this is the case is largely an empirical question, and 
I will not attempt to answer it here.  It may be that, in general, it is unlikely that 
our affective states reliably detect things that are divorced from our self-
interests.  However, it may also be that seemingly exceptional cases, such as 
the devoted artist or the moral saint, are more common than we tend to think 
(how about single parents?).  The point I want to make here is that the 
function of affective states does not solely entail that they detect prudential 
features of our environment.   
                                            
66 Of course, the pleasure that we receive from aesthetic appreciation may contribute 
towards our well-being, but this is a more general point about the relationship between 
pleasure and well-being.  The point I want to make here is that the objects of aesthetic 
appreciation themselves (e.g. the beauty of a sunset, the interest of a piece of art, etc.) 
do not necessarily contribute towards well-being.   
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3.3.2  Dysfunctional affective states 
In this section, I will argue that, in certain contexts, we have reason to believe 
that affective states may systematically fail to detect evaluative features of our 
environment that bear on our well-being.  In such contexts, as with the kinds 
of affective states discussed in the previous section, happiness may not tend 
to be correlated with well-being.    
The two cases I will consider concern affective states that have developed as 
a result of promoting our biological or cultural fitness respectively.  I will 
assume that, in such cases, our biological and cultural fitness tends to 
coincide with well-being ingredients.  The problem is that, even if the affective 
states developed as a result of reliably detecting prudential features of our 
environment, they may cease to do so in certain contexts or under certain 
conditions.  
Let us being by considering affective states that evolved because they reliably 
detected prudential features of our environment.  The problem is that, in our 
present environment, our evolved affective states may be no longer adaptive.  
Our basic affective states may no longer be attuned to features of our ecology 
that are important for our survival and reproductive success.  This is because 
the environment in which such affective states evolved may not be sufficiently 
similar to our present environment.67   
Consider, for example, the affective state of hunger.  Hunger represents that 
we are soon-to-be-undernourished and motivates us to avoid that state, 
namely through seeking out and consuming certain kinds of food (in 
particular, energy-high foods, such as sugars and fats).  In our adaptive 
environment, it is likely that food was scarce.  Thus, the affective state of 
hunger may have evolved to represent that we are soon-to-be-
undernourished within a food-scarce environment.  In our present 
environment, food may not be so scarce – indeed, it may be abundant.  Thus, 
our hunger may unreliably represent that we are soon-to-be-undernourished.  
In our present environment, hunger may often represent that we are soon-to-
be-undernourished when in fact there is plenty of food available.   
More generally, it is possible that many failures of self-control may largely be 
accounted for by differences in our adaptive and present environment (Offer 
                                            
67 In the context of evolutionary psychology, this is often referred to as “mismatch theory.” 
(Nesse 2004)  
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2006).  In our adaptive environment, resources were scarce, and we had to 
grab them when they came along.  In contrast, in our present environment, 
resources are abundant, and we must delay gratification in order to accrue 
resources for the future.68  The point is that basic affective states evolved to 
represent features of the environment in which they evolved.  This kind of 
environment is likely to be significantly different from the kind of environment 
in which we find ourselves now.         
In response, one could argue that, although this may be the case in certain 
contexts, it is unlikely to typically be the case.  If it were typically the case that 
our evolved affective states were no longer attuned to important features of 
our ecology, affective states would not play the role that they tend to play in 
our practical lives.  We rely on our affective states to both inform and guide 
our behaviour.  If we feel sad, for example, we represent the loss of 
something we care about and we are motivated to avoid similar losses in the 
future.  If our affective states consistently misrepresented the world, we would 
also consistently fail to function in a normal manner.   
Indeed, this may be exactly what happens with certain psychological 
disorders, such as depression and mania.  In depression, things are often 
represented as being much worse than they in fact are.  In mania, things are 
often represented as being much better than they in fact are.  Both conditions 
have damaging effects on our normal functioning.  As another example, 
Damasio (2005) shows that individuals with damage to the affective areas of 
the brain have radically non-adaptive behaviour.  Such individuals are unable 
to follow a schedule, do not seem to be able to learn from mistakes and are 
unable to make simple decisions.69  This suggests that, at least typically, our 
affective states are attuned to important features of our ecology.  Insofar as 
most people tend to function reasonably well, we can infer that most people’s 
affective states reliably detect prudential features of their environment. 
This response is reasonable to the extent that most individuals do not suffer 
from the serious problems of agency (of the kind that Damasio describes) that 
                                            
68 As Haybron notes, we may not just have a “sweet tooth”, but also a “stuff tooth” or a 
“status tooth” (Haybron, 2008: p.245) 
69 Damasio emphasizes that the subject’s theoretical understanding of their various 
circumstances are normal, but their sense of their importance is lost, rendering them 
unable to behave in ways that are in their interest and unable to make sound decisions 
or, in some cases, to make decisions at all. 
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would be expected if their affective states were generally dysfunctional.  
However, the problem with this response is that it ignores the extent to which 
a typical individual may fail to function well in certain contexts as a result of 
dysfunctional or inappropriate affective states.  I suggest that this may occur 
to a substantial extent.   
This is perhaps best illustrated by affective states that have developed 
through learning.  Such affective states are not dysfunctional as a result of 
significant mismatches between our evolutionary and present environment.  
However, they may tend to be dysfunctional as a result of mismatches 
between our present environment and the environment in which they 
developed. Our affective dispositions may fail to adapt to changes in our 
environment.  This is in part possible because our affective states are, to a 
certain extent, cognitively impenetrable (Faucher & Tappolet 2008).  The 
cognitive impenetrability of affective states can render them to be largely 
immune to change.  This is clearly seen with recalcitrant emotions.  Upon 
walking on a glass floor high above the ground we may believe that we are 
safe, but still feel fear.  Similarly, we may have phobias concerning all sorts of 
things (from spiders, to wide open spaces, to clowns) that we know on a 
cognitive level are not dangerous or threatening.  Fear responses may often 
detect danger, but in these kinds of cases they do not.  Moreover, we cannot 
always change such responses via our cognitive states, such as our 
judgements or beliefs.  It is possible, therefore, that affective states that 
developed to successfully inform and guide our behaviour no longer do so 
within our present environment.    
Consider, for example, how our circumstances can change to be incongruent 
with the circumstances in which our affective responses were learnt.  In child 
development, feelings of separation distress often reliably detect being 
vulnerable in some way (such as not having enough food).  However, as the 
child develops, the same signs of vulnerability (i.e., a lack of a caregiver) may 
not tend to be reliably caused by actual vulnerability.  Children need to learn 
through their experiences that such signs no longer concern their security.  
Healthy development largely consists in become emotionally independent in 
this way.  This is, however, an extremely difficult process, the failure of which 
is often at the heart of therapies such as psychoanalysis.  These kinds of 
therapies often stress the fact that emotional responses that were effective in 
the past no longer have the same utility that they once had. 
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In addition, our affective states may develop to be overly responsive to certain 
features of our environment.  We have a well-documented “negativity bias”, 
whereby we focus more on potential threats and dangers than on positive 
values (Kahneman, 2011).70  We are also prone towards focusing on the 
short-term consequences of particular events and actions, in contrast to the 
long-term consequences (Rachlin 2004).  Both of these biases may have a 
huge impact on our behaviour.  Our affective states may be more in-tune with 
short-term threats than our long-term opportunities.  Moreover, from an 
evolutionary or early developmental perspective, these biases make sense.  It 
makes sense to focus on the possibility of negative events (such as going 
starving or being abandoned) as such events could have been life 
threatening.  And it makes sense to focus on the short-term (such as eating 
as much food as possible now, rather than saving some for later) as we 
largely depended on such timeframes.  The problem is that our present 
environment may be largely risk free and may contain many evaluative 
features related to our future.  A negativity bias and a short-term bias may 
have been advantageous in either our evolutionary or developmental history, 
but that does not mean that such biases continue to result in the reliable 
detection of certain well-being ingredients.   
As a final example, our personality traits make a significant difference to the 
affective states that we experience; a person’s personality traits are one of the 
largest determinants of a person’s level of measured happiness and are, to a 
certain extent, immune to change (Diener & Biswas-Diener 2008).  Two 
people with different kinds of personality traits (an extrovert and an introvert, 
say) may have similar circumstances yet detect different evaluative features 
of those circumstances.  In doing so, both individuals lose out on important 
information about certain well-being ingredients (in the same way that people 
lose out on certain kinds of information due the negativity and short-term 
biases).  These differences may seem unimportant in certain situations (such 
as deciding whether to socialize on a particular evening) but may add up over 
                                            
70  To make things more complicated, psychologists have also documented that people tend 
to have a “positivity bias”, whereby most moments are experienced as being positive.  
The interplay between these two biases seems to be a follows.  With regards to the 
negativity bias, negative events are experienced as being bad to a much greater extent 
than corresponding positive events are experienced as being good.  With regards to the 
positivity bias, most events are experienced as being positive.  As Barbara Fredrickson 
succinctly puts it: “whereas negativity dominates positivity in intensity, positivity 
dominates negativity in frequency.” (Fredrickson 2013) 
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time to have a substantial impact on our lives (e.g. having developed or not 
developed good friendships) (Nettle 2007).         
The point is that, even if our affective states inform and guide our action, they 
may cause us to systematically act in ways that are not in our self-interest.  
Indeed, we cannot infer from the fact that affective states developed to 
successfully inform and guide our behaviour that they currently fulfil that 
purpose.  We may spend large amounts of time trying to avoid being 
vulnerable and trying to avoid other immediate threats, for example.  As a 
result, we may consistently misrepresent certain prudential features of our 
environment: the ways in which we are socially secure, the fact that we have 
various long-term opportunities, and so on.  In effect, these systematic 
misrepresentations can be viewed as mental disorders that tend to be 
pervasive and universally shared.  They do not prevent us from leading 
normal lives, but they may well prevent us from functioning reasonably well.  It 
is this viewpoint that inspires much Buddhist (as well as Stoic) philosophy, 
whereby our emotions often lead us astray from reality and well functioning.  
In sum, even if our affective states have been set up (through evolution or 
learning) to detect evaluative features of our environment, they may no longer 
reliably do so in our present environment.   
To sum up this section, I have argued that, although affective states have the 
function of informing us and guiding our actions, this does not mean that (in 
our present environment) they typically succeed in performing this function.  
Intuitively, there are certain contexts in which we think that affective states fail 
to reliably detect evaluative features of our environment.  We do not use our 
happiness as a proxy for how well are financial accounts are going, for 
example.  Nor do we use happiness as a proxy for the well-being of mental 
patients, such as manic depressives.  In this section, I have suggested that 
such contexts may in fact be widespread.  There may be many contexts in 
which we would not use happiness as a proxy for well-being.  These contexts 
may add up; so much so that it would be imprecise and uninformative to claim 
that happiness is generally functional.  
3.3.3  Refining the Indicator View  
In the previous two sections, I have argued that, in certain contexts, we have 
reason to believe that happiness does not tend to be reliably caused by well-
being ingredients.  In such contexts, affective states may either tend to be 
systematically dysfunctional or tend to detect non-prudential features of our 
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environment.  These contexts may add up.  Thus, it is inappropriate to treat 
happiness as a general indicator of well-being.   
In this section, I will consider how we should refine the Indicator View in light 
of these contexts.  One might think that the existence of such contexts 
renders the Indicator View untenable.  For, how can we tell that information 
about happiness tells us about our well-being, rather than some other feature 
of our environment?  Perhaps our affective states are largely dysfunctional, or 
generally detect non-prudential features of our environment?  
I do not think that this is a problem for the following reason.  For any given 
context, we can identify whether affective states are likely to be prudentially 
relevant or not.  For example, how people feel during moral or political 
debates may not significantly bear on their well-being – the function of their 
emotions in such contexts may entail that they detect moral features of their 
environment, which do not necessarily coincide with prudential ones.  In 
contrast, how people feel during a recession may significant bear on their 
well-being – the function of their emotions in such contexts may entail that 
they detect prudential features of their environment, such as the likelihood of 
employment for themselves and their loves ones.   
We can say a similar thing about dysfunctional affective states.  Findings from 
psychology and cognitive science can inform us about the kinds of affective 
states that are likely to be dysfunctional and those that are not.  As mentioned 
in the previous section, there are certain contexts in which we intuitively think 
that affective states fail to detect evaluative features of our environment.  We 
do not use our happiness as a proxy for how well our financial accounts are 
going, for example.  Nor do we use happiness as a proxy for the well-being of 
mental patients, such as manic depressives.  This is presumably because, 
within such contexts, our affective reactions suffer from a particular lack of 
information or certain cognitive biases.  In contrast, we do use happiness as a 
proxy for how well we are doing in our day-to-day activities, such as our 
progress in work activities that provide us with instant feedback, or the 
maintenance of our close relationships.     
In short, for any given context, we can identify whether affective states are 
likely to be reliably caused by well-being ingredients or not.  We can do this by 
considering the nature of the context in question. Affective states are 
representational states with a particular kind of content: sadness represents 
loss; satisfaction represents the achievement of a goal; fear represents 
danger; and so on.  The content of an affective state tends to be determined 
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by the context in which it is caused.  We tend to experience sadness, for 
example, in a context in which we have experienced a significant loss.  In 
order to have such an experience, we need to have a reasonable amount of 
information about our situation, and to not suffer from any particular cognitive 
biases.  We can, then, identify whether any particular affective state is likely to 
be prudentially relevant by considering the nature of the context in which the 
affective state was caused.  
Once we have identified the kinds of contexts in which we have reason to 
believe that happiness does not tend to be reliably caused by well-being 
ingredients, we can treat happiness as an indicator of well-being outside of 
those contexts.  It is for this reason that we should treat happiness as a 
defeasible indicator of well-being.  
In the remainder of this chapter, I will consider the kinds of evidence that are 
required to defeat the evidence about well-being provided by happiness.  I will 
call these kinds of evidence, “happiness defeaters”.       
3.4  Happiness defeaters 
In the previous main section, I argued that it is appropriate to treat happiness 
as a defeasible indicator of well-being.  That is, according to the Indicator 
View, we should treat happiness as an indicator of well-being unless we have 
reason to do otherwise.  In the final section of this chapter, I will consider the 
kinds of evidence that are required to defeat the evidence about well-being 
provided by happiness.  I will distinguish between two kinds of defeaters, 
namely undercutting and rebutting defeaters.  I will argue that, in practice, 
evidence of both kinds of defeaters must be present in order to not treat 
happiness as an indicator of well-being.   
3.4.1  Undercutting and rebutting defeaters 
An undercutting defeater undermines the evidential connection between an 
indicator (in this case happiness) and the thing indicated by it (in this case 
well-being).  In the first main section of the chapter, I argued that we have 
reason to believe that happiness tends to be correlated with well-being on the 
basis that the function of affective states entails that they tend to detect 
prudential features of our environment.  In the second main section of the 
chapter, however, I showed that this evidential connection is undermined by 
two different kinds of evidence.  The first kind of evidence concerns contexts 
in which the function of affective states entails that they detect non-prudential 
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(e.g. moral, aesthetic, epistemic, etc.) features of our environment.  The 
second kind of evidence concerns conditions in which affective states are 
dysfunctional.  Both kinds of evidence provide us with reason to believe that, 
in certain contexts, happiness does not tend to be correlated with well-being.    
In contrast to an undercutting defeater, a rebutting defeater is a superior form 
of evidence that supports contrary beliefs about well-being to those supported 
by happiness.  Thus, rebutting defeaters are distinct from undercutting 
defeaters in that they do not directly concern the evidential connection 
between happiness and well-being.  Rather, rebutting defeaters provide us 
with reason to believe that happiness is not correlated with well-being 
because it is in conflict with other (more reliable) indicators of with well-being.   
In the remainder of this section, I will consider potential rebutting defeaters.  I 
will argue that well-being ingredients that do not tend to be causally 
connected to happiness, such as a person’s level of income or educational 
attainment (Kahneman & Deaton 2010), may be rebutting defeaters.      
In chapter two, I argued that happiness correlates with well-being to the extent 
that it is causally connected to other well-being ingredients.  For example, 
happiness tends to be caused by various well-being ingredients, such as good 
health and quality relationships (Kahneman & Deaton 2010).  To this extent, 
happiness correlates with well-being.  This may either be because happiness 
constitutes well-being (and therefore good health and quality relationships 
tend to cause well-being) or because happiness is caused by well-being (and 
therefore good health and quality relationships tend to constitute well-being).  
Either way, according to the theory-neutral account of well-being outlined in 
chapter two, happiness correlates with well-being to the extent that it is 
causally connected to well-being ingredients.   
This point is important in the contexts in which two well-being ingredients 
come into conflict with each other.  In such contexts, the well-being ingredient 
that is causally connected to other well-being ingredients to a greater extent is 
more likely to be correlated with well-being.  Consider, for example, the 
finding that happiness is not causally related to income in the long-term 
(Easterlin, 2010).  It is possible, therefore, that there are rich people who are 
unhappy and poor people who are happy.  How comparatively well off are 
such people?  Are the unhappy rich better off than the happy poor, or vice 
versa?  Assuming that there are no undercutting defeaters present, there are 
two broad ways in which we could interpret such a context: we may believe 
that income correlates with well-being to a greater extent than happiness, or 
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vice versa.  In chapter two, I argued that we should justify our beliefs in such 
contexts on the basis of the causal connections between the well-being 
ingredients in question and other well-being ingredients.  If happiness is 
causally connected to other well-being ingredients to a greater extent than 
income is then we should believe that happiness is more likely to be 
correlated with well-being.  We should believe the converse insofar as income 
is causally connected to other well-being ingredients to a greater extent than 
happiness is.  
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that income is causally connected to 
other well-being ingredients to a greater extent than happiness is.  If this were 
the case, in the contexts in which happiness and income conflict, income can 
be viewed as a rebutting defeater.  That is, in such contexts, the evidence 
provided by income gives us reason to believe that happiness is not 
correlated with well-being.     
In practice, empirical researchers seem to implicitly assume that there are 
many kinds of evidence about well-being that are rebutting defeaters to the 
evidence provided by happiness.  For instance, Stiglitz et al. (2009), in their 
influential report for the Commission on the Measurement of Economic 
Performance and Social Progress on measures of well-being beyond GDP, 
listed the following eight goods as indicators of well-being:  
• material living standards  
• health 
• education 
• personal activities including work 
• political voice and governance 
• social connections and relationships 
• environment  
• insecurity of an economic as well as physical nature	  
These kinds of lists seem to rest on the implicit assumption that the goods 
that make up the list are the well-being ingredients that are most causally 
connected to other well-being ingredients.  Insofar as happiness is not one of 
the goods on the list, when happiness and any of the above goods come into 
conflict, the implication is that each good on the list is a rebutting defeater of 
the evidence provided by happiness.   
In sum, rebutting defeaters provide us with reason to believe that happiness is 
not correlated with well-being because it is in conflict with other (more reliable) 
indicators of with well-being.  Rebutting defeaters may include indicators of 
well-being, such as a person’s level of income or educational attainment.  In 
 127 
order to defeat the evidence provided by happiness, these indicators must 
provide us with evidence of well-being ingredients that are causally connected 
to other well-being ingredients to a greater extent than happiness is.      
3.4.2  Evidence of happiness defeaters 
The presence of either an undercutting or rebutting happiness defeater 
provides us with reason to not treat happiness as an indicator of well-being.  
However, we do not always know whether or not a happiness defeater is 
present.  In this section, I will consider the evidence of happiness defeaters 
that is required in order for us to not treat happiness as an indicator of well-
being.  
Let us consider undercutting defeaters, first.  The presence of an undercutting 
defeater within a particular context means that happiness provides us with no 
evidence about well-being within that context.  However, in practice, we do 
not tend to have straightforward evidence that an undercutting defeater is 
present within a particular context.  Evidence of undercutting defeaters within 
a particular context, such as evidence of a lack of information or certain 
cognitive biases, does not tend to completely undermine the evidential 
connection between happiness and well-being within that context.  In order to 
do that, we need evidence that the undercutting defeaters are widespread and 
pervasive.  Having a cold, for example, may tend to make me focus on more 
negative events and pay less attention to certain positive aspects of my well-
being.  Yet, the extent to which this undermines the evidential connection 
between my happiness and my well-being is not obvious.  If something really 
bad happened to me, such as the loss of a loved one, it is unlikely to go 
unnoticed because of my temporary illness.  We need further information to 
conclude that an undercutting defeater is present.    
We can say a similar thing about rebutting defeaters.  The presence of a 
rebutting defeater with a particular context means that the evidence about 
well-being provided by happiness within that context is simply outweighed by 
the evidence provided by the defeater.  Again, however, we do not tend to 
have straightforward evidence that a rebutting defeater is present within a 
particular context. Evidence of rebutting defeaters within a particular context, 
such as well-being ingredients that do not correlate with happiness, does not 
obviously outweigh the evidence about well-being provided by happiness.  In 
order to do that, we would need to know that these superior forms of evidence 
are not themselves prone to any particular undercutting defeaters, such as 
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certain cognitive biases or scope effects.  We need to know this information in 
order to conclude that a rebutting defeater is present.    
In practice, I think we need evidence of both kinds of defeaters in order to 
conclude that a particular defeater is present.  That is, we need evidence of 
both rebutting defeaters and undercutting defeaters in order to not treat 
happiness as an indicator of well-being. 
Consider how evidence of rebutting defeaters is needed to confirm the 
presence of certain undercutting defeaters.  For example, we may think that 
our bias towards the short-term (our “myopia” for the future) undermines the 
evidence provided by happiness about our long-term well-being.  In order to 
conclude that such an undercutting defeater is present, we need evidence of 
certain rebutting defeaters.  For instance, we might find that happiness does 
not correlate with our more long-term well-being ingredients, such as our 
financial security or our meaningful relationships.  If this were the case, we 
can reasonably conclude that evidence of our bias towards the short-term 
defeats the evidence of well-being provided by happiness.          
Alternatively, consider how evidence of undercutting defeaters may confirm 
the presence of certain rebutting defeaters.  For example, we may have 
evidence that income rebuts the evidence provided by happiness about our 
well-being (that is, measures of income may correlate with measures of other 
well-being ingredients to a greater extent that measures of happiness).  In 
order to conclude that such a rebutting defeater is present, we need evidence 
of certain undercutting defeaters.  For instance, we may find that happiness is 
prone to various cognitive biases that prevent it from being reliably caused by 
certain important well-being ingredients, such as our achievements of long-
term goals or our opportunities for future well-being.  If this were the case, we 
can reasonably conclude that evidence of income defeats the evidence of 
well-being provided by happiness.            
It is in these ways that evidence of both rebutting and undercutting defeaters 
can enable us to determine the kinds of contexts in which we have reason to 
believe happiness does and does not tend to correlate with well-being.  
Identifying these contexts is an exciting topic for both further philosophical and 
empirical research.          
3.4.3  Potential evidence of happiness defeaters 
So far, I have claimed that the evidence provided by happiness does not 
justify propositions about well-being when we have evidence that both kinds 
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of defeaters are present.  What we are justified in believing about well-being 
in a particular context depends on the total amount of evidence available 
within that context.  When we have evidence of both undercutting and 
rebutting defeaters, we cannot justify propositions about well-being on the 
basis of information about happiness.    
But what are we justified in believing about well-being when we don’t have 
evidence of such defeaters?  Is it simply the case that, without evidence of 
both kinds of defeaters, we are justified in forming beliefs about well-being on 
the basis of information about happiness?   
I have already argued that we have reason to believe that happiness tends to 
be correlated with well-being, and therefore that it is appropriate to treat 
happiness as an indicator of well-being.  This suggests that, when we don’t 
have evidence of any defeaters, we have no reason not to believe that 
happiness is correlated with well-being; thus, without evidence of any 
defeaters, it seems that we are justified in forming beliefs about well-being on 
the basis of information about happiness.    
However, one could be sceptical about this claim.  We may have reason to 
believe that there are other defeaters out there, only ones that we do not have 
evidence of yet.  According to this objection, we can only be sure about 
justifying of our beliefs about well-being from the evidence provided by 
happiness when we know that we have considered all or most of the potential 
evidence of defeaters.   
For example, it may be that, as we gain a better understanding of the 
heuristics and biases that influence our cognition, we may come to realise that 
there are a large amount of contexts in which our affective states are 
dysfunctional, and thereby fail to reliably detect well-being ingredients.  These 
heuristics and biases may provide us with reason to believe that, within the 
contexts in question, happiness does not correlate with well-being. Such 
defeaters may currently exist, only we do not yet know about them.   
Perhaps, then, we cannot treat happiness as an indicator of well-being until 
we have a greater understanding of possible defeaters?  I think such 
scepticism is unwarranted.  We can incorporate the fact that the evidence 
provided by happiness can be defeated in certain contexts without limiting the 
extent to which information about happiness justifies beliefs about well-being 
outside of those contexts.  Once we identify and control for the contexts or 
conditions in which the evidence provided by happiness can be defeated, it 
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seems plausible to claim that we can infer information about well-being from 
information about happiness.  
The problem with the sceptical view is that it limits the amount of progress that 
can be made in the measurement of well-being.  Empirical research will 
always take place under the limitation of imperfect knowledge (Chang 2004); 
yet, this need not paralyze us from making judgements about well-being from 
different kinds of evidence about well-being.  If we have reason to believe that 
happiness tends to be reliably caused by well-being ingredients, we have 
reason to believe that happiness tends to be correlated with well-being.  
When there is no counter-evidence available, there is at least some kind of 
weighting in favour of treating happiness as an indicator of well-being.  This is 
required if we are to make progress in the measurement of well-being.  Thus, 
I believe we need evidence against the correlation between happiness and 
well-being in order to defeat a rational presumption in its favour. 
There is, however, an element of truth in the more sceptical view.  The 
general weighting in favour of happiness providing us with information about 
well-being may be generally weak in light of the potential to discover 
additional defeaters.  Simply put, the evidence provided by happiness should, 
perhaps, be taken with a pinch of salt.  However, this is a different position to 
the one that maintains there is either no weighting in favour (or even a 
weighting against) the epistemic merit of evidence provided by happiness in 
the absence of evidence of defeaters.  Such a position is unwarranted.  We 
can see that our affective states generally enable us to function well, except in 
certain contexts and conditions.  Thus, even if we do not know the limits of 
how well it enables us to function, we can at least set a weighting that is 
somewhat in favour of the epistemic value of happiness rather against it.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued in favour of the Indicator View – the view that it 
is appropriate for us to treat happiness as a defeasible indicator of well-being.  
I have argued that the function of affective states is to inform and guide our 
action, which they partly do by reliably detecting evaluative features of our 
environment that bear on our well-being. This provides us with reason to 
believe that happiness tends to correlate with well-being, and thereby 
indicates well-being in an important range of cases.  
Happiness is a defeasible indicator of well-being because, in certain contexts, 
we have reason to believe that happiness does not tend to correlate with well-
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being.  These are the contexts either in which affective states are 
dysfunctional or in which the function of affective states entails that they 
detect evaluative features of our environment that do not bear on our well-
being (i.e. undercutting defeaters).  Alternatively, there may be contexts in 
which we have direct evidence that happiness does not tend to be causally 
connected to certain well-being ingredients (i.e. rebutting defeaters).  
In the next two chapters, I will refine the Indicator View by further considering 
the function of affective states.  In chapter four, I will show that, although the 
function of affective states entails that they detect well-being ingredients, 
things are actually more complicated.  I will argue that the function of affective 
states entails two things in this respect, namely to detect: (a) unexpected 
changes in well-being ingredients and (b) levels of well-being ingredients.  In 
chapter five, I will show that, the function of affective states entails that they 
specifically detect (unexpected) local changes in well-being. Happiness, 
therefore, is appropriately treated as a defeasible indicator of local changes in 
well-being.    
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Chapter 4 
Happiness as an Indicator of Changes in Well-being 
 
Abstract 
In this chapter, I will refine the Indicator View outlined in chapter three.  I will 
argue that happiness is a defeasible indicator of changes in well-being. 
According to this refined version of the Indicator View, it is appropriate to treat 
happiness as an indicator of changes in well-being unless we have reason to 
do otherwise.     
Again, the argument in favour of this view is based on function of affective 
states.  The function of affective states is to inform and guide action.  I will 
argue that the practically relevant evaluative features of our environment tend 
to be changes in well-being ingredients.  This provides us with reason to 
believe that happiness will tend to correlate with changes in well-being.  Thus, 
we can treat happiness as an indicator of changes in well-being.       
In addition, I will argue that, in certain contexts, we may have reason to 
believe that happiness does not correlate with changes in well-being.  In such 
contexts, the practically relevant evaluative features of our environment tend 
to be levels of (in contrast to changes in) certain well-being ingredients.  
Within such contexts, we have reason to believe that happiness will tend to 
correlate with certain aspects of our level of well-being; thus, in such contexts, 
we should not treat happiness as an indicator of changes in well-being.     
Lastly, I will show how this refined view of the function of affective states can 
enable us to interpret empirical findings from the study of happiness.  In 
particular, I will show that the Indicator View provides us with plausible 
interpretations of the Easterlin Paradox and the phenomenon of adaptation.      
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4.1  Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the function of happiness partly entails 
that affective states detect well-being ingredients.  In this chapter, I will refine 
this view.  I will argue that the function of affective states entails that they 
detect changes in our well-being ingredients.     
I will argue in favour of this refined version of the Indicator View as follows.  In 
the first main section of the chapter, I will review three philosophical theories 
of the function of affective states, namely the views of Elijah Millgram, Timothy 
Schroeder and Peter Railton.   
In the second main section of the chapter, I will show that, from these three 
views, we can establish two main claims.  First, the function of affective states 
entails that they detect (unexpected) changes in well-being.  This claim is 
endorsed by both Schroeder’s and Railton’s views and is consistent with 
Millgram’s view.  Second, in certain contexts, the function of affective states 
entails that they detect levels of certain well-being ingredients.  This claim is 
consistent with all three views.  Thus, we have reason to believe that, in an 
important range of cases, happiness tends to correlate with changes in well-
being; in certain contexts, however, we have reason to believe that happiness 
correlates with levels of well-being.    
In the third main section of the chapter, I show how this view can provide us 
with plausible interpretations of some of the main findings from the study of 
happiness.  In particular, I will show that the Easterlin Paradox and the 
phenomenon of adaptation can be explained by the fact that happiness 
indicates changes in well-being.  In addition, I will show that other important 
findings can be explained by the fact that, in certain contexts or conditions, 
happiness indicates either unexpected changes in well-being or certain 
aspects of one’s level of well-being. 
4.2  Three views of the function of affective states 
In this section I will compare and contrast three philosophical theories of the 
function of affective states, namely the views outlined by Elijah Millgram 
(2000), Timothy Schroeder (2001; 2004; 2006) and Peter Railton (2008; MS).  
I will show that all three views are similar in that they maintain the function of 
our affective states entails that they tend to detect changes in our well-being, 
in contrast to our absolute level of well-being. 
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In discussing their respective theories, all three theorists use the terms 
“pleasure/displeasure”, “positive/negative affect”, “positive/negative emotion” 
and “happiness/unhappiness” interchangeably.  For the purpose of evaluating 
the significance of their arguments for the claims of this chapter, the 
differences between these notions do not matter.71  To keep things simple, I 
will discuss the claims of each view in terms of pleasure.    
4.2.1  Millgram’s View 
Millgram argues in favour of the normative claim that pleasure should indicate 
changes in well-being.  His target is the particular utilitarian view that we 
should maximise well-being and that well-being is constituted by pleasure.  
According to this version of utilitarianism, we should maximise pleasure.  
Millgram argues that this view is wrong because it consists in the wrong view 
of pleasure.  According to Millgram, pleasure does not constitute well-being – 
the function of pleasure is to indicate changes in well-being.  
Why does Millgram think that pleasure has the function of indicating changes 
in well-being?  His argument is perhaps best illustrated by the following two 
examples that he provides: 
“Getting admitted to (or rejected by) a prestigious college may make an 
enormous difference in how well the prospective student’s life is going, while 
making relatively little difference to how she feels: after a week or so of 
celebration or dejection, the applicant will be back on an even keel. The 
sense of accomplishment in bringing home the washing machine is gone by 
the next morning, although the contribution the appliance will make to one’s 
well-being is not. (You will very shortly cease to feel much of anything about 
the fact that you can now just drop your clothes into the machine, instead of 
spending your afternoons at the laundromat; but, feeling or no feeling, the 
washing machine continues to wash your clothes and to save you those 
afternoons.)” (Millgram, 2000: p.119)72 
                                            
71This is not to say that there are no differences between pleasure, affect and emotion.  In 
chapter one, I argued that affective states (a) represent features of our environment that 
are practically relevant, (b) represent environmental features as good or bad, and (c) 
may be either conscious or non-conscious states.  In contrast to affective states, 
pleasures may exclude both components (a) and (c).  Pleasures/displeasures may 
simply represent something as good/bad.  In addition, pleasures/displeasures are always 
conscious states; they are what it feels like to represent something as good/bad.                  
72 From now on, until stated otherwise, all references are from Millgram, 2000. 
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In these kinds of cases, Millgram claims that new circumstances should not 
make a difference to how we feel in the long-run.  If someone cannot get used 
to their improved circumstances, Millgram claims, we will think that they are 
not getting something right.  According to Millgram’s view, experiencing 
pleasure is like receiving news:  “When good news comes along, we become 
elated; happiness surges.  But after a while, even though the news is as good 
as it ever was, pleasure fades.” (p.121) News informs us of changes in our 
circumstances.  Once these changes have been incorporated into our lives 
we should then be concerned with new changes, rather than dwelling on 
previous ones.     
It is worth being clear on why Millgram thinks this is the case.  One might think 
that it is counterintuitive not to be concerned with old changes.  After all, as 
Millgram points out, our improved circumstances have not got worse – they 
are as good as they were when we first received news of them.  So why not 
continue to take pleasure in old changes, as well as new ones?  Millgram 
thinks that we should get used to our improved circumstances for the 
following reason.  Pleasure, according to Millgram, is a mechanism for 
directing our priorities.  We care about maximizing our well-being, and 
therefore care about improving our circumstances in some way.  Thus, it 
makes sense to suppose that there’s no point in dwelling on the good things 
that are already at hand.  What we need to do is focus on changes in our 
circumstances and react to those changes in a way that will enable us to 
improve our well-being.73                  
On Millgram’s view, then, pleasure should indicate changes in well-being.  
Like all indicators, pleasure can fail in various ways to indicate changes in 
well-being accurately.  We may have false beliefs about our circumstances, 
for example (either thinking that our circumstances have changed when they 
in fact have not, or vice versa).  Millgram also notes that we may put pleasure 
to use in fictional contexts, the same way that we put visual representations of 
our surroundings to a different use when going to the movies.  Presumably, 
pleasure may also (correctly) indicate changes in our circumstances that do 
                                            
73 Although Millgram may implicitly assume that we care about maximizing our well-being, 
this assumption does not matter for organization of this chapter.  Pleasure can still be 
viewed as a mechanism for directing our priorities, even if we do not care about 
maximizing our well-being.  Millgram’s view merely rests on the claim that we care about 
improving our circumstances in some way.  Pleasure enables our lives to get better in 
some respect, through informing us of (and motivating us to react to) changes in our 
circumstances.           
 136 
not relate to changes in our well-being, such as empathic pleasures, as well 
as (fictional and non-fictional) aesthetic pleasures.  Although Millgram does 
not mention this last point, this possibility is consistent with his view.   
In providing an account of why pleasure should indicate changes in well-being 
(rather than absolute levels of well-being) Millgram uses the analogy of hill-
climbing.  Hill-climbing is a technique used to climb the highest hill in a 
particular landscape in the event that you can only see the terrain around you 
(rather than the whole of the landscape).  It works by identifying the highest 
point within a nearby radius, and then standing on that point.  This process is 
repeated until there is no point within the small radius that is higher than the 
point you’re standing on.  Millgram claims that hill-climbing is efficient in that it 
doesn’t require significant amounts of information that may be hard to come 
by, such as information about the overall topography of the landscape.  For 
this reason, he claims that:  
“Human beings are built to hill-climb […] in order to hill-climb effectively, you 
don’t need to know what your altitude is (even though you are hill-climbing in 
order to gain altitude). All you need to know is: which of a few adjacent points 
is higher than the others? If your strategy for improving your welfare is to hill-
climb in the welfare landscape, you don’t actually have to know how well 
you’re doing; it’s enough to know whether some change you make is a 
change for the better or for the worse.” (p.123) 
Millgram claims that pleasure is an effective device for pursuing a hill-climbing 
strategy to improve our well-being.  With limited information about the “welfare 
landscape,” one should pursue this strategy with such a device.  In sum, 
Millgram argues that pleasure (as an indicator of changes in well-being) 
provides us with an effective way of promoting our well-being.74    
In support of this view, Millgram provides us with several cases in which 
pleasure does in fact tend to indicate changes in well-being.  He cites studies 
which show that subjects are not significantly happier or less happy a year 
after winning the lottery or becoming paraplegic respectively (Brickman et al. 
1978).  Such findings suggest that, although good fortune and disaster tend to 
                                            
74 As discussed in chapter three, we do not need to accept Millgram’s claims that pleasure 
should have this function in order to accept the fact that pleasure has this function in a 
historical sense.  That is, we can claim that pleasure has been set up (either through 
evolution or learning) to provide us with an effective way of promoting our well-being, 
even if pleasure should be used in a different way (e.g. to respond to moral concerns).    
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make us feel pleasure or displeasure, these feelings wear off once we 
become accustomed to our new situation: once you get used to your new 
circumstances, they will “not make that great a difference to how you feel” 
(Millgram, 2000: p.117).   
Of course, there are exceptions to this tendency.  Millgram admits that 
sometimes people get depressed and stay that way; that severe trials may 
permanently affect one’s ability to be happy, even if becoming paraplegic is 
not enough.  On Millgram’s view, however, these are cases in which pleasure 
fails to perform its function.  Depressed individuals, for instance, are 
dysfunctional, according to Millgram, in that they are unable to detect new 
changes in their well-being and thereby effectively promote their well-being.    
In addition, it is worth noting that there are cases in which pleasure succeeds 
in performing its function, but that doing so may be an ineffective strategy for 
promoting well-being.  Pleasure may be an effective tool in many 
circumstances, but it is not invariably the right tool, and doesn’t invariably 
produce the best outcome (i.e., improve our well-being).  Millgram again uses 
the hill-climbing metaphor to highlight two ways in which this may be the case, 
which I will briefly consider in turn.     
First, the effectiveness of hill-climbing relies on going from point A to point B 
being of a similar difficulty to going from point B back to point A.  That is, if we 
discover that the highest point we have reached is not in fact the highest point 
that we can reach, we may need to retrace our steps before being climbing to 
the highest possible point.  In certain contexts, this may be considerably more 
difficult or even impossible.  This analogy can be clearly seen with changes in 
well-being.  For example, although a degree in medicine may be an 
improvement in one’s well-being, it may not be as good as a degree in law in 
the long-run (i.e. if one ends up deciding to be a lawyer); unfortunately, 
however, once one has completed a medicine degree, one may no longer 
have the time or money to do a law degree. 
Second, if all we do is hill-climb then we can get trapped at the top of a 
relatively low hill.  This may be the case even if there are higher hills (just out 
of view) to climb elsewhere.  With regards to well-being, we may reach a 
dead-end of potential further improvements, and not be able to see any 
alternative options available to us.  For example, we may consistently try and 
improve our well-being by making improvements to the business that we 
started up.  We may try and improve our marketing strategy, customer 
relations or overall efficiency.  Only being able to focus on making these kinds 
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of improvements may leave us blind to the fact that starting up a very different 
kind of business would make us much better off.  Simply put, if all we do is 
focus on changes in well-being, we may fail to see whether the improvements 
we have made have made us significantly better off overall.           
Thus, hill-climbing can be ineffective both because we may be unable to 
retrace our steps and because we may be unable to see better improvements 
in our well-being.  Although indicating changes in well-being may often be an 
effective way of promoting our well-being, this may not always be the case.  
The above two points will be of interest later on, when considering the 
contexts in which the function of affective states does not entail that they 
detect changes in well-being.              
In sum, Millgram claims that pleasure has the function of indicating changes in 
well-being.  We should feel good when our lives improve.  Conversely, we 
should feel bad when our lives get worse.  Indeed, we often do.  Pleasure has 
the job of indicating changes in well-being because responding to such 
changes tends to be an effective strategy for the promotion of well-being.            
4.2.2  Schroeder’s View 
Schroeder defends a representational view of pleasure.  He maintains that 
pleasure (displeasure) represents net changes in desire satisfaction 
(frustration).  For the purpose of evaluating the significance of his arguments 
for the claims of this chapter, the differences between desire-satisfaction and 
well-being do not matter.75  Thus, in discussing Schroeder’s view, I will use 
the terms “desire-satisfaction” and “well-being” interchangeably.  
After arguing that pleasure/displeasure are representational states, Schroeder 
claims that pleasure represents net gains in desire satisfaction and 
displeasure represents net losses: “By and large, getting what we want 
pleases us, and being pleased is a sign that things are going our way.  
Similarly, having our desires frustrated is unpleasant, and being displeased is 
a sign that things are going against our wishes.” (Schroeder, 2000: p.513)            
                                            
75 Again, the notions used by Schroeder reflect the aims of his argument.  Schroeder focuses 
on the notion of desire-satisfaction, rather than the on notion of well-being, primarily 
because he does not want to commit to any particular theory of value (i.e., whether a 
desire-satisfaction theory of well-being is true, whether reasons internalism is true, and 
so on).  Thus, rather than claiming that pleasure represents net changes in well-being, 
Schroeder maintains a value-neutral view.             
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Schroeder takes net desire satisfaction or frustration to be a function of the 
satisfaction or frustration of individual desires, with stronger desires being 
weighted more heavily than weaker desires in the global evaluation.  Thus, 
net desire satisfaction may be positive or negative to a greater or lesser 
degree.  
Schroeder’s view differs from and extends Millgram’s view in two respects.  
Firstly, Schroeder introduces the notion of intensity of pleasure, whereby the 
greater net change in desire satisfaction, the more intense the resulting 
pleasure.76  With regards to well-being, Schroeder’s view would be that the 
greater the net change in well-being, the more intense the resulting 
pleasure.77     
Secondly, Schroeder claims that pleasures track net changes in desire-
satisfaction.  Thus, insofar as pleasure accurately represents the net change 
in desire-satisfaction, one cannot experience simultaneous pleasures and 
displeasures.78  If, for example, our desire for chocolate is frustrated at the 
same time as our desire for television is satisfied, we will experience either 
pleasure or displeasure depending on which of the two desires are stronger.  
If our desire for television is stronger than our desire for chocolate, we will 
experience pleasure.  This is because we have witnessed a net increase in 
desire-satisfaction.  If both our desires for chocolate and television are 
satisfied, we will experience a still greater amount of pleasure, which indicates 
a greater net increase in desire-satisfaction.79        
                                            
76 The work of Davis (1981) and Reisenzein (2009) support this view.  Both theorists claim 
that the intensity of pleasure is determined by the sum of (a) the strength of the desire 
that has been satisfied and (b) the degree of belief that the desire has been satisfied.           
77 It is important to note that the intensity of pleasure is distinct from the level of arousal.  
Being pleased sometimes involves being stimulated, excited, aroused: one talks about 
joy or ecstasy; other times, being pleased involves being contented, relaxed, put at ease: 
one talks about bliss or satiation.  Schroeder correctly maintains that we can distinguish 
between the high/low arousal component of affective states and the pleasurable 
component of affective states.  One can, for instance, compare a moment of joy and a 
moment of bliss and say which was more pleasant i.e., which pleasure was more 
intense.   
78 This does not rule out the possibility of experiencing simultaneous pleasures and 
displeasures.  Insofar as pleasure inaccurately represents the net change in desire-
satisfaction, experiences of simultaneous pleasures are possible.    
79 Again, it is useful to distinguish the intensity of pleasure and the level of arousal, here.  
According to Schroeder, when desire-satisfactions are combined in this way (e.g., the 
net satisfaction constituted by the satisfaction of our desire for chocolate and television) 
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Like all representations, pleasure can fail to represent net changes in desire-
satisfaction in various ways.  Schroeder outlines three of these ways.  Firstly, 
such representations may be, to a certain extent, cognitively impenetrable.  
The result is that perceptual representations of net changes in desire-
satisfaction can override intellectual representations.  Schroeder gives the 
example of a child having an injection, who may feel less pain as a result of 
looking away from the needle, despite believing (on an intellectual level) that 
he is being injected by it (Schroeder, 2000: p.517).  Secondly, pleasure may 
fail to pick up on net changes in desire-satisfaction when there are extraneous 
influences on affect, such as in cases of depression.  Lastly, both pleasure 
and displeasure can increase.  In such cases, pleasure says that our desires 
are, on balance, being satisfied; displeasure says that they are, on balance, 
more frustrated.  Schroeder likens such experiences to cognitive illusions, 
whereby we have similar experiences of mutually exclusive phenomena.     
One last point is worth mentioning concerning a further respect in which 
Schroeder’s view differs from/extends Millgram’s view.  In later work, 
Schroeder (2004; 2007) added the important role that expectations play in the 
elicitation of pleasure.  Consider the following example provided by 
Schroeder:   
“If Theresa is accustomed to sleeping on a nice double bed, being forced to sleep on 
a plastic-coated single bed (say, in a student dorm) will be unpleasant; but if she lives 
in the dorm, she will become accustomed to the less-nice bed, and stop being 
caused displeasure by it.  Similarly, if she is sure that Montreal will win the Stanley 
Cup, she will be more displeased by a loss than if that was what she was expecting 
all along, all else being equal.” (Schroeder, 2007: 260) 
The role that expectations play in the things that reliably cause pleasure 
makes sense if pleasure represents net changes in desire-satisfaction.  This 
is because net changes in desire-satisfaction must be net changes relative to 
something.  Now, it may be that pleasure represents change relative to total 
levels of desire-satisfaction, or absolute levels of well-being (as in Millgram’s 
view).  However, Schroeder claims that this is less obvious in the case of 
pleasure.  He suggests that pleasures in this sense are more like our sense of 
                                            
there is only one resultant pleasure, which represents the net desire-satisfaction.  We 
can, however, distinguish between the desire-satisfactions on the basis of their sources 
(i.e., eating chocolate and watching television) and the attendant non-pleasure 
associated feelings (i.e., arousal vs. non-arousal) that come with each source.     
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warmth and cold, which represents changes from a particular baseline rather 
than absolute levels of heat.    
Schroeder modified his view so that pleasure represents only unexpected net 
increases in desire-satisfaction.  He further stresses that this expectation-
related baseline is also, to a certain extent, cognitively impenetrable.  That is, 
it is our gut-level expectations that play the important role.  This explains 
statements such as, “Of course I knew she would be late, but somehow it still 
surprised me”, or cases whereby one “can’t quite believe” they got the great 
new job, romantic partner, or piece of financial luck they did (Schroeder, 
2007).  In these cases, gut-level and intellectual-level expectations come 
apart, and our gut-level expectations tend to determine the pleasure or 
displeasure that we feel.   
The work of emotion theorist Nico Frijda (1988) supports the importance of 
gut-level expectations in eliciting pleasure.  He notes that, generally speaking, 
the frame of reference that determines what counts as an emotional event 
consists of that which is deemed possible: “Those who grieve and mourn 
have not really taken their leave from the departed person; they still expect 
him or her at the other end of their arms, bed, or table.  Those who feel that 
they should be able to cope suffer when they cannot cope.” (Frijda, 1988: 
p.353) The role of expectations also explains how small improvements in well-
being can sometimes cause (seemingly disproportionate) intense pleasures, 
such as the large amount of joy experienced from receiving a gift from a 
stranger.  Such changes are small, but unexpected, and thereby consist in a 
greater unexpected net change in well-being.   
In sum, Schroeder claims that pleasure (affect) represents unexpected net 
changes in desire-satisfaction (well-being).  We tend to feel good as a result 
of our lives improving in unexpected ways.  Conversely, we tend to feel bad 
due to our lives getting unexpectedly worse.  
4.2.3  Railton’s View  
Like Millgram, Railton cites “surprising” findings from the study of happiness 
that are in need of some kind of explanation.  As mentioned in chapter one, 
this field of research is often referred to as the study of subjective well-being 
(SWB).  SWB researchers have found that very few life conditions make a 
difference to our long-run SWB.  SWB in developed countries has not 
increased over the past 50 years, despite large increases in the material 
standard of living.  Many chronic illnesses and serious disabilities do not result 
in long-term declines in SWB.  The old tend to have higher levels of SWB than 
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the middle-aged.  Climate, religion, family, friends, social status, etc. tend not 
to matter for SWB.  What does matter is personality, intimate relationships, 
self-determined activities, keeping physically and mentally active, employment 
and freedom (Railton, 2008; MS).     
These kinds of findings are often explained by the “set point” theory of SWB: 
despite changes in life conditions, we slide back to our SWB set point.  
Railton sums up this trend as follows:  
“What we desire promises a gain in well-being. We like this idea, and so are 
motivated to attempt to satisfy the desire (or remove frustrations to it). As the desire 
is satisfied, we do experience a “shot” of well-being. When habituation causes this 
well-being to disappear like water in sand, we do not blame satisfying the desire (that 
felt good), but the fact that we are not now satisfying the desire.” (Railton, MS: 
p.14)80 
In offering an explanation for these phenomena, Railton claims that it is only 
because SWB has a set point structure that it can play the role it should in our 
psychic economy.  In this sense, his view is much like Millgram’s view.  In 
contrast to Millgram’s hill-climbing analogy, Railton illustrates the role of the 
affective system using the analogy of an autopilot in an aircraft.  An autopilot 
works by recording an “error signal” whenever the aircraft drifts very slights off 
course (to one side or another).  In response to an error signal, the autopilot 
turns on or off the appropriate motors (that move the aircraft from one side or 
another) to remain on course.  Once the ship is back on course, the “error 
signal” ceases to be recorded, and the motors shut down.  Railton notes that 
this system contains the basic elements of regulation:  
“A set-point value, a monitor providing positive or negative feedback concerning the 
state of the system relative to the set-point, an automatic connection between this 
information and corresponding control of the system state, and continued monitoring 
to determine whether this control operation is succeeding in restoring the set-point 
value.  Our machines and our bodies are full of such homeostatic regulators.” (p.14)    
Railton goes on to claim that our affective system is a more intelligent 
regulator than this.  In a further analogy, he likens our affective system to a 
delta-meter in a racing sailboat.  Delta-meters respond to changes in speed.  
When the boat is travelling at a constant speed, fast or slow, the meter reads 
zero.  But if the boat begins to speed up, the meter gives a positive reading 
                                            
80 From now on, until stated otherwise, all references are to Railton, MS.   
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(the greater the increase in speed, the greater the positive reading).  And if 
the boat slows down, the meter gives a negative reading (the greater the 
decrease in speed, the greater the negative reading).   
With regards to well-being, the position of the racing sailboat is analogous to a 
person’s absolute level of well-being.  The speed (or velocity) of the boat is 
analogous to a person’s change in well-being.  And the change in speed (or 
acceleration/deceleration) of the boat is analogous to a person’s rate of 
change in well-being.  Railton uses the analogy of the delta-meter to show 
that the function of pleasure does not merely entail that it detects changes in 
well-being.  It may also detect a person’s rate of change in well-being.   
Railton considers this kind of regulation to be more intelligent because it is not 
wed to any set point.  The zero point of the delta meter does not correspond 
to a certain velocity; rather, it corresponds to the change in speed (i.e. 
acceleration/deceleration) – the first derivative of velocity.  Absolute speed 
loses its significance, so long as the sail trimmer is doing what they can to 
secure every possible gain in speed at that moment, and avoids every 
possible way of slowing the boat down.  In this way, our affective system “is 
not keyed to our absolute rate of movement through life (income, 
accomplishment, etc.), but to whether we are making more or less progress in 
attaining the goals or desires of the moment.” (p.15) 
It is worth being clear on how Railton’s position differs from Millgram’s view in 
this respect.  The key difference between the two views concerns the 
respective baseline from which pleasure is caused by prudential features of 
our environment.  For a regulatory system to be sensitive to change, it must 
return to a certain baseline.  Consider, for example, winning the lottery and 
feeling good as a result.  Through feeling good, we detect the fact that 
winning the lottery has increased our level of well-being.  However, if winning 
the lottery continued to make us feel good, we would fail to recognise further 
changes in our well-being.  In order to detect such changes, the pleasure 
caused by winning the lottery must, at some point, dissipate (ideally, when it 
ceases to be useful for informing and guiding our action).  Our level of 
pleasure must, at some point, return to a particular baseline.    
Now, according to Millgram, this baseline is our absolute level of well-being.  
For Railton (as well as Schroeder), this baseline is our expected changes in 
well-being.  According to both Railton and Schroeder, our feelings are 
determined by our anticipations concerning changes in our well-being.  If we 
anticipate that our level of well-being will stay the same, and our level of well-
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being increases (decreases), we will experience pleasure (displeasure).  
Similarly, if we anticipate that our level of well-being will increase, and our 
level of well-being increases more (less) than we anticipated, we will feel good 
(bad).  In this way, pleasure only detects the most relevant features of our 
environment for action.  Through anticipating the state of the world, and then 
matching those anticipations with the actual state of the world, we only need 
to pay attention to genuinely new information.  Expected information is 
redundant.  Thus, according to Railton (and Schroeder), the function of 
pleasure entials that it detects unexpected prudential features of our 
environment.        
Railton’s view explains two “surprising” findings regarding the causes of 
pleasure.  Firstly, although many kinds of circumstances have been shown to 
make no lasting difference to people’s level of happiness (e.g. increases in 
income, status, educational attainment, etc.) certain kinds of events and 
conditions do tend to have a lasting impact.  For example, experiences such 
as going on vacation or having a meal at a restaurant tend to make people 
happier than material purchases such as clothes or computer equipment (Van 
Boven & Gilovich 2003).  As another example, people’s level of happiness 
adapts more quickly to news that they definitely have a serious illness than to 
news that they might have a serious illness (Frederick & Loewenstein 1999).  
What these kinds of events and conditions have in common is that they tend 
to be unexpected.  Insofar as going on vacation or having a meal at a 
restaurant is variable, it is hard to predict the impact on such events on our 
well-being (Wilson & Gilbert 2008).  And insofar as potentially having a 
serious illness is uncertain, the impact of such a condition is also 
unpredictable.  Railton’s view emphasises the fact that unexpected 
circumstances tend to cause us pleasure/displeasure.  It explains why certain 
kinds of events and conditions tend to have more of a lasting impact on our 
happiness than others – the impact that such circumstances have on our well-
being tends to be unexpected.           
Secondly, Railton’s view explains why social references have such a 
pervasive impact on happiness (Frank, 2001; Layard, 2005).  For example, 
unemployment tends to have a lasting (negative) impact on happiness in a 
healthy economic climate, but not so much of an impact within an economic 
depression (Graham, 2009).  In other words, we feel bad when we are the 
only one who is doing badly, but we feel okay if we are doing just as badly as 
everyone else.  Again, this phenomenon can be explained with reference to 
our expectations.  According to Railton’s view, the function of pleasure entails 
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that it detects how well we are doing relative to how well we expect to be 
doing.  People around us provide us with useful information about what is 
possible in our situation.  If everyone around us is doing well and we are 
doing badly, we can expect to be doing better.  Thus, our actual 
circumstances will be worse than our anticipated circumstances, thereby 
making us feel bad.  In contrast, if everyone around us is doing just as badly 
as we are, this suggests that we are doing everything we can in virtue of the 
options we face, the resources that we are utilising, and so on.  Our actual 
circumstances will be no worse than our anticipated circumstances, and 
therefore we will cease to feel bad about them.  This is consistent with other 
findings in social psychology, which suggest that we use the information 
provided by the actions and circumstances of those around us to form 
predictions about how we should act.81   
Railton reviews an array of neurological evidence in showing that our affective 
baseline is our expected changes in well-being.  For instance, he reviews the 
influential work of Schultz et al. (1997), which suggests that we experience 
pleasure in accordance with the baseline of our expected changes in our 
circumstances.  An alternative way of viewing this point is that pleasure is 
reliably caused by changes (“prediction errors”) in our expected changes in 
our circumstances.         
What matters, according to this view, is not necessarily whether our well-
being improves, but whether our well-being is improving to a greater or lesser 
degree than expected.  Can we improve our well-being to an even greater 
extent?82  Or are we trying to improve our well-being too much, perhaps in an 
unfeasible manner?  We are effectively learning at each moment how much 
improvement to seek, adjusting this to constantly changing circumstances.  
Whenever we increase our rate of improvement we are rewarded by an 
experience of positive affect; whenever we decrease our rate of improvement, 
we are punished by an experience of negative affect.  This learning system is 
continuously monitoring our rate of progress, and uses this information to 
attune and re-attune our responses to the world.    
                                            
81  For a comprehensive review of findings from social psychology concerning the impact of 
others on people’s behaviour see Doris, 2002.     
82 Note that we may be able to improve our well-being to an even greater extent either by 
continuing our level of progress in the particular task at hand or through focusing 
attention and devoting resources to alternative areas of our lives.  Carver (2003) argues 
that pleasure has the function of performing this latter role.   
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Lastly, it is worth noting how Railton’s delta-meter metaphor is also instructive 
of the ways in which using such an indicator may not be an effective way of 
promoting well-being in the long-run.  In the main, even if our delta-meter 
regularly produces positive readings, it still does not provide us with 
information about our absolute distance travelled.  Suppose, for example, that 
we have been sailing in strong winds or against the tide.  We may regularly 
find new ways of gaining headway, and thereby increasing our rate of 
progress.  Yet, our ultimate progress may be minimal.  Without looking over to 
the horizon, we will not be able to judge whether other boats have made much 
more progress (in different winds or tides).  We can clearly see this analogy 
with regards to well-being.  Returning to the example used in discussing 
Millgram’s view, we may spend a significant amount of trying to improve our 
business, regularly increasing our rate of improvement in well-being.  Yet, at 
some point, we can come to realize that setting up a different kind of business 
would have resulted in a greater change in our well-being overall.  This kind of 
information cannot be provided by an affective system that solely indicates 
either our change in well-being or rate of change in well-being.           
In sum, Railton claims that the function of pleasure entails that it detects 
unexpected changes in our well-being.  According to this view, we tend to feel 
good when our lives improve to a greater extent than we anticipated.  
Conversely, we tend to feel bad when our lives improve to a lesser extent 
than expected.        
4.3  The Refined Indicator View 
In the previous section I reviewed three accounts of the function of affective 
states.  In the second section of the chapter, I will show that, from these three 
views, we can establish two main claims.  First, in an important range of 
cases, the function of affective states entails that they detect (unexpected) 
changes in well-being ingredients.  This claim is endorsed by both 
Schroeder’s and Railton’s views and is consistent with Millgram’s view.  
Second, in certain contexts, the function of affective states entails that they 
detect levels of certain well-being ingredients.  This claim is consistent with all 
three views.  Thus, in an important range of cases, we have reason to believe 
that happiness tends to correlate with changes in well-being; in certain 
contexts, however, we have reason to believe that happiness correlates with 
certain aspects of one’s level of well-being.    
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4.3.1  Affective states and (unexpected) changes in well-being  
The first claim that we can draw from the views above is that, in an important 
range of cases, the function of affective states entails that they detect 
(unexpected) changes in well-being ingredients.  All three accounts maintain 
that affective states should be reliably caused by changes in well-being 
ingredients relative to a baseline.  For Millgram, this baseline is our absolute 
level of well-being ingredients; for Schroeder and Railton, this baseline is our 
expected changes in well-being ingredients.  I believe that the latter views are 
right in thinking that, in an important range of cases, affective states should be 
reliably caused by changes in well-being ingredients relative to the baseline of 
our expected changes in well-being ingredients.  
Consider, for example, observing the value of your stocks and shares decline 
as a result of a poor marketing policy.  Each day your stocks decline, and 
thereby decrease your level of well-being (with regards to certain well-being 
ingredients, such as income, reputation, achievement, etc.).  After a few days, 
however, the stocks start to decline at a slower rate; they are still declining, 
but not as quickly as they were before.  This change may result in you feeling 
happy – you may feel good that things are not as bad as they were before 
(“Perhaps things are looking up after all?”) even though your level of well-
being is still decreasing.  Yet, this trend should not be detected by pleasure, 
according to Millgram’s view.  According to Millgram, happiness should be 
reliably caused by changes in well-being relative to your absolute level of well-
being.  Thus, observing the value of your stocks and shares decline at a 
slower rate should still result in you feeling unhappy – you should feel bad, 
according to Millgram, because your level of well-being is decreasing.  On the 
one hand, this is correct – it is useful to know that your stocks are declining.  
On the other hand, however, merely detecting whether your level of well-being 
is decreasing or increasing misses crucial information about your situation.  It 
may be that your stocks have declined at a slower rate because of the 
changes you made to your marketing policy.  Indeed, if you continued to make 
similar changes, your stocks may cease to decline altogether, and may even 
start to increase.  It is in this way that detecting unexpected changes in well-
being provides you with practically relevant information beyond your overall 
change in well-being.  The fact that your stocks and shares are declining at a 
slower rate suggests that you are on the right track; that you should keep on 
doing whatever it is that you’re doing.  Pleasure should be reliably caused by 
this kind of information insofar as it should inform and guide action.             
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As another example, consider Charles Carver’s (2003) view of the function of 
pleasure.  Carver argues that pleasure indicates increases in our rate of 
increases in well-being.  According to Carver, pleasure indicates not merely 
that our well-being is increasing; rather, pleasure indicates that our rate of 
increases in well-being is increasing.  We feel good, according to Carver, 
when we are improving at an even greater rate than we were previously.  
Carver argues that the function of detecting such changes is to signal that we 
are improving more than we need to.  Such improvements are good for us, 
but we could be devoting our attention and resources to improving other 
aspects of our well-being, namely the aspects of our well-being that are more 
in need of improvement.  As a result of indicating increases in our rate of 
increases in well-being, pleasure can provide us with this kind of information.  
Again, however, according to Millgram’s view, pleasure does not have this 
function.  According to Millgram, pleasure should merely be caused by 
changes in well-being ingredients.  This incorrectly rules out contexts in which 
we require information about whether certain aspects of our well-being 
ingredients are improving at a greater rate than they need to.   
Shroeder and Railton’s views capture cases in which happiness should detect 
rates of change in well-being ingredients in the following way.  When we come 
to expect constant improvements in well-being ingredients, Schroeder and 
Railton both maintain that affective states should detect unexpected changes 
in well-being ingredients.   
Schroder and Railton’s views also adequately account for cases in which 
strong affective states should be indicated by relatively small changes in well-
being ingredients (and vice versa).  Consider, again, the case of experiencing 
strong feelings of joy as a result of receiving a gift from a stranger.  Receiving 
this gift is not a great change in well-being, yet it is indicated by a strong 
affective state.  According to Schroeder’s and Railton’s views, affect strength 
should not indicate the degree of changes in well-being in themselves.  
Rather, affect strength should indicate the degree of changes in well-being 
relative to our expectations.  Thus, a relatively small change in well-being 
ingredients may cause a strong affective state insofar as the change was 
largely unexpected.  Conversely, a relatively large change in well-being 
ingredients may cause a weak affective state insofar as the change was 
largely expected.  
In sum, both Schroeder and Railton’s views discussed above endorse the 
claim that, in some cases, the function of affective states entails that they 
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detect unexpected changes in well-being ingredients.  In such cases, 
expected changes do not provide us with practically relevant news about our 
circumstances.  In contrast, unexpected changes do – they tell us that the 
world was not as we had thought it was.  This logic is consistent with 
Millgram’s view.  Millgram argues that the function of affective states is to 
indicate changes in well-being because it is these changes that provide us 
with practically relevant news about how well we are doing.         
Indeed, I think that Millgram’s view is insightful in this respect.  I suggest that 
changes in well-being ingredients tend to be, to some extent, unexpected.  
Thus, Millgram’s view (that the function of affective states entails that they 
detect changes in well-being ingredients) may tend to be similar in practice to 
both Schroeder and Railton’s view (that the function of affective states entails 
that they detect unexpected changes in well-being ingredients).     
The reason for believing this claim is simply that most changes in well-being 
ingredients tend to be, to a certain extent, unpredictable.  Consider, for 
example, getting into a warm bath, and finding it pleasurable.  You know the 
bath will be warm because you tested the temperature before getting in.  You 
also know what a warm bath feels like from previously having a warm bath.  
Yet, despite knowing how the warm bath would feel, you still felt pleasure 
from getting into it.  This is because, to a certain extent, the experience was 
unpredictable.  We may know that getting into a warm bath feels relaxing in 
various ways, but we do not know the exact way in which the warm bath will 
relax us – the particular groups of muscles that will be soothed by the warm 
water, the exact change in external body temperature, and so on.  The exact 
state of affairs involved in getting into the warm bath is unexpected; thus, 
such states of affairs tend to result in us feeling pleasure.       
This phenomenon is perhaps best illustrated by the practice of tickling.  An 
influential model of agency (called the Forward Model: see Prinz 2007b) 
suggests that we distinguish between active and passive movements by the 
presence or absence of anticipatory images that match the experiences that 
we have when our bodies move.  For instance, if I am about to lift my arm in a 
specific direction, I form an anticipatory image of what that movement would 
feel like.  If the actual feeling of lifting my arm in that direction matches my 
anticipatory image of that movement, the action will feel active.  Conversely, if 
the actual feelings of that movement do not match my anticipatory image, the 
action will feel passive.  Now, the practice of tickling shows just how exact 
one’s anticipatory image needs to be in order to match one’s actual feelings.  
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Notoriously, you can’t tickle yourself.  This is explained by the fact that the 
tickle response requires unexpected movements.  Blakemore et al. (1998) 
developed a robotic hand that a subject can use to tickle herself.  The subject 
controls the hand through his or her own finger movements.  If the hand 
moves in sync with the subject’s fingers, tickling does not occur – the 
movements of the hand were entirely expected.  However, if the hand moves 
with a slight delay, tickling does occur – even though the subjects knew they 
were about to be tickled, and the movements of the hand were expected, the 
exact time at which the tickling occurs was unexpected.  This level of 
exactness in our expectations suggests that pleasure can still result from 
relatively expected states of affairs insofar as those states of affairs are not 
expected exactly. 
I think we can reasonably assume that changes in well-being tend to be partly 
unexpected in this respect.  We expect our food to taste a certain way, but we 
cannot exactly predict how it will taste.  Likewise, we can predict how a certain 
interaction will go, but we are unable to do so entirely.  Our expectations of 
changes in well-being ingredients may have a considerable effect on the 
intensity of the affective states reliably caused by such changes.  But, it is 
unlikely that they will tend to null our affective responses altogether.  It is for 
this reason that we can assume that changes in well-being ingredients will 
tend to be unexpected changes, and thereby reliably cause affective states.  
The upshot is that we have reason to believe that happiness tends to 
correlate with changes in well-being.83          
4.3.2  Affective states and certain aspects of one’s level of well-
being  
In this section, I will argue in favour of a second kind of claim, in addition to 
the claims argued for in the previous two sections.  It is the claim that, in 
certain contexts, the function of affective states entails that they detect one’s 
level of certain well-being ingredients.  Thus, in such contexts, we have 
reason to believe that happiness tends to correlate with certain aspects of 
one’s level of well-being.   
                                            
83 The fact that our expectations have a considerable effect on the intensity of the affective 
states may make a significant different to the kinds of circumstances that affect our 
overall levels of happiness in the long-run.  I will deal with this issue in more detail in the 
final main section of this chapter, in considering findings from the study of happiness.  I 
will argue that expectations shaped by social references play a large role in determining 
the kinds of external conditions that impact our level of happiness over time.     
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This claim relates to the contexts discussed above (in discussing both 
Millgram’s and Railton’s views) in which the sole focus on changes in well-
being ingredients can fail to be an effective strategy for promoting well-being.  
Recall Railton’s delta-meter analogy, and how, in certain contexts, a delta-
meter fails to provide you with practically relevant information.  When sailing 
in strong winds or against the tide, you may regularly find new ways of gaining 
headway, and thereby increasing your rate of progress, but make little 
progress overall.  With regards to well-being, we may spend a significant 
amount of time and effort making progress in a particular endeavour, only to 
realize that we would have been better off putting our resources into a 
different project altogether.    
When we take a more “reflective perspective” (Tiberius 2005b) the practically 
relevant features of our environment will not tend to be (unexpected) changes 
in well-being ingredients.  Rather, we need to take into account our level of 
certain well-being ingredients – how well we are doing in a more global 
respect.84  We need to reflect on how much progress we are making, where it 
is that we are going, and so on.  A more reflective perspective sometimes 
requires that our levels of certain well-being ingredients reliably cause our 
affective states.  As Valerie Tiberius puts it: “Acknowledging the beauty of our 
everyday surroundings and appreciating the wonders of nature are good 
things to do and sometimes an invaluable tonic for the materialistic or 
accomplishment-focused perspectives that can easily absorb us.” (Tiberius, 
2005b: p.165) Such reflection (which includes a range of cognitive capacities, 
including our affective dispositions) can enable us to reprioritize certain well-
being ingredients or enable us to more effectively pursue our current priorities.  
Of course, for the purposes of action, such moments of reflection should 
ultimately be short-lived.  As Tiberius goes on to note: “It is good to stop and 
smell the roses, but not so good to smell them all the time.” (Tiberius, 2005b: 
p.165) For this reason, our absolute levels of certain well-being ingredients 
will not tend to be a key determinant of happiness.   
The function of affective states, in certain contexts, entails that they detect our 
level of certain well-being ingredients.  This fact can account for some kinds of 
cases that are not as plausibly captured by Millgram’s, Schroeder’s or 
Railton’s views.  In discussing Schroeder’s account, above, I briefly discussed 
                                            
84 In chapter five, I will consider the difference between local and global aspects of well-being 
in more detail.   
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an example provided by Frijda (1988) concerning the suffering of those who 
grieve.  Frijda agrees with Schroeder in claiming that the frame of reference 
that determines whether an event causes an affective state in us consists in 
our expectations.  Thus, Frijda writes: “Those who grieve and mourn have not 
really taken their leave from the departed person; they still expect him or her 
at the other end of their arms, bed, or table. Those who feel that they should 
be able to cope suffer when they cannot cope.” (Frijda, 1988: p.353; emphasis 
added) Frijda claims that those who grieve suffer because they (partially) 
expect the departed person to be present.  I think that this explanation is only 
partly correct, however.  Frijda is right to claim that there is some kind of 
baseline, or relevant comparison, in play.  But I think he is wrong in claiming 
that this frame of reference consists in our expectations.  It seems more 
plausible to claim grief is determined by the fact that the differences between 
when the person was alive and now when they’re dead are practically 
relevant.  That is, it is the loss itself that is salient, not the unexpected nature 
of the loss.  This seems more plausible that imputing an irrational belief that 
they haven’t departed, such that the grieving person is constantly surprised 
that they aren’t there.     
Moreover, there are some cases that cannot be adequately accounted for by 
(unexpected) changes in well-being ingredients.  Consider, for example, acts 
of gratitude that often cause pleasure in those performing such acts.  The 
practice of gratitude is a large part of almost all major religions and is now a 
major focus of positive psychologists (Emmons 2007).  Positive psychologists 
advise subjects to consider three things that they are grateful for each day.  
This simple practice can make a significant difference to subjects’ level of 
happiness (Seligman 2011).  Yet, often the things one can be thankful for are 
neither things that have changed in any way nor are unexpected.  Indeed, one 
may generally be grateful for familiar features of one’s life, such as one’s 
health, family, loving relationships, food to eat, house to live in, and so on.  
Again, it seems that a more plausible explanation of these kinds of cases is 
that such familiar features of one’s life become practically relevant as a result 
of deliberately focusing one’s attention on them.              
As one last example, the fact that, in certain contexts, the function of affective 
states entails that they detect our level of certain well-being ingredients can 
explain the influence that our level of energy has on our happiness (Gailliot 
2012).  Simply put, when we have high levels of energy, we tend to feel good; 
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when we have low levels, we tend to feel bad.85  I think the most plausible 
explanation of this phenomenon is that our level of energy dictates the extent 
to which we should focus on our level of well-being.  When we have low levels 
of energy, we tend to focus on our lack of certain well-being ingredients, for 
instance.  This makes sense insofar as we should focus on maintaining our 
current level of well-being when we do not have enough energy to increase it.   
4.3.3  Putting it all together 
In the past two sections, I have argued in favour of two main claims regarding 
the function of affective states.  First, in a large range of cases, the function of 
affective states entails that they detect (unexpected) changes in well-being 
ingredients.  Second, in certain contexts, the function of affective states 
entails that they detect levels of certain well-being ingredients.  Thus, we have 
reason to believe the following: in an important range of cases, happiness 
tends to correlate with changes in well-being; however, in certain contexts, 
happiness correlates with certain aspects of one’s level of well-being.  In 
short, when we have reason to take happiness as an indicator of well-being, it 
is appropriate to take happiness as a defeasible indicator of (unexpected) 
changes in well-being.    
I do not think we can justify the stronger claim, namely that, when happiness 
correlates with well-being, it generally correlates with (unexpected) changes in 
well-being.  I do not think we can justify this claim for the same reasons I 
argued in chapter three that we cannot justify the claim that happiness 
generally correlates with well-being.  In certain contexts, the function of 
happiness does not entail that it detects (unexpected) changes in well-being.  
These contexts may add up, to the extent that happiness does not generally 
correlate with (unexpected) changes in well-being.  A theory of the correlates 
of happiness, which is based on the function of happiness, should be open to 
this empirical possibility.   
I do think, however, that we can investigate and identify the kinds of contexts 
in which happiness is likely to correlate with changes in well-being in general 
or, in particular, unexpected changes in well-being or certain aspects of one’s 
                                            
85 In referring to our level of energy, I do not mean our momentary level of arousal, which is 
taken to be a component of affective states.  Rather, in referring to our level of energy, I 
mean our current level of available energy, such as our blood glucose level. We can 
have low energy in this sense, but still have high arousal states (e.g. we can be in need 
of sugar, yet still run away from a danger).  Low energy in this sense is strongly 
correlated with low mood (Gailliot, 2012).               
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level of well-being.  For instance, some studies have manipulated the practical 
relevance of different features of the same situation, in order to cause 
different kinds of affective states.86 For instance, Hsee et al. (1991) show that 
if an outcome is framed in such a way that its relation to our level of well-being 
is most relevant for action, this will result in a different kind of affect than if the 
outcome is framed such that its relation to rate of change in well-being is most 
relevant for action.  Hsee and his colleagues suggest that affect 
simultaneously indicates circumstances related to levels of well-being as well 
as the first and second derivative of levels of well-being.87  The relative 
weights of each of these three dimensions of well-being is determined by the 
way in which the outcome is framed (i.e., which dimension is most relevant for 
action for the subject at any given time).     
The upshot is that, when presented with information about happiness, we can 
treat it as potentially providing us with three different kinds of information 
about well-being.  Firstly, it may provide us with information about changes in 
well-being.  Secondly, it may provide us with information about unexpected 
changes in well-being.  Thirdly, it may provide us with information about 
certain aspects of one’s level of well-being.  By thinking about the contexts in 
which happiness is caused, we can identify which of these three dimensions 
of well-being happiness provides us with information about.  In the next 
section, I will interpret some of the key findings from the study of happiness 
using this refined version of the Indicator View.  
4.4.  Using the Indicator View to Interpret Empirical Findings 
4.4.1  The Easterlin Paradox and the Phenomenon of Adaptation 
Perhaps the most important finding from the study of subjective well-being88 is 
the finding that significant increases in income do not tend to result in lasting 
                                            
86 Indeed, in a footnote, Millgram (2000) mentions these experimental findings, suggesting 
that his account, if fully developed, would be consistent with the view presented here.    
87 In addition, Hsee et al. (1994) provide evidence that affect co-varies with the third 
derivative of well-being (i.e., changes in rates of change in well-being) though admits 
that such patterns may be difficult to detect in our practical lives.  It seems very unlikely 
that any higher derivatives of well-being (i.e. fourth or fifth derivatives) can be practically 
relevant.    
88 In this section, I will talk of “subjective well-being findings” in conjunction with “happiness 
findings” as the two terms are often used interchangeably in the empirical literature.  
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significant increases in subjective well-being (on a population level) – the so-
called “Easterlin Paradox”.  Interestingly, recent studies have shown that 
increases in income do tend to result in lasting increases in life satisfaction, 
but fail to impact people’s happiness (Kahneman & Deaton, 2010).  I will 
discuss the difference between happiness and life satisfaction in detail in 
chapter five.  It is also worth noting that the debate over the validity of the 
Easterlin Paradox findings rages on (Easterlin, 2010).  I will not enter into this 
debate.  For our purposes, I will assume that the Easterlin Paradox findings 
are valid and show how the Indicator View can plausibly take such findings 
into account.     
The Easterlin Paradox seemingly forces us to answer the following question: 
If income has little impact on happiness in the long-term, is it the case that 
happiness fails to indicate the impact that income has on well-being, or is it 
that income has little impact on well-being?  Different theorists answer this 
question differently, often bringing further evidence to bear on the question.  
Subjective well-being researchers tend to claim that the Easterlin Paradox 
shows that income has little impact on well-being.  For instance, Schwartz 
(2005) argues that the benefits of income are counter-balanced by the 
disbenefits of increased choice – too many choices can make us less capable 
of making good decisions and being satisfied with the decisions that we make.  
Offer (2007) argues that the benefits of income are outweighed by the self-
control problems that affluence creates – problems such as obesity and a lack 
of commitment to long-term relationships.  Both of these theories are 
plausible, as are many others.  Increases in income tend to come with 
increased mobility and the loss of social capital (Putnam 1995; Lane 2000), 
more easily accessible status goods (in contrast to relational goods) 
(Becchetti et al. 2011; Layard, 2005), increases in materialism and advertising 
(Kasser 2002; Lewis 2013), income inequality (Wilkinson et al. 2009; Marmot 
2004), working hours (Coote & Franklin 2010; Frank 2012), urbanisation and 
environmental degradation (Andreou 2010; Haybron 2011b), and so on.  It is 
possible that all of these factors can mitigate the benefits that increases in 
income provide. 
In contrast to these arguments, other theorists argue that the Easterlin 
Paradox can be solved insofar as happiness fails to indicate the impact that 
income has on well-being.  Increases in income are clearly beneficial in 
                                            
Although subjective well-being findings often incorporate both findings about happiness 
and life satisfaction, these two constructs tend to be strongly correlated.  
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several ways: resulting in increases in health, life expectancy, standard of 
living, education, access to technology, economic and political freedoms, etc.  
These benefits may well outweigh the kinds of costs noted above.  If so, 
significant increases in income tend to result in lasting increases in well-being.  
The findings of the Easterlin Paradox show that such increases in well-being 
are not indicated by happiness.  Perhaps the most prominent advocate of this 
kind of argument is the development economist Amartya Sen, mentioned in 
the discussion of adaptive preferences in chapter two.  Recall that Sen argues 
people with a low standard of living can be happy, despite having a low level 
of well-being.        
What can we make of these arguments?  Is it the case that happiness fails to 
indicate the impact that income has on well-being, or is it that income has little 
impact on well-being?  According to the Indicator View, each side of the 
argument is largely mistaken.  Happiness tends to neither successfully nor 
unsuccessfully indicate levels of well-being, according to the Indicator View.  
Rather, happiness tends to indicate changes in well-being.  This is because 
changes in our well-being tend to be the practically relevant evaluative 
features in our environment.  Thus, we should not expect significant changes 
in our external circumstances to have a lasting impact on our happiness.  
Such changes will only tend to be practically relevant for a short period of 
time, once they have informed and guided our action.  Indeed, increases in 
income have been shown to result in increases in happiness in the short-term. 
(This is the “paradox” part of the Easterlin Paradox, namely that increases in 
income tends to result in increases in happiness in the short-term, but not the 
long-term.) After a while, however, we will experience new changes in our 
well-being which will be practically relevant for us.  The former change will 
cease to have an impact on our happiness.  In this way, we should not expect 
any significant changes in our well-being to have a lasting impact on our 
happiness.   
According to the Indicator View, the findings of the Easterlin Paradox are no 
surprise.  Indeed, the findings do not provide us with a paradox.  Increases in 
income tend to have a short-term impact on happiness because happiness 
indicates environmental features that inform and guide action.  Increases in 
income tend to contribute towards changes in well-being that inform and guide 
action.  However, such changes are only practically relevant for a short period 
of time.  In the long-term, other changes in well-being occur that will be more 
relevant for immediate action.  The upshot is that significant increases in 
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income (or, indeed, significant changes in most external circumstances) 
should not tend to make a lasting impact on happiness.   
The Indicator View provides a similar interpretation of the phenomenon of 
adaptation.  The phenomenon of adaptation concerns the way in which 
people seemingly adapt to their circumstances, even if such circumstances 
are significantly beneficial or harmful to them.  This is strikingly illustrated by 
cases of “adaptive preferences”, which were reviewed in chapter two.  As Sen 
notes:      
“The deprived people tend to come to terms with their deprivation because of 
the sheer necessity of survival, and they may, as a result, lack the courage to 
demand any radical change, and may even adjust their desires and 
expectations to what they unambitiously see as feasible.” (Sen, 1999: p.63) 
Cases of adaptive preferences involve individuals who are badly off, yet 
happy.  Again, according to the Indicator View, these findings are no surprise.  
Changes in stable external circumstances tend to have a short-term impact on 
happiness because happiness indicates environmental features that inform 
and guide action.  Such circumstances tend to contribute towards changes in 
well-being that inform and guide action.  However, such changes are only 
practically relevant for a short period of time.  In the long-term, other changes 
in well-being occur that will be more relevant for immediate action.  The 
upshot is that changes in stable external circumstances should not tend to 
make a lasting impact on happiness.   
The Indicator View, therefore, gives support to “set-point theory” – the idea 
that, after reacting to significant changes in certain life conditions (such as 
winning the lottery, on the up-side, or losing a limb, on the down side), our 
level of happiness eventually returns to its original “set-point” (Clark et al. 
2008; Headey & Wearing 1989; Lykken 1999).  According to the Indicator 
View, after registering changes in well-being, affective states should re-
calibrate and return to a baseline, in preparation for registering the next 
change.  This is not to say that this baseline cannot change (more on this 
below).  However, we should expect the baseline to be fairly stable over time, 
resulting in the kind of set points observed in the subjective well-being 
literature (Headey 2007; Luhmann et al. 2012).  
Indeed, one further prediction of the Indicator View is that people’s set-point 
should tend to be above-neutral.  An effective strategy for action is to desire 
things that are neither too challenging nor too easy to attain (Millgram, 2000).  
If we only desired things that were too challenging to attain, we would expect 
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to experience few consistent increases in our well-being, and thereby a low 
level of happiness over time.  In contrast, if we only desired things that were 
easily attainable, we should expect to experience very consistent increases in 
our well-being, and thereby a high level of happiness over time.  In actuality, 
we should expect things to be somewhere in the middle: insofar as we desire 
things that are neither too challenging nor too easy to attain, we should expect 
to experience fairly consistent increases in our well-being, and thereby a 
moderate level of happiness over time.  This is indeed what positive 
psychologists have found (Deiner & Biswas-Deiner, 2008; Railton, 2008).   
In sum, according to the Indicator View, happiness does not tend to indicate 
levels of well-being.  Happiness tends to indicate whether our lives are getting 
better or worse, not whether we are doing well or badly.  Thus, major changes 
in one’s level of well-being will not tend to be indicated by one’s level of 
happiness in the long-term. 
4.4.2  Happiness promoting strategies 
The Indicator View also makes sense of the main strategies for promoting 
happiness that have been discovered by positive psychologists.  Happiness 
promoting strategies work by increasing the salience of certain dimensions of 
a subject’s well-being.  This may either be done directly or indirectly.  Directly, 
interventions may instruct subjects to focus on certain aspects of their well-
being, such as recent improvements in their well-being, or particular aspects 
of their lives that they are grateful for.  Indirectly, interventions may either 
increase the (a) frequency of a subject’s improvements in well-being or (b) 
unexpectedness of a subject’s improvements in well-being.  I will consider 
each strategy in turn. 
Consider, first, interventions that directly increase the salience of certain 
aspects of a subject’s level of well-being.  Perhaps the best-known happiness 
promoting strategies in the positive psychology literature are various gratitude 
exercises.  Martin Seligman’s “What Went Well” task invites subjects at the 
end of their day to write down three things that went well during the day.  
Another task invites subjects to write a “gratitude letter” to their friend, relative, 
lover, teacher, colleague, etc. (Seligman, 2011).  Both tasks consist in 
particular aspects of a subject’s level of well-being becoming salient to them.  
In the “What Went Well” task, the subject is reminded of three events during 
the day that increased their well-being; in writing a “gratitude letter”, the 
subject is reminded of the value of a particular relationship in their life.     
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Let us now consider the other two kinds of positive psychology interventions, 
namely those that increase (a) the frequency or (b) the unexpectedness of a 
subject’s improvements in well-being.  According to the Indicator View, in an 
important range of cases, the function of affective states entails that they 
detect changes in well-being ingredients.  It is no surprise, then, that many 
happiness interventions attempt to increase the amount of changes in well-
being ingredients experienced by a subject.  For instance, Teresa Amabile 
and Steven Kramer suggest that focusing on increasing the frequency of 
“small wins” throughout one’s day makes one happier than focusing on less-
frequent larger successes (Amabile & Kramer 2011).  Similarly, Kennon 
Sheldon and Sonia Lyubomirsky’s “Happiness Adaption Prevention” (HAP) 
model emphasises that positive changes in well-being that are continually 
appreciated are most likely to produce continued happiness (Sheldon & 
Lyubomirsky 2012).  Put simply, increases in well-being tend to result in 
temporary happiness – the more increases we experience, the happier we 
feel.    
In certain contexts, according to the Indicator View, the function of affective 
states entails that they detect unexpected changes in well-being; thus, other 
happiness promoting strategies aim to increase the unexpectedness of a 
subject’s improvements in well-being.  Sheldon and Lyubomirsky’s HAP 
model also emphasises that varied increases in well-being tend to result in 
more lasting happiness than fixed increases in well-being.  This is, 
presumably, because more varied changes in well-being are less predictable 
– they are less expected.  The more unexpected a change in well-being, the 
greater the practical relevance of that change.  The unexpectedness of varied 
circumstances can account for the effectiveness of other happiness promoting 
strategies.  Seligman et al.’s “Novel Use of Strengths” exercise consists in 
subjects identifying their five “signature strengths” and using those strengths 
in new and different ways every day.  In contrast to a similar exercise that 
consists in subjects using their signature strengths in non-varied ways, the 
more varied exercise was effective at improving happiness and depression 
scores for the six months that the exercise took place (Seligman et al. 2005).         
Indeed, one of the most effective strategies for promoting happiness involves 
increasing both the frequency and unexpectedness of a subject’s 
improvements in well-being.  These strategies focus on producing a greater 
sense of “flow” in a subject’s everyday activities.  Feelings of flow tend to arise 
when a subject is successfully carrying out an activity that is both skilful and 
challenging.  The activity is not challenging to the extent that the subject does 
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not make consistent progress.  And the subject is not skilled in the activity to 
the extent that they find it too easy.  Rather, the challenge of the activity and 
the skill of the subject are at just the right levels so that the subject improves 
frequently.  Moreover, because of the level of skill involved in the activity, the 
improvements tend to be both complex and varied.  Imagine, for example, the 
variation in types of rock and rock-faces experienced by a professional rock-
climber.  Not surprisingly, cultivating experiences of flow has been shown to 
be one of the most effective ways of promoting lasting happiness 
(Csíkszentmihályi 2008).  Cultivating such experiences tends to result in 
certain aspects of one’s well-being (namely, the frequent and varied 
improvements being made in the respective activity) being consistently 
relevant for action.89                 
4.4.3  The key determinants of lasting happiness 
The conditions and circumstances that make a lasting difference to a subject’s 
happiness also tend to be the three dimensions of a subject’s well-being 
(outlined above) that should be detected by affective states.  In accordance 
with the Indicator View, the key determinants of lasting happiness can be 
divided into three broad kinds, namely conditions that tend to cause: (a) 
certain aspects of a subject’s level of well-being to be salient; (b) frequent 
changes in well-being; (c) unexpected changes in well-being.  I will consider 
each of these kinds of conditions in turn.    
Firstly, conditions and circumstances that tend to cause certain aspects of a 
subject’s well-being to be salient have a lasting impact on a subject’s 
happiness.  This, of course, makes sense according to the Indicator View.  
For example, gratitude exercises that make one focus on various aspects of 
one’s level of well-being (e.g. one’s friends, family, health, financial security, 
etc.) tend to make us feel happier.  However, it is not obvious that there are 
stable conditions that continually make certain aspects of our well-being 
salient to us.  Recall the evidence outlined above regarding the fleeting 
happiness and unhappiness of lottery winners and disabled patients 
respectively.  It makes sense for an individual to focus on (unexpected) 
                                            
89 Note that many of these happiness-promoting strategies do not necessarily result in 
directly promoting one’s well-being (in addition to promoting one’s happiness).  However, 
happiness has been shown to have a variety of beneficial effects on one’s attention, 
cognition and motivation (Fredrickson, 2001; Luyobmirsky et al, 2010).  Thus, 
happiness-promoting strategies may tend to result in indirectly promoting one’s well-
being.  I will consider this issue in more detail in Appendix A.   
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changes in their well-being in order to effectively promote their well-being.  
Continuously focusing on stable conditions that relate to certain aspects of 
one’s level of well-being is likely to be practically ineffective.  
Nonetheless, there is some evidence that certain conditions make a lasting 
impact on the salience of certain aspects of our level of well-being.  For 
example, Graham and Pettinato (2002) show that, on average, rich countries 
are happier than poor countries, but that this trend is negligible after average 
incomes of $10,000: 
Fig 4.1  
 
The common explanation given for these findings is that income makes a 
lasting impact on happiness when we are unable to fulfil our basic needs for 
nutrition, shelter, survival, health, etc. (Layard, 2005; Diener & Biswas-Diener, 
2008) When our basic needs are not being met, these aspects of our lives 
become continuously practically relevant to us.  If this interpretation of the 
findings is true, certain conditions can make a lasting impact on the salience 
of certain aspects of our level of well-being and thereby make a lasting 
difference to our happiness.    
The second broad kind of conditions and circumstances that have a lasting 
impact on a subject’s happiness are those that tend to cause frequent 
changes in well-being.  Perhaps the most interesting conditions in this respect 
are those that result in “positive cycles” of positive affect and the condition in 
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question (Fredrickson, 2001).90 That is, certain conditions tend to cause 
increases in well-being that make us temporarily happy, which then tends to 
cause us to further promote such conditions, which cause increases in well-
being that make us momentarily happy, and so on.  These kinds of conditions 
tend to result in upward spirals of improvements in well-being and thereby 
lasting increases in happiness.  
For instance, friendship tends to make a lasting impact on happiness 
(Kahneman & Deaton, 2008).  This may partly be due to the positive cycles of 
friendship and positive affect (Bishop, MS).91  Friendship makes us feel good, 
but feeling good also makes us friendlier.  For example, studies show that 
feeling good makes you more likely to initiate a conversation with a stranger 
(Isen 1970), offer intimate self-disclosures to others (Cunningham 1988), and 
judge the people you spend time with as “kind, self-assured, open, tolerant, 
warm” (Lyubomirsky & Tucker 1998).  In general, the friends and family of 
happier people judge them to be more “socially skilled (e.g., more articulate 
and well mannered), better public speakers, self-confident, and assertive, and 
as having more close friends, a strong romantic relationship, and more family 
support” (Lyubomirsky et al. 2005: p.827, see text for citations).  In short, 
maintaining our friendships makes us happy, and being happy makes us 
maintain our friendships.  The result is that friendships tend to result in 
consistent increases in well-being. 
There is evidence that upward spirals of well-being are caused by other 
circumstances and conditions, including intimate relationships (Fredrickson, 
2001), autonomy and productivity (Côté 1999), coping styles (Fredrickson & 
Joiner 2002), optimism (Seligman 2006), engagement (Deci & Ryan 2000) 
and altruism (Thoits & Hewitt 2001).  These conditions tend to be key 
determinants of lasting happiness (Diener & Biswas-Diener, 2008).     
The third broad kind of conditions and circumstances that have a lasting 
impact on a subject’s happiness are those that tend to cause unexpected 
changes in well-being.  I will consider four conditions here, namely 
                                            
90 I will consider the implications of these positive cycles for the measurement of well-being 
in more detail in Appendix A.  
91 Of course, there are other explanations of the lasting impact that friendship tends to make 
on happiness.  For example, it may be that those with good friendships also tend to have 
a positive affective disposition.  Nonetheless, I think there is good evidence that positive 
cycles of affect occur with regards to friendship, and that this can partly explain the 
relationship between friendship and happiness.   
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unemployment, age, control and noise.  The first two conditions have an 
impact on happiness due to the expectations produced by social references 
i.e. information about our own well-being provided by the well-being of others.  
When one becomes unemployed, one is surrounded by people who are doing 
better, at least financially.  The employed continuously provide the 
unemployed with information about how well they could be doing financially, 
thereby increasing one’s expectations for higher levels of well-being.  These 
higher expectations are often not met (it is often hard for the unemployed to 
find employment again) thereby resulting in lasting unhappiness.92   
A similar mechanism may be at work with regards to the impact that age has 
on happiness.  The relationship between happiness and age tends to follow a 
U-shaped curve, whereby subjects tend to be happiest when young and old, 
and unhappiest in their middle-age (Blanchflower & Oswald 2008).  This may 
largely be due to changes in expectations throughout a subject’s lifespan.  
During middle-age, one is surrounded by people who have succeeded in 
certain aspects of life (career, status, relationships, etc.) which may have the 
effect of raising one’s expectations for achieving such success.  Middle-age is 
often viewed as one’s “prime-of-life” (Slote 1983) – the period of one’s life in 
which one has the most amount of time and resources to achieve success, 
and thereby expects to achieve one’s highest level of well-being.  In contrast, 
at old age, one is not expected to achieve great success – staying healthy, 
relatively autonomous and being a supportive family member will often 
suffice.93     
                                            
92 The fact that unemployment does not have such a lasting impact on unhappiness within a 
recession supports this interpretation (Graham, 2010).  Within a recession, the 
unemployed are numerous, which creates the impression that the unemployed may not 
in fact be able to do better financially.    
93 Three further lines of evidence support this interpretation.  The first concerns similar 
studies done on great apes, which shows that our animal cousins also tend to be 
unhappiest at middle-age (Weiss et al. 2012).  Again, this is not surprising – it is during 
middle-age in which apes are expected to reach their highest status and reproductive 
fitness.   
The second line of evidence concerns people’s value changes over the lifespan (Reed & 
Carstensen 2012).  During middle-age, when people have more time and resources, 
they tend to value more “extrinsic” values, such as income, status, etc.  In contrast, in 
old-age, when people have less time and resources, people tend to value more “intrinsic” 
values, such as relationships, leisure, etc.  It is reasonable to think that value changes 
largely occur due to changes in what is possible (i.e. in one’s expectations of well-being).    
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The remaining two conditions that I will consider in this section have an 
impact on happiness due to expectations that are independent of social 
references.  These conditions are control and noise.  A sense of control is one 
of the largest determinants of happiness/unhappiness (Diener & Biswas-
Diener, 2008).  This makes perfect sense according to the Indicator View.  
Negative changes in one’s well-being that are unexpected will tend to be more 
relevant for action than expected negative changes.  A lack of control typically 
comes from experiencing negative changes that one does not expect.94  The 
impact of noise on unhappiness is similar in this respect.  Background noise is 
well documented as having a pervasive affect on unhappiness, but it is 
important to realise that only unpredictable noise  (i.e. noise that cannot be 
expected) has this affect (Railton, MS).  One only needs to think about how 
annoying sporadic bursts of building work outside your office can be to 
appreciate this affect.  This also explains why one-sided mobile phone 
conversations (which consist in largely unpredictable bursts of conversation) 
can be so irritable to the third-person observer, in contrast to standard two-
sided conversations in the background.     
We have seen that, according to the Indicator View, the key determinants of 
lasting happiness can be divided into three broad kinds, namely conditions 
that tend to cause: (a) certain aspects of a subject’s level of well-being to be 
salient; (b) frequent changes in well-being; (c) unexpected changes in well-
being.  An understanding of these three causal factors can enable us to 
interpret why it is that certain circumstances and conditions do and do not 
have a lasting impact on happiness.  In addition, they can enable us to 
interpret why particular conditions have varying kinds of impacts on 
happiness.  For example, it is possible that income does not tend to have a 
                                            
The final line of evidence concerns the affect that relative income has on happiness.  
One study shows that relative income has an impact before the age of 45, but not after 
(Fitzroy et al. 2013).  A plausible explanation of this finding is that, before the age of 45, 
people tend to expect to attain a similar level of income (“I could achieve that!”); in 
contrast, after the age of 45, people may tend to not expect to attain much greater levels 
of income (“I could have/can no longer achieve that”).  Thus, relative income has a 
lasting impact on unhappiness before the age of 45, but not after.   
94 Indeed, when one comes to expect having a lack of control, it tends to cease to cause 
unhappiness altogether, in a phenomenon referred to as “learned helplessness.”  Those 
suffering from learned helplessness no longer respond to negative events out of their 
control – they seemingly become indifferent to such events.  Although learned 
helplessness is largely considered to be a behaviour phenomenon, it seems reasonable 
to assume that it also an affective component.     
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lasting impact on happiness because increases in income do not tend to 
cause frequent (unexpected) increases in well-being.  However, it is also 
possible that income can have a lasting impact on happiness insofar as one’s 
income is spent in ways that cause frequent (unexpected) increases in well-
being (Dunn et al. 2011).  Moreover, it is possible that, below a certain level, 
income may tend to have a lasting impact on happiness; when one’s basic 
needs are not being met, one’s poor standard of living may continuously be 
practically relevant.  In this way, the Indicator View can provide us with both 
plausible and informative interpretations of empirical findings from the study of 
happiness.   
Conclusion 
Over this and the previous chapter, I have developed the Indicator View on 
the basis of the function of affective states.  The function of affective states 
entails that they detect practically relevant evaluative features of our 
environment.  I have argued that a number of different kinds of evaluative 
features of our environment tend to be practically relevant.  In particular, I 
have discussed how the function of affective states entails that they detect (a) 
non-prudential features of our environment (e.g. moral, aesthetic or epistemic 
features); (b) changes in well-being ingredients; (c) unexpected changes in 
well-being ingredients; and (d) levels of certain well-being ingredients.  I 
believe that these different kinds of evaluative features account for the 
majority of the evaluative features of our environment that tend to be relevant 
for action and thereby reliably cause us to experience affective states.     
The fact that the function of affective states incorporates these different kinds 
of evaluative features is reflected in Valerie Tiberius’ account of the different 
perspectives that we can have on our lives.  Tiberius notes:  
“Because we have many different commitments, and because each 
commitment is comprised of a pattern of attitudes that can wax and wane, we 
can be in different perspectives at different times.  We can, for example, take 
a reflective perspective when we are feeling contemplative and we want to 
think about how our lives are going.  Alternatively, when we are absorbed in a 
project, we take a perspective that focuses on this project and excludes 
almost everything else.  The things that change when our perspective 
changes are what is most salient to us, which facts are deemed relevant 
considerations, and what motives are most available.” (Tiberius 2008; p.68)  
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The claims of this chapter can be viewed as claims about the kind of 
perspective that we tend to have in our practical lives.  I have suggested that, 
in an important range of cases, this perspective is that of improving our well-
being.  This perspective requires that affective states reliably detect changes 
in our well-being.  We have good reason, therefore, to treat happiness as a 
defeasible indicator of changes in well-being.   
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Chapter 5 
Happiness as an Indicator of Local Well-being 
 
Abstract 
In this chapter, I will further refine the Indicator View.  I will argue that 
happiness is a defeasible indicator of local changes in well-being (i.e. 
moment-to-moment changes in our objectives, goals and concerns).  I will 
argue that some of the local changes indicated by happiness have intrinsic 
prudential value.  These changes tend not to be indicated by more global 
measures of well-being, such as measures of life satisfaction.  Yet, I will argue 
that how well our lives are going on this local level intrinsically matters for our 
overall well-being.  We can, therefore, successfully measure an important 
aspect of well-being through measuring happiness. 
I will argue in favour of this view as follows.  In the first section of the chapter, 
I will argue that we have reason to believe affective states tend to correlate 
with local changes in well-being; it is local changes that tend to be relevant for 
action.  In contrast, I will suggest that judgements of life satisfaction tend to 
correlate with global changes in well-being (e.g. long-term changes in our 
goals, values and projects).  Therefore, we should treat happiness as an 
indicator of local changes in well-being, and life satisfaction as an indicator of 
global changes in well-being.     
In the remainder of the chapter, I will consider the value of the local changes 
in well-being that tend to be indicated by happiness, and the implications that 
this has for the measurement of well-being.  Some of the local changes in 
well-being indicated by happiness have instrumental prudential value; some 
have intrinsic prudential value.  In the second section of the chapter, I will 
consider the local changes in well-being that have instrumental value.  Can 
we successfully measure well-being over time through measuring such 
changes?  I will argue that we cannot.  In particular, I will argue that we 
cannot accurately approximate a person’s overall change in well-being over 
time by aggregating the value of their local changes in well-being (indicated 
by happiness) over that time.          
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In the third section of the chapter, I will consider the intrinsic value of the local 
changes in well-being that tend to be indicated by happiness; these changes 
constitute what I will call local well-being.   
In the fourth section of the chapter, I will consider the extent to which local 
well-being constitutes overall well-being.  Some theorists argue that our global 
(in contrast to local) well-being has a distinct kind of value, in virtue of the fact 
that it is constituted by meaningful life narratives or concerns.  I will argue 
against this view.  I will argue that both local and global well-being constitute 
overall well-being in the same way; neither kind of well-being has a distinct 
kind of prudential value.  In the fifth section of the chapter, I will suggest that 
the relative values of people’s local and global well-being vary across their 
lifespan, personality and cultural environment.  The upshot is that we can 
successfully measure changes in an important aspect of well-being through 
measuring happiness. 
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5.1  Happiness as a defeasible indicator of local changes in 
well-being 
In the first main section of the chapter, I will argue that, in an important range 
of cases, the evaluative features of our environment that are relevant for 
action tend to be local changes in our well-being.  Local changes in well-being 
concern how well we are doing from moment to moment: in meeting our 
current needs, achieving our short-term goals, connecting with those around 
us, solving a pressing problem, etc.  In contrast, global changes in well-being 
concern how well we are doing in general: in achieving our long-term goals 
such as our personal projects, lifelong ambitions, achieving the respect of 
others, making meaningful contributions or accomplishments, etc.  Happiness 
is a fast-responding, sensitive indicator of local changes in well-being that 
guides our efforts towards success and away from failure or frustration 
(Railton, MS).  In contrast to happiness, I will argue that life satisfaction is a 
broad indicator of global changes in well-being.      
5.1.1  Affective states and local changes in well-being 
In chapter four, I argued that happiness tends to correlate with changes in 
well-being.  The function of happiness, in an important range of cases, entails 
that it detects (unexpected) changes in well-being ingredients.  I argued that 
this provides us with good reason to treat happiness as a defeasible indicator 
of changes in well-being. 
However, there are different kinds of changes in well-being, each of which are 
relevant for action in different respects.  Two kinds of changes in well-being 
are especially important, and have recently been highlighted by Peter Railton 
in his discussion of the function of happiness (Railton 2008; MS).  Roughly 
put, we need to act both on a specific, moment-to-moment level, and on a 
more general, long-term level.  To help gain an understanding of these two 
modes of action, consider the following vignette provided by Peter Railton:  
“You’ve just gotten off the phone with your sister, who told you that, when the 
visiting nurse dropped in on your aging parent, he realized that the oven had 
been left on for many hours, carbonizing the food within, which had evidently 
been completely forgotten.  The smell of burnt food filled the house, yet your 
mother was completely unaware.  “We need to do something—we can’t just 
leave her alone at home anymore,” your sister says, “How soon can you get 
up there to start working something out?”  You feel stricken, your sister has 
borne the brunt of looking after your mother for the last few years, and it is 
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clearly your turn to pitch in in earnest…You realize you’ve finished your 
teaching for the week and can fly up to visit her.  Now you feel a boost of 
positive energy and rush to call the airline.  But they put you on what feels like 
perpetual hold.  Your frustration growing, you cast around for an alternative.  
“Ah, I can call my travel agent!”  Another burst of positive energy.  But you 
realize you don’t have his number at the office.  You think hard.  Maybe you 
can remember it.  Is it 734-677-0900?  You brighten.  Or maybe it’s 734-677-
0090?  You’re impatient—you have to try something.  So you try the first, and 
you get the travel agency’s familiar phone tree.  Great!  You relax your 
tension just a bit.  But when you ask for your agent, she’s at lunch.  “Damn!  
Can’t waste time while the last seats might be sold.  Now what?”  You 
remember your new phone lets you go on the web, though you hate figuring 
this sort of thing out and never had the time or, in truth, the desire to learn 
how.  Now you are rushed and anxious, but highly motivated, and you make 
yourself work methodically at it, working your way through the screens, 
concentrating intensely, trying to figure out what would make sense.  You’re 
greatly relieved and a bit proud that you manage to make it all the way onto 
the web, and start booking a seat.” (Railton, MS: p.39)  
In this vignette you have received news of several global changes in your 
well-being: the health and welfare of your parent, the need to help her in old 
age, and being fair to your sibling.  This news instantly changes your current 
priorities for action, requiring a radical shift in your practical perspective.  Yet, 
Railton notes that you do not dwell on the news itself.  Once you have taken 
in its import, you stay attuned to local changes in your well-being: the more 
specific, moment-to-moment aspects of your situation.  As Railton notes, your 
affective states supply, “positive energy for the next step, frustration when you 
can’t move forward and associated motivation to look hard for alternatives, as 
well as some gratification and pride at making headway and taking matters in 
hand.” (Railton, MS: p.40-41)  
We need our momentary affective states to be relatively separate from mental 
states that detect more general, long-term changes in our well-being.  More 
global changes may dictate where we need to go in life, but they do not tend 
to inform us about how to get there.  Actual progress tends to require specific 
actions, taken from moment-to-moment.  The function of affective states may 
primarily be to inform and guide our action on this level.   
Affective states must be continuously sensitive to variations in circumstance, 
ability, or opportunity.  As Railton notes, “In the course of a day, we may need 
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to take thousands of steps towards meeting our needs, fulfilling our 
responsibilities, advancing our goals, attending to our concerns, or simply 
managing not to lose ground.” (Railton, MS: p.41)  Our affective states help 
alert, guide, motivate, and reward us along the way.   
Without such information and guidance, we are unlikely to improve our 
circumstances.  This is most notably seen in affective disorders, such as 
mania and depression.  Manic individuals have an overwhelming balance of 
positive over negative affect, which tends to disrupt the normal regulation of 
action.  Such individuals tend to be impulsive and erratic; their affective states 
are effectively continuously signalling to them, “you’re doing the right thing, 
keep at it.”  In contrast, depressed individuals have an overwhelming balance 
of negative over positive affect, which disrupts well-functioning in a different 
yet equally damaging way.  Such individuals tend to be indecisive, ruminative 
and withdrawn; their affective states are effectively continuously signalling to 
them, “you’re doing the wrong thing, give this up.”  These affective disorders 
illustrate why affective states have the function of informing and guiding our 
action on a specific, moment-to-moment level.  We need to act on this level in 
order to function well and make progress in our lives.    
I will refer to specific, moment-to-moment changes in well-being as local 
changes in well-being.  In contrast, I will refer to more general, long-term 
changes (such as a loved one being in ill-health) as global changes in well-
being.  Most of our actions take place on a local level, from moment-to-
moment.  Thus, in informing and guiding our action, our affective states will 
tend to detect local changes in well-being.  This is why, as mentioned in 
chapter one, our emotions (which tend to detect local changes) will generally 
dominate our affective state, in contrast to our moods (which tend to detect 
global changes).  The result of this tendency is that happiness will not tend to 
indicate more global changes in well-being.  In short, happiness tends to 
indicate local, rather than global, changes in well-being.      
5.1.2  Mood, life satisfaction and global changes in well-being 
In this section, I will suggest that, in contrast to happiness, life satisfaction 
tends to indicate global changes in well-being.   
We have seen that happiness indicates local changes in well-being for the 
following reason: in order to be well-functioning agents, we need to 
continuously adjust our behaviour in accordance with specific, short-term 
changes in our circumstances.  Local changes in well-being may not be the 
most important changes in our lives, but they are the ones that generally 
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dictate our action – it is through such changes that we can achieve more 
substantial (global) changes.  Local changes tend to be instrumental.  To 
return to Railton’s vignette above, you care about booking a plane ticket in 
order to see your parents and help out your sister.  The value of booking a 
plane ticket is instrumental; what you really care about is helping your parent 
and being fair to your sibling.  Thus, we can view happiness as an indicator of 
local changes in well-being, which in turn reflects how well we are doing at 
taking the steps necessary for the achievement of more global changes.  
Happiness tends to indicate whether or not we are getting to the place we 
want to go, rather than whether or not we have got there.    
This, however, is not the full story of the function of affective states.  In 
addition, we require affective states that inform and guide our action on a 
more global level.  To illustrate the need for a more global indicator, let us 
again return to Railton’s vignette above.  Railton notes that, upon hearing that 
your mother’s living condition will need to be changed, you may realize that it 
no longer is enough to count on the occasional visits of nurses or relatives 
(Railton, MS: p.42).  News of her ill-health symbolises that significant changes 
in your life are about to occur: in both your mother’s well-being and perhaps in 
many other features of your life.  Such changes require a global level of 
concern for the new situation.  In contrast to more local changes, you may not 
be able to deal with this change through carrying out a few specific tasks 
within a relatively short period of time.  As Railton notes: “During this time you 
must have some background dissatisfaction or lack of complacency, making 
possible emergent changes in orientation of thought and effort on a continuing 
basis, as appropriate.” (Railton, MS: p.42)   
This more global state of concern and readiness to act must persist without 
interfering with the detection of the momentary ups and downs relevant to 
specific activities and objectives. Thus, what is needed is not a fast-
responding, fast-dissipating affective state (i.e. an emotional state).  Rather, 
we need to change our mood.  Moods set the tone for our life without entirely 
interfering with out emotional states.  As Laura Sizer puts it: “[mood] is more 
subtle [than emotion], acting as background to our ongoing activities.  [It] has 
more to do with the way one approaches life as a whole than with reactions to 
particular objects or events.” (Sizer, 2010: p.147)  
In contrast to emotional states, moods tend to indicate more global changes in 
well-being.  This does not necessarily mean that moods represent more 
global evaluative features of our environment.  I do not wish to take a stand 
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on the representational nature of moods.95  However, I do mean to claim that 
moods have the function of guiding our action on a global level in response to 
important changes in our environment.  
Although moods do not entirely interfere with our capacity to experience 
momentary affective states, they do impact our propensities to attend, think, 
feel and act in certain ways.  For example, as discussed above, after hearing 
about a loved one being in ill-health, you may be more anxious and 
distractible, less satisfied with life (Railton: MS).  The effects of moods are 
persistent and pervasive.  Dan Haybron illustrates this fact by noting the 
effects of four different moods, namely being depressed, elated, anxious and 
serene: “While in a depressed mood…an individual will likely find little 
pleasure in what happens, will tend to look on the dark side of things, and 
may more likely be saddened by negative events. The elated person will 
exhibit the opposite tendencies. And someone afflicted by anxiety will tend to 
multiply and exaggerate potential threats, experience greater upset at 
setbacks, and be more prone to experience fear and perhaps anger. Whereas 
a more serene individual will tend to take things in stride, see fewer causes for 
anxiety, worry less about perceived threats, etc.” (Haybron 2005: p.17) These 
examples all illustrate a general feature of moods, namely that they dispose 
us to experience mood-congruent emotions.  
Indeed, the direction of causality between moods and emotions goes both 
ways.  Our mood disposes us to experience mood-congruent emotions, and 
repeated or intense emotions can contribute to the onset of a mood (Sizer, 
2010; Prinz, 2004).  For example, if we are continually doing well on a local 
level, we will tend to feel good, and such feelings may cause us to be in a 
good mood.  Information about how well we are doing from moment-to-
moment may have implications for how well we are doing more globally.  
Thus, although moods do not entirely interfere with our capacity to experience 
momentary affective states, we should expect moods and emotions to be 
                                            
95 On the one hand, some theorists argue that moods are simply generalised forms of 
emotion, and thereby represent general/global evaluative features of our environment, 
rather than specific/local features (DeLancey 2006; Prinz, 2004).  On the other hand, 
other theorists argue that moods are different kinds of affective states than emotions, in 
that they can be objectless (Sizer 2000; Siemer 2009).  Such theorists argue that moods 
are fundamentally dispositional states, which influence our attention, cognition and 
behaviour in various ways without representing evaluative features of our environment.  
Theorists on both sides of this issue agree that moods can be distinguished from 
emotions in virtue of the fact that they are more diffuse and pervasive in their effects. 
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closely related.  More precisely, we should expect that positive moods (such 
as elation or contentment) tend to correlate with positive emotions (such as 
joy or satisfaction) and negative moods (such as depression or anxiety) tend 
to correlate with negative emotions (such as sadness or fear). The fact that 
emotions and moods are causally connected means that how well we are 
doing on more local and global levels are likely to influence each other.    
Global changes in well-being concern how well we are doing on a more global 
level: the achievement of life goals, material security, personal projects, long-
term ambitions, developing intimate relationships with others, etc.  I have 
argued that global changes in well-being do not tend to be indicated by 
happiness.  Rather, in the remainder of this section, I will suggest that such 
changes tend to be indicated by an altogether different mental construct, 
namely life satisfaction.   
Life satisfaction is measured by empirical researchers who ask subjects to 
judge how satisfied they are with their life (or a particular domain of their life) 
overall.  It seems reasonable to presume that such judgements are formed on 
the basis of the subject’s recently experienced moods (or even current mood).  
In arguing for this view, Michael Robinson, notes that, “rather than making 
complex evaluations of current life circumstances, the data in the present 
investigation suggest that people can simply index their mood states.” 
(Robinson 2000: p.165) That is, moods seem to mediate the relation between 
global events and life satisfaction: how people judge their lives may depend 
largely on their moods.96   
This suggests that we can view life satisfaction as a kind of meta-mood – 
feelings of general satisfaction or dissatisfaction with our lives caused by 
global changes in our well-being.  When we are in a bad mood, we are less 
satisfied with our lives, and for good reason – our bad mood may reflect the 
occurrence of a recent global change for the worse in our well-being, such as 
a loved one being in ill-health.  As a result of this change, we may feel that our 
lives are not good enough – we are dissatisfied.  Conversely, when we are in 
a good mood, we are more satisfied with our lives; we may have just 
completed a project that we have been working on for some time, or spent 
                                            
96 This also explains why measures of life satisfaction and happiness tend to be strongly 
correlated (Diener et al. 2012).  Moods tend to cause mood-congruent emotions.  Thus, 
moods influence both our emotions and our life satisfaction.  In addition, persistent kinds 
of emotion can cause the onset of a mood.  Insofar as life satisfaction is influenced by 
our recent moods, therefore, it will also be influenced by our emotions.     
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time with a good friend.  The result is that we may feel that our life is going 
sufficient well – we are satisfied.  
Of course, in certain contexts, life satisfaction may fail to indicate global 
changes in well-being.  Nobert Schwarz and Fritz Strack (1999) have shown 
that judgements of life satisfaction are often biased by recent affective states 
caused by seemingly trivial prudential factors, such as the weather or the 
fortunes of the national football team.  In addition, Haybron (2000) argues that 
life satisfaction may be largely influenced by ethical norms, such as norms of 
gratitude (“My life is good enough”) or non-complacency (“My life could be 
better”).  For now, it is enough to recognize that, although in certain contexts 
life satisfaction may not tend to indicate global changes in well-being, it may 
nonetheless tend to do so outside of such contexts.  In short, life satisfaction 
may be a defeasible indicator of global changes in well-being.   
We have, then, the following picture of indicators of well-being based on the 
mental states that inform and guide action: happiness (largely constituted by 
emotions) tends to indicate local changes in well-being; life satisfaction 
(largely influenced by moods) tends to indicate global changes in well-being.  
There is empirical support for this picture with regards to the different key 
determinates of happiness and life satisfaction.  Conditions that have a 
consistent immediate impact on our lives, such as our health or the quality of 
our relationships, tend to correlate with happiness.  In contrast, life 
satisfaction tends to correlate with long-term conditions, such as one’s level of 
income or educational attainment (Kahneman & Deaton, 2010).      
In the next few sections, I will consider the implications that this picture has for 
the project of measuring well-being through measuring happiness.  In the next 
two sections, I will consider the instrumental and intrinsic value of the local 
changes in well-being that tend to be indicated by happiness.  I will argue that 
such changes may tend to have intrinsic, not instrumental, prudential value.    
 
5.2  The instrumental value of the local changes in well-being 
indicated by happiness 
Perhaps the most obvious way in which specific, moment-to-moment changes 
in well-being are valuable is that they have instrumental prudential value.  
Consider, for example, your average day: you get up, get ready for work, feed 
yourself, commute to work, check your emails, talk to a colleague, make 
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varying levels of progress in on-going objectives and other items on your to-
do list, have a break, feed yourself, etc.  You carry out many (if not most) of 
your actions and activities in order to achieve some other aim, such as being 
healthy, completing a project or developing a relationship.  And such actions 
and activities tend to pay-off, otherwise we would stop trying so hard to 
improve our lives or instead focus on maintaining what we already have.  
These lines of thought lead us towards the claim that local changes in well-
being tend to be valuable largely because they bring about more global 
changes in well-being.    
The instrumental value of local changes in well-being suggests that we can 
calculate (or at least roughly approximate) how well someone is doing in a 
more global sense by aggregating their local changes over time.  That is, the 
sum of the local changes in well-being indicated by happiness over time may 
be a good approximation of a person’s overall change in well-being over that 
time.  This method of calculating people’s well-being from information about 
happiness over time has much in common with Daniel Kahneman’s notion of 
Objective Happiness (Kahneman 1999).  A person’s Objective Happiness is 
calculated by aggregating his or her momentary levels of affect over time.  
Kahneman argues that such information tells us about how well that person 
was doing over that period of time (Kahneman et al. 1997).     
In this section, however, I will argue that this method is implausible for three 
reasons.  The first two reasons reflect the fact that happiness is not a reliable 
indicator of the instrumental prudential value of local changes in well-being.  
First, happiness does not indicate the size of local changes in well-being – it 
merely indicates a person’s amount of local changes experienced over time.  
Second, happiness may indicate “false positives” – local changes in well-
being that turn out not to have instrumental value.  The third reason is that 
global changes in well-being over a certain period of time may not be caused 
by local changes in well-being over that time. 
5.2.1  Aggregating the size of local changes in well-being over time 
To illustrate the method in question consider the following example: Suppose 
that at time t0 my level of well-being is zero.  At time t1 my level of well-being 
increases by 5.  At time t2 my level of well-being increases by 7.  At time t3 
my level of well-being increases by 2.  At t4 my level of well-being decreases 
by 2.  And at t5 my level of well-being increases by 2.  These changes in well-
being have been illustrated in the graph below (fig 5.1).  In order to calculate 
the total change in well-being from t0-t5, we need to subtract the area of the 
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graph below the zero point from the area of the graph above the zero point.  
The total area corresponds to the total change in well-being over that time.   
Fig 5.1 
 
Perhaps the main problem with this method is that affective states do not tend 
to indicate the size of changes in well-being.  Positive (negative) affective 
states indicate increases (decreases) in well-being, but they do not tend to 
indicate whether they are large or small increases (decreases).  The strength 
of an affective state should be caused by the extent to which a particular 
change in well-being is relevant for action.  The practical relevance of a 
change in well-being does not tend to coincide with the size of that change.   
For example, suppose that, throughout the course of a day, you worked on a 
big problem and eventually solved it.  Let us suppose that solving the big 
problem consisted in solving ten smaller problems throughout the day, and 
that solving each of them caused an episode of pleasure.  Further suppose 
that each of the ten smaller problems were entirely of instrumental value – 
solving them was only valuable insofar as they contributed towards solving 
the big problem.  Now, if affective states indicate the size of changes in well-
being, this would imply that the episode of pleasure caused by solving the big 
problem would have ten times the strength as the episodes of pleasure 
caused by solving each of the ten smaller problems.  This, however, is clearly 
implausible.  The strength of our affective states is not entirely proportional to 
the value of the things they indicate.  Rather, the strength of our affective 
states is proportional to the extent to which we should act differently.  The 
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reason we don’t feel ten times as much pleasure from solving the big problem 
as we did from solving any of the ten smaller problems is because solving the 
big problem is not ten times more relevant for action.  We may need to act 
somewhat differently as a result of solving the big problem (let other people 
know about the solution, think about what problems we need to solved next, 
whether the solution can be applied to those problems, and so on); but, it is 
unlikely that such actions will require a substantially greater amount of effort 
than any of our previous actions throughout the day.     
One might object that, in claiming affective states do not tend to indicate the 
size of changes in well-being, I am confusing the strength of an affective state 
with its level of arousal.  The level of arousal of an affective state is the extent 
to which an affective state consists in excitable physiological reactions or 
action tendencies.  For example, being elated or stressed is a high-arousal 
state, whereas being calm or fatigued is a low-arousal state.  One might agree 
that, in the example above, solving the big problem should not cause an 
affective state with a level of arousal that is ten times that of the affective 
states caused by solving any of the smaller problems – solving the big 
problem clearly does not require such high levels of excitable physiological 
reactions or action tendencies.  However, one might argue that, independent 
of the level of arousal of an affective state, there is a component of an 
affective state that does tend to indicate the size of changes in well-being.   
This objection finds support in James Russell’s “circumplex” model of affective 
states, whereby affective states can be categorised on the basis of their 
(typical) level of arousal and “hedonic tone” (Russell et al. 1989).  One could 
claim that the hedonic tone of affective states tends to indicate the size of 
changes in well-being.  For example, typical episodes of relaxation and 
contentment both consist in low arousal affective states with a positive 
hedonic tone.  Yet, a typical episode of contentment has a higher positive 
hedonic tone than a typical episode of relaxation.  This suggests that typical 
episodes of contentment tend to indicate greater increases in well-being than 
typical episodes of relaxation.  If this is correct, this lends support to the idea 
that the strength of affective states – conceived of as its level of hedonic tone 
– tends to indicate the size of changes in well-being.   
I agree that the level of arousal and the hedonic tone of an affective state can 
operate independently of each other.  The level of arousal of an affective state 
has the function of mobilising an effective response to the given situation – 
one that is either excitable or non-excitable.  In contrast, the hedonic tone of 
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an affective state has the function of representing how relevant the given 
situation is for (either excitable or non-excitable) action.   
However, I still disagree that the strength of affective states tends to indicate 
the size of changes in well-being.  This is because how relevant a given 
change in well-being is for action is not solely determined by the size of that 
change.  All things being equal, we should expect the strength of affective 
states to be caused by the size of the changes in well-being.  However, all 
things do not tend to be equal, for at least two reasons.   
First, unexpected changes in well-being are of greater practical relevance 
than expected changes.  This is why we can experience so much pleasure 
from something relatively trivial yet unexpected, such as receiving a small gift 
from a stranger.  Conversely, we can fail to experience much pleasure from 
something relatively important yet expected, such as finally achieving the goal 
that we have worked so hard for.  In general, if we expect regular increases in 
well-being then decreases in well-being will be more relevant for action, and 
vice versa.  As Haybron notes: “A Manhattan debutante may consider a day 
without her cell phone about as bad as it gets, while a crippled resident of 
Manila’s trash dumps is liable to have rather different standards.” (Haybron 
2007: p.403) Whereas the person in Manhattan may expect her well-being to 
generally improve throughout the day, the person in Manila may expect the 
opposite.  The result is that infrequent decreases in well-being will be 
practically relevant for the former individual, and the occasional increase in 
well-being will be practically relevant for the latter individual.  In short, our 
expectations partly determine both the direction and size of changes that are 
practically relevant.  
Secondly, certain changes in well-being require us to act considerably 
differently (again, either in an excitable or non-excitable way) whereas others 
do not.  For instance, certain small changes in well-being may require us to 
act considerably differently (and thereby tend to cause strong affective 
states), whereas certain large changes may not.  I think this is exactly what 
happens with regard to long-term goals.  Long-term goals tend to be 
unobtainable in themselves.  For example, running a marathon off the cuff 
would be extremely difficult and unhealthy.  Such goals are not relevant for 
action until they are split up into short-term goals: sub-goals (running a half 
marathon), objectives (going for a run three times a week), tasks (cooking 
healthy food), and so on.  It is these short-term goals that are relevant for 
action.  Success or failure with regard to such goals tends to cause strong 
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affective states, even though such achievements constitute relatively small 
changes in well-being.  In comparison, success or failure with regard to the 
long-term goals of running a marathon tends to cause stronger affective 
states, but not in proportion to the much larger change in well-being that such 
an achievement constitutes.  In general, changes in well-being that have 
instrumental value are likely to be practically relevant (and thereby cause 
strong affective states) despite being relatively unimportant.     
The upshot of these two points is that the strength of an affective state does 
not tend to indicate the size of the change in well-being that it indicates.  We 
cannot, therefore, use the method illustrated by the graph above to aggregate 
local changes in well-being indicated by a person’s affective states over time.  
The method above presumes that we know the following information about 
local changes in well-being: t1=+5; t2=+7; t3=+2; t4=-2; at t5=+2.  We do not 
know the size of these local changes, however.  Instead, we merely know the 
following: t1=+; t2=+; t3=+; t4=-; at t5=+.  That is, we know that four local 
increases and one local decrease in well-being were experienced over t1-t5.  
The information provided by happiness does not accurately tell us additional 
information about the instrumental value of local changes in well-being.     
5.2.2  Aggregating instances of local changes in well-being over 
time 
In this section, I will consider whether a simpler version of the summative 
method discussed in the previous section can provide us with useful 
information about how well someone is doing in a more global sense.  This 
simpler version does not consist in aggregating the direction and size of local 
changes in well-being; it merely aggregates the direction of local changes.  It 
consists in adding up all the increases in well-being indicated by positive 
affective states, and subtracting all the decreases in well-being indicated by 
negative affective states over time.  I will consider whether this calculation can 
provide us with an (albeit rough) approximation of someone’s overall change 
in well-being over that time.     
I think there are three main problems with this kind of aggregation.  Firstly, 
although the simpler version avoids the flaws of the method outlined above, 
the assumption that it is better to experience more increases in well-being 
than decreases in well-being is often false.  Our overall change in well-being 
over time is constituted not merely by the amount of changes in well-being 
that we experience; it is constituted both by the amount and size of changes 
in our well-being.  Consider, for example, two people who both experience 
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three increases in well-being and three decreases in well-being. The simpler 
version of the summative method would adjudicate that their overall change in 
well-being over the time in question is equivalent.  Yet, this may be widely 
inaccurate.  One person, for example, may have experienced the death of a 
loved one, in contrast to minor increases in their well-being (making progress 
in their hobby, say).  Whereas the other person may have experienced the 
birth of their child, in contrast to minor decrease in their well-being (not being 
that productive at work, say).  The overall change in well-being for the two 
individuals would be considerably different.  Yet, this information is lost by the 
revised method of aggregation.   
Secondly, sometimes (perhaps often) the local changes indicated by 
happiness do not result in more global changes.  That is, such changes may 
not turn out to be instrumentally valuable; they may not “pay off”.  Consider, 
for example, a person who goes to a good university to study law, only to drop 
out (after completing most of their course) to become an artist.  Let us 
assume that their time at university did not provide them with any skills that 
contributed towards their career as an artist, nor did it particularly provide 
them with the insight that being an artist was their calling in life.  Further, let 
us assume that the student received little intrinsic value from completing parts 
of their course, despite doing so successfully.  In such a case, the progress 
that the person made throughout their law degree did not turn out to have the 
instrumental value that it was presumed to have had throughout.  We would 
be wrong to approximate that the local changes in well-being experienced by 
the person throughout their course contributed towards more global changes 
in their well-being.  The local changes did not pay off.   
Thus, local changes may not provide us with much information about a 
person’s overall change in well-being over time.  As an analogy, consider two 
sailboats, both with delta-meters that provide us with information about 
whether the boat is getting faster or slower (i.e. we have information about the 
boat’s changes in speed).  Now imagine that one boat is in calm waters, 
whereas the other one is in choppy seas.  Both boatmen are highly skilled, 
and consistently improve the speed of their respective boats.  However, the 
boat in choppy seas has to battle against the occasional large wave, each of 
which reduces the boat’s speed to almost zero – after each wave, the boat 
must start incrementally gaining speed again.  Let us further suppose that the 
boat in calm waters also faces the same amount of set-backs, only such set-
backs are caused by minor fluctuations in the wind that have a much smaller 
effect on the boat’s reduction in speed.  In such a scenario, the delta-meters 
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on both boats register the same amount of local improvements in the speed of 
their respective boats.  Yet, one boat is struggling against major (i.e. global) 
set-backs, while the other boat faces only minor (i.e. local) set-backs.  Over 
time, the boat in calm waters will have reached a respectable speed, whereas 
the boat in choppy seas may still be at the same speed at which it started.  
The point is that, from information about local changes in speed alone, we 
cannot reliably make judgements about overall changes in speed over time.  
The same goes for changes in well-being.     
This is not to say that all, or even most, local changes are devoid of 
instrumental prudential value.  Presumably, local changes often do pay-off, 
otherwise we would not invest so much of our time and resources into 
bringing about them about.  Returning to the analogy in the previous 
paragraph, if the boatman in choppy seas looks to see how much progress he 
has made and discovers that he has made very little, he may well give up.  
Thus, we can assume that the local changes in well-being indicated by 
happiness tend to have instrumental value.  The problem is that we cannot 
know how instrumentally valuable such changes are over time purely from 
looking at such changes in isolation.           
The third problem with this method of aggregation is that even if the local 
changes indicated by happiness do tend to pay off, we still may not be able to 
approximate a person’s total change in well-being over time from their local 
changes in well-being over that time.  The reason is simply that we have no 
way of knowing about all of a person’s global changes in well-being from 
information about their local changes in well-being.  We can only know about 
global changes caused by local changes.  For example, we have no way of 
knowing whether two people with the same amount of local changes in well-
being over a certain period of time experienced the same amount of global 
changes in their well-being.  Even if both of their local changes in well-being 
paid off and resulted in more global changes, one individual may have 
experienced a global increase or decrease in their well-being that the other 
individual did not.  One individual may have just received news of a loved one 
being in ill-health, for example.  Yet, we cannot derive this kind of important 
information from their local changes in well-being.97    
                                            
97 Of course, this information will tend to show up in their happiness to a certain extent, but 
not in proportion to the importance of the change.    
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Note that the problem is not merely that people can be either lucky or unlucky 
– that, through no effort of their own, people can experience global changes in 
their well-being that are not caused by previous local changes.  Although this 
is true, the main problem is that we can deliberately experience many global 
changes in our well-being that are not caused as a result of previous local 
changes.  Consider, for example, someone who works very hard at their job 
throughout the year, achieves a small pay rise, and then meets someone they 
fall in love with at the Christmas party.  The latter change may be much more 
important than the global change in well-being caused by the consistent local 
changes in well-being achieved at work throughout the year.  The point is that 
the value of global changes in well-being may not tend to reflect the amount of 
local changes in well-being that brought about such changes.  Thus, we 
cannot discern the importance of a person’s global changes in well-being 
simply from information about local changes.       
I think the above three problems prevent us from being able to roughly 
approximate overall changes in well-being over time by aggregating the local 
changes in well-being indicated by happiness over that time.  However, this is 
not to say that happiness tells us nothing about people’s well-being.  In the 
next section, I will consider two ways in which the local changes in well-being 
indicated by happiness may tend to have intrinsic prudential value.     
5.3  The intrinsic value of the local changes in well-being 
indicated by happiness 
In the previous section, I argued that, although local changes in well-being 
tend to have instrumental value, we cannot roughly approximate a person’s 
overall change in well-being over time from such local changes.  It may seem, 
therefore, that local changes in well-being do not provide us with much 
information about well-being.  In this and the next section I will argue that, 
upon further reflection, this is not the case.   
In this section, I will discuss two ways in which local changes in well-being 
have intrinsic prudential value.  First, local changes have intrinsic prudential 
value insofar as they involve worthwhile activities that we find intrinsically 
motivating, such as learning and experimentation, developing skills and 
abilities, and forming and sustaining relationships.  Second, local changes 
may have intrinsic prudential value insofar as they involve activities that 
constitute our active engagement with things of value.  These two kinds of 
local changes concern what I will refer to as a person’s “local well-being”.  I 
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will show that happiness reliably indicates these two kinds of local changes, 
and thus reliably indicates changes in our local well-being.      
5.3.1  Local changes in well-being and intrinsic motivation 
Let us first consider local changes in well-being concerning worthwhile 
activities that people are intrinsically motivated towards.  Examples include 
things such as learning and experimentation, developing skills and abilities, 
and forming and sustaining relationships. These kinds of activities are often 
partaken in not merely as a means to another (more global) end.     
The construct of intrinsic motivation was developed to describe the enjoyment 
people find in pursuing challenges, in pushing themselves to learn and to try 
new things (Besser-Jones, MS).  It is now widely recognized as an important 
phenomenon (Deci & Moller 2005; Ryan & Deci 2000; Reiss 2004).  Richard 
Ryan and Edward Deci describe the phenomenon of intrinsic motivation as 
follows: 
“Perhaps no single phenomenon reflects the positive potential of human 
nature as much as intrinsic motivation, the inherent tendency to seek out 
novelty and challenges, to extend and exercise one’s capacities, to explore, 
and to learn. Developmentalists acknowledge that from the time of birth, 
children, in their healthiest states, are active, inquisitive, curious, and playful, 
even in the absence of specific rewards. The construct of intrinsic motivation 
describes this natural inclination toward assimilation, mastery, spontaneous 
interest, and exploration that is so essential to cognitive and social 
development and that represents a principal source of enjoyment and vitality 
throughout life.” (Ryan & Deci, 2000: p.70)  
Perhaps the most well-known instance of intrinsic motivation is a specific 
psychological state coined by Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi as “flow”.  As in all 
instances of intrinsic motivation, people in flow act solely out of a sense of 
interest and enjoyment, in contrast to acting for the sake of their ends.  While 
they likely have an end in mind, which is part of their reasons to carry out the 
activity, thoughts about attaining that end are not motivating them to act.  
Rather, in the case of flow experiences, people become “completely involved 
in something to the point of forgetting time, fatigue, and everything else but 
the activity itself” (Csikszentmihalyi et al. 2005: p.599).   
Flow experiences occur when individuals engage in complex and challenging 
activities that they are competent in.  A classic example of a flow experience 
is rock-climbing.  The goal is to reach the summit, and while the rock climber 
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never loses sight of this goal, the goal is not what motivates them in the 
moment.  What motivates the climber is the challenge of exploring the 
configuration of the rocks and crevices.  They enjoy the activity and lose 
themselves in it, in a state of “optimal experience”.  Similarly, athletes 
describe being “in the zone”, whereby excellence becomes effortless, crowd 
and competitors disappearing into a blissful, steady absorption in the moment.    
There are many other kinds of activities, beyond rock-climbing and other 
sports that people are intrinsically motivated towards.  Indeed, Antonella Delle 
Fave and Fausto Massimo point out that there are some cultures dominated 
by such activities:  
“Once part of the mainline farming culture of Europe, the Occitan villagers (in 
the Italian Alps), cut off from the rest of the world by winter snows, have been 
left behind as a quaint reminder of a way of life that has long since 
disappeared elsewhere…When asked if they ever felt the intense 
concentration, clarity of goals, effortless action characteristic of the flow 
experience, all the older villagers recognized in it the feeling typical of their 
everyday working lives. That is how they felt, they reported, when they took 
the cows to the pastures, when they pruned their orchard, when they sat 
down to carve a piece of furniture out of wood.” (Delle Fave & Massimo, 
1992: p.187)  
In order for an activity to generate a state of flow, it must be of a certain kind.  
Perhaps the most essential factor in stimulating flow appears to be the 
structure of the specific activity in question: Does it provide a sense of 
discovery? Does it tap into creative feelings? Does it push the person to a 
higher-level of performance? (Csikszentmihalyi & Csikszentmihalyi 1992) 
Without these kinds of features, people partaking in the activity will fail to be 
interested in it or find it enjoyable; instead, they will be preoccupied with 
attaining the end of the activity.     
The same point holds with respect to other forms of intrinsic motivation.  While 
flow experiences are generated by activities that demand a balance of 
challenges and skills, more general forms of intrinsic motivation are generated 
by activities that one finds enjoyable, such as drawing and learning. Such 
activities enable us, “to take interest in novelty, to actively assimilate, and to 
creatively apply our skills.” (Ryan & Deci, 2000: p.56)  
Intrinsically motivated activities, therefore, are specific types of activities.  Not 
all well-being promoting activities can be intrinsically motivating.  For example, 
one may have a personal project that consists in being a well-known 
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musician.  Playing music may be an intrinsically motivated activity, but other 
related activities, such as promoting one’s gigs, transporting musical 
equipment, having a part-time job, etc., are unlikely to be.  The latter activities 
do not invoke a specialised skill, and do not present agents with challenges 
towards which to rise.  They are not ones that people have a propensity to 
find interesting and enjoyable.   
Although intrinsically motivated activities are limited in scope, we have reason 
to believe that happiness tends to indicate local changes in well-being 
concerning such activities.  This is because one of the hallmarks of such 
activities is that they provide us with instant feedback (Csikszentmihalyi & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1990).  Success in intrinsically motivated activities is 
immediate, resulting from the expression of interest or the exercise of a skill.  
In contrast, success in instrumentally motivated activated is often harder to 
come by and provides a reward that is ultimately uncertain (i.e. whether or not 
the given task will be instrumental in bringing about a more global change in 
well-being).  Indeed, an established body of empirical evidence suggests that 
intrinsically motivated activities are one of the key determinants of happiness 
(Ryan & Deci, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2001).  This confirms the validity of what 
John Rawls calls the “Aristotelian Principle”, whereby, all other things being 
equal, the exercise of our capacities makes us happy (Rawls 2005).    
However, even if happiness tends to indicate local changes in well-being that 
concern intrinsically motivated activities, is it the case that such changes have 
intrinsic prudential value?  That is, why think that intrinsically motivated 
activities are intrinsically valuable?  
I believe that, unless we have significant reasons to believe otherwise, it is 
implausible to deny the intrinsic prudential value of intrinsically motivated 
activities.98 When people are asked why they carry out such activities, they 
will answer that such activities are intrinsically rewarding.  The 
phenomenology of intrinsic motivation is that the activity you are partaking in 
has intrinsic prudential value.  Of course, sometimes these experiences may 
                                            
98 Note that this argument applies to all theories of well-being, regardless of whether they 
accept or reject the experience or pro-attitude requirement.  For instance, according to 
theories that accept the pro-attitude requirement, intrinsically motivated activities may 
have intrinsic prudential value because people care about them (and would presumably 
continue to do so under ideal conditions).  In contrast, according to theories that reject 
the pro-attitude requirement, intrinsically motivated activities may have intrinsic 
prudential value because they have certain properties that have intrinsic prudential 
value, such as the exercise of one’s skills or capacities, or their fit with a person’s nature.     
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be mistaken.  You could be intrinsically motivated to carry out an activity that 
is harmful or otherwise lacks value.  Similarly, one could argue that typical 
flow activities tend to be largely self-absorbed – obsessed rock climbers may 
in fact be wasting their life on trivial pursuits.  Yet, we would need strong 
reasons to doubt the value of most intrinsically motivated activities, such as 
learning and experimentation, developing hobbies and skills, and sustaining 
bonds of affection and friendship – most intrinsically motivated activities are 
worthwhile.  In the absence of reasons to believe otherwise, I think we should 
presume that intrinsically motivated activities tend to have intrinsic prudential 
value.  
In addition, certain accounts of well-being may offer explicit reasons for 
thinking that intrinsically motivated activities have intrinsic prudential value.  I 
will consider two here.  First, intrinsically motivated activities may constitute 
what we might call “prudential virtue”.  This idea relies on an analogy with 
moral value.  It is a hallmark of moral virtue that an activity has higher moral 
value if it is done automatically, or effortlessly, rather than deliberated over.  
Julia Annas (2008; 2011) describes the motivational state of the mature 
virtuous person as a specific form of intrinsic motivation: virtuous activity 
engages a person in distinct challenges, requires mastery of skills, and, for 
the mature virtuous person, generates spontaneous interest.  By analogy, 
intrinsically motivated activities may be the hallmark of “prudential virtue.”  
The second reason that I will consider is related to Dan Haybron’s “self-
fulfilment” account of well-being (Haybron 2008a).  Haybron argues that well-
being is constituted by the fulfilment of our individual nature, and this involves 
the fulfilment of our “emotional nature.”  I contend that the fulfilment of our 
emotion nature is largely a matter of carrying out the activities that we find 
intrinsically motivating.  As an illustration of this, consider the following 
example provided by Haybron: 
“Consider a young man, Henry, who has a passion for model trains. Henry 
has the opportunity to go into business with a profitable model railroad shop 
at which he knows he would be happy. Yet he decides, after careful 
reflection, to purchase a farm. He has good reasons for the choice: he 
imagines—correctly—that he would make a fine farmer, and finds the 
prospect of working the land highly attractive: he sees an elemental appeal to 
being outdoors and getting his hands dirty, dealing with matters of human 
survival, and living in close contact with an independent reality. Nothing 
made-up about it, and none of the degrading political maneuverings and 
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double-dealings of the professional world. Finally, he desires the extra money 
it would bring—it is an unusually profitable venture—and he wants to make 
his parents, whose own background is agricultural, proud. Henry goes to work 
on the farm and succeeds admirably. His parents are de- lighted. He is, in 
short, successfully carrying out a thoughtfully chosen plan of life. (We can 
assume that he fulfills his other major aims: marrying a woman he loves, 
having happy and healthy children, etc.)  
…The trouble is, Henry is miserable, and has been since taking over the 
farm. Though he would prefer to be happy, he thinks happiness overrated: a 
small, and ultimately dispensable, part of the good life. Life isn’t supposed to 
be fun. Besides, he’s pursuing a noble calling: happiness is small potatoes by 
comparison. (He reads a lot of Tolstoy.) But a few of Henry’s old friends know 
better: he chose the wrong line of work. In spite of his ideals, working the land 
is not an activity that moves, inspires, or fulfills him. It has the opposite effect. 
It’s not that he hates everything he does; again, he thinks it worthwhile, and it 
pleases him when his crops do well. But the only time he comes alive is when 
he indulges in his model railroading hobby. That’s what turns him on.” 
(Haybron, 2008a: p.25) 
Haybron emphasizes that Henry’s actions are not ill-informed in any way – he 
values the worthwhile lifelong pursuit of working a farm to a much greater 
extent than he values model railroading.  In addition, Henry knows that he 
would be far happier if we went into the model train business – it’s just that he 
does not highly value his own happiness.  Nonetheless, Haybron argues that 
Henry is not better off in this respect, as he has assigned too little importance 
to the things that fulfil his emotional nature (i.e. the things that make him 
happy).  Now, we needn’t entirely agree with Haybron on this point.  That is, it 
may or may not be the case that the fulfilment of our emotional nature partly 
constitutes our well-being.  Yet, we can agree with Haybron that our emotional 
nature makes a difference to the things that are good for us.  This adds further 
support to the claim that the activities we are intrinsically motivated by have 
prudential value.   
Lastly, it is worth noting that the local changes in well-being that we 
experience from our intimate relationships and friendships tend to have 
intrinsic, as well as instrumental, prudential value.  People talk of 
“maintaining” their relationships through staying in contact, spending time 
together, confiding in each other, and so on.  But, such activities are rarely 
done for entirely instrument reasons (i.e. to maintain the status of the 
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relationship).  Spending time with friends and loved ones is good in itself, as 
well as being a good way of maintaining or developing those relationships.  It 
is perhaps for this reason that “relationships” are often cited as one of the 
main determinants of happiness (Diener & Biswas-Diener, 2008); the time 
taken maintaining one’s relationships does not merely make one’s life 
instrumentally better, but also makes an intrinsic difference to the quality of 
one’s life.  These local changes in well-being seem to have a considerable 
impact on our well-being in themselves. 
5.3.2  Local changes in well-being and engaging with things of 
value 
In the previous section, I argued that local changes in well-being have intrinsic 
prudential value insofar as they involve activities that we find intrinsically 
motivating.  In this section, I want to argue that these and another kind of local 
changes in well-being may have intrinsic prudential value in an additional 
respect: such changes constitute our active engagement with things of value.    
The kinds of local changes I have in mind are those that concern activities we 
are either intrinsically or autonomously motivated towards.  These changes 
may have intrinsic prudential value insofar as they constitute our active 
engagement with things of value.  I have already considered activities that we 
are intrinsically motivated towards, so I will focus on autonomously motivated 
activities here.  Autonomous motivation is a form of “extrinsic” motivation.  
Whereas intrinsic motivation appeals to interests, extrinsic motivation appeals 
to values (Deci & Moller, 2005: p.591).  As we discussed in the previous 
section, whether or not an activity is interesting on its own (and so is a source 
of intrinsic motivation) has largely to do with the structure of the activity.  If the 
activity is one that taps into our natural propensities, then it has the potential 
to prompt a state of intrinsic motivation in the agent.  But if it doesn’t have this 
structure, it is not at all likely to prompt a state of intrinsic motivation; our 
engagement in the activity will tend to be a form extrinsic motivation.    
There are two broad forms of extrinsic motivation, namely “controlled” and 
“autonomous” forms.  A controlled form of extrinsic motivation is one in which 
people perceive their goals as being externally imposed on them, whereas an 
autonomous form of extrinsic motivation is one in which people perceive their 
goals as being their own (Ryan & Deci, 2000).  You are control motivated 
insofar as you partake in an activity because you “have” to, rather than 
become you “want” to; you perceive yourself as being controlled by external 
features – the threat of punishment or promise of reward, for instance.  
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Another way of putting this point is that you experience a kind of detachment 
from your goals: you work to pursue goals that are not of your own making.   
The promotion of well-being is like this for many people.  We often pursue 
goals that have been externally imposed on us, be it through society, 
educators, or religious institutions.  We know that we have to “be successful” 
but do not appreciate why such success matter; we know that people will 
disapprove of us if we are not successful, or that we will feel bad.  But these 
are not autonomous motivations – they are rewards or punishments that are 
external to us.  
An autonomous form of extrinsic motivation is one in which agents identify 
with a particular goal and thereby see it as their own.99  They may have also 
integrated it into their sense of self through bringing it into harmony with their 
other goals (Sheldon 2004).  The result is that autonomous motivation simply 
feels different to controlled motivation.  When we are autonomously motivated 
we feel like the “origin” of one’s actions rather than a “pawn” (Deci & Moller, 
2005).  For example, a child who does their homework because they want to 
learn, in contrast to a child does their homework because they want to avoid 
punishment, will feel as if their actions come from within, as opposed to being 
imposed on them from the outside.  Another way of putting this point is that 
the former child is moved by her values, whereas the latter child is not.    
Both autonomously and intrinsically motivated activities may have intrinsic 
prudential value in that they partly constitute our active engagement with 
things of value.  Such engagement is valuable because we cannot entirely 
appreciate the things that are good for us from a reflective standpoint.  We 
come to value particular things as a result of our active engagement with 
them.  In contrast to controlled motivation, autonomous and intrinsic forms of 
motivation are the kinds of motivation that enable us to appreciate the value of 
the things that we engage with in our lives.  As Valerie Tiberius notes, “it is (at 
least in part) by being a friend, daughter, sibling or parent that we discover 
what is valuable about these relationships. It is by absorbing ourselves in a 
hobby or career that we experience the value of accomplishment.  It is by 
losing ourselves in the moment that we experience the value of pleasure, 
peace of mind, or fun.” (Tiberius, 2005: p.171).   
                                            
99 This state has much in common with accounts of autonomy that emphasise the 
importance of identifying with one’s goals, desires, etc. (Dworkin 1988; Frankfurt 1988; 
Watson 1987)  
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Autonomously motivated activities, like intrinsically motivated activities, tend 
to be correlated with happiness (Ryan & Deci, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2001).  
Whereas intrinsically motivated activities tend to directly cause happiness, 
autonomously motivated activities may do so more indirectly.  Autonomous 
forms of motivation tend to result in outcomes that cause happiness, such as 
a higher degree of motivation, higher performance rates, enhanced coping 
skill and reduced anxiety (Ryan & Deci, 2000).  Thus, the local changes in 
well-being concerning autonomously motivated activities will tend to be 
indicated by happiness (albeit, perhaps to a lesser extent than local changes 
in well-being concerning intrinsically motivated activities).   
The upshot is that the local changes in well-being indicated by happiness 
often have intrinsic prudential value.  These kinds of changes concern what I 
will refer to as a person’s “local well-being”.  We have reason to believe that 
happiness reliably indicates changes in our local well-being.        
The question I will be concerned with in the next section is to what extent 
does local well-being matter?  To what extent can we measure overall well-
being through measuring local well-being?  In the next section, I will discuss 
what we might call the “global challenge”.  It is the view that we can only 
successfully measure well-being through measuring global well-being (as 
indicated by life satisfaction), rather than local well-being (as indicated by 
happiness).  Such a view is intuitively appealing and favoured by a number of 
theorists of well-being.  Nonetheless, I will argue that it is false.   
5.4  The global challenge  
In the previous section, I suggested that we can successfully measure 
changes in well-being through measuring happiness because happiness 
tends to indicate changes in local well-being.  That is, happiness tends to 
indicate local changes in well-being that have intrinsic prudential value.   
We can contrast a person’s local well-being with their global well-being.  A 
person’s global well-being consists in how well they are doing on a general 
level – in achieving such life goals as material security, personal projects, 
long-term ambitions, achieving the respect of others, making meaningful 
accomplishments, etc.  These things certainly seem to be important to our 
well-being – so much so that we may question the extent to which we can 
successfully measure well-being through measuring local well-being.  How 
important is local well-being in comparison to global well-being? 
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I will call this the global challenge.  The global challenge may consist in two 
different claims.  The first claim is that global well-being is the only thing that 
matters for well-being.  According to this claim, changes in local well-being do 
not contribute towards overall well-being.  The second claim is that global 
well-being matters for well-being in a distinct way.  According to this claim, 
both changes in global and local well-being may contribute towards overall 
well-being, but changes in global well-being may do so in an additional 
respect.   
I will assume that the first claim is false, and therefore will not discuss it in this 
section.  In the previous section, I outlined two ways in which local well-being 
seems to have intrinsic value.100  The second claim, however, seems more 
plausible.  Indeed, I think something like it is currently endorsed by a number 
of well-being theorists.101  Nonetheless, I will argue that it is also false.  I will 
argue that both global and local well-being contribute towards overall well-
being for the same reasons, even if not to the same extent.  I will suggest that 
the extent to which both kinds of well-being contribute towards a person’s 
overall well-being is at least partly determined by factors concerning the 
person’s lifespan, personality and cultural environment.          
What are the arguments in favour of the global challenge?  I think that there is 
one way in particular in which global well-being may tend to have a distinct 
kind of intrinsic value.  Changes in global well-being may tend to be 
meaningful changes – they tend to contribute towards the meaningfulness of 
our lives.  Those who find point and meaning in their life are fully invested in 
their life.  As Joseph Raz puts it, “they address themselves to various projects 
and relationships with energy and commitment.” (Raz, 2004: p.280) As 
mentioned in chapter one, meaningfulness and well-being are clearly 
interrelated.  The aspects of our lives that contribute towards our well-being 
tend to be those which (at least would) make us feel that our life is not 
meaningless.  Changes in global well-being may tend to be distinct from local 
changes in this respect – such changes give our lives meaning.         
                                            
100 A straightforward way of seeing the falsity of this claim is to compare two lives equal with 
respect to global well-being, but one life containing a higher level of local well-being.  It 
seems implausible to suggest that the life with a higher level of local well-being does not 
thereby have a higher level of overall well-being.  
101 See, for instance, Velleman (1991), Raz (2004) and Kauppinen (2012). 
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I will consider two ways in which changes in global well-being may tend to be 
uniquely meaningful.  Global changes may be meaningful insofar as they 
involve activities that (a) form a meaningful narrative, or (b) we deeply care 
about.  With regards to (a), I will argue that our engagement in activities that 
form a meaningful narrative enables us to appreciate the value of both the 
long-term achievement and actively engaging in things of value.  However, 
this does not mean that either the long-term achievement or the process of 
engagement is more valuable than short-term achievements or a non-
narrative process of engagement.  With regards to (b), I will argue that, 
although we do deeply care about global changes in well-being, this is not 
unique to global changes – we can come to deeply care about local changes 
in well-being.  The upshot is that changes in both local and global well-being 
are valuable in the same ways.  
5.4.1  Global changes in well-being that are part of a good narrative 
In this section, I will consider whether global changes in well-being tend to 
have a distinct kind of intrinsic value as a result of being part of a good 
narrative.  For example, overcoming adversity to accomplish one’s long-term 
ambition forms a better narrative than the same accomplishment occurring 
through luck.  There is no doubt that such narratives have aesthetic value.  
But do they make our lives go better for us?  A number of well-being theorists 
have recently answered this question in the affirmative (Velleman, 1991; 
Kauppinen, 2012; Portmore 2007; Raibley 2012; Bramble, forthcoming).  In 
this section, I will argue that such theorists are mistaken.  Good narratives 
may enable us to appreciate the value of certain long-term achievements and 
actively engaging in things of value.  However, they do not, in themselves, 
contribute towards well-being.     
Before considering the value of narratives, it is worth noting that narratives 
tend to significantly influence judgements of life satisfaction.  For instance, in 
one study Diener et al. (2001) provided subjects with vignettes of either very 
positive or very negative lives.  Some subjects received vignettes of lives that 
ended abruptly.  Other subjects received vignettes of lives that ended with an 
extended five-year period, that was still either positive or negative, but only 
mildly so.  Diener et al. found that a positive life was perceived as more 
satisfying when it ended abruptly on a high note than when it extended for an 
additional five mildly positive years.  In contrast, a terrible life was viewed as 
less satisfying when the five mildly negative years were added.  The authors 
labelled this the “James Dean Effect”, with reference to the fact that we tend 
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to think people with short intensely positive lives have satisfying lives so long 
as they end “on a high.”    
Further psychological research shows that narratives determine people’s life 
satisfaction across a wide range of contexts and timescales.  For instance, in 
a seminal study on retrospective evaluations of pain, Daniel Kahneman et al. 
(1993) found that, under certain circumstances, people are satisfied with more 
pain to less.  Kahneman and his colleagues found that, when subjects were 
asked how satisfied they were with certain episodes of pain, subjects reported 
the painful experience of submerging their hand into 14°C ice water for 60 
seconds, plus an additional 30 seconds of 15°C ice water, was more 
satisfying than a shorter trial of 60 seconds of 14°C ice water alone.  The 
addition of the more moderate, though still aversive pain, led to the 
(seemingly irrational102) preference of objectively more pain over less.   
This pattern has been shown in retrospective evaluations about a number of 
disagreeable experiences, including exposure to unpleasantly loud noises, 
aversive film clips, pressure from a vice, and painful medical procedures (Finn 
2010).  In each of these cases, the longer episode that ended with less 
discomfort was judged to be more satisfying than the shorter episode.103  
The lesson to learn from these studies is that judgements of life satisfaction 
are significantly influenced by global changes that mark the end of a difficult 
activity, result in previous local changes “paying-off”, or that end the activity 
on a “high note.”  Such narratives tend to make us feel that our lives are more 
meaningful, even if they consist in episodes of suffering.  Roy Baumeister et 
al. (2012) summarize these trends as follows:  
“Our findings depict the unhappy but meaningful life as seriously involved in difficult 
undertakings. It was marked by ample worry, stress, argument, and anxiety. People 
with such lives spend much time thinking about past and future: They expect to do a 
                                            
102 For commentary on the irrationality of such preferences, see Broome (1996).  For an 
alternative view, see Beardman (2000). 
103 This pattern has also been shown in contexts other than pain and discomfort.  For 
instance, Bridgid Finn (2010) explored whether extending an effortful study experience 
with a less effortful interval would be preferred to a shorter, unextended interval.  She 
found that the students’ judgements of satisfaction with their study experience were 
influenced more by the structure of the learning episode, rather than their performance 
on the test.  Like other aversive experiences, effortful study that ended with somewhat 
easier material was judged to be less difficult, to cause less discomfort, and to be easier 
to cope with than a study experience that included equally challenging material but that 
did not include the more moderate material at the end. 
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lot of deep thinking, they imagine future events, and they reflect on past struggles 
and challenges. They perceive themselves as having had more unpleasant 
experiences than others, and in fact 3% of having a meaningful life was due to having 
had bad things happen to you.” (Baumeister et al, 2012: p. 15)  
In the remainder of this section, I will consider whether the “meaningful life”, 
as described in this quote, has a distinct kind of intrinsic value in contrast to 
the “happy life.”  Is it the case that good narratives have intrinsic prudential 
value in themselves?104     
To illustrate the view that they do, consider David Velleman’s description of 
two possible lives:  
“One life begins in the depths but takes an upward trend: a childhood of 
deprivation, a troubled youth, struggles and setbacks in early adulthood, 
followed finally by success and satisfaction in middle age and a peaceful 
retirement. Another life begins at the heights but slides downhill: a blissful 
childhood and youth, precocious triumphs and rewards in early adulthood, 
followed by a midlife strewn with disasters that lead to misery in old age. 
Surely, we can imagine two such lives containing equal sums of momentary 
well-being. Your retirement is as blessed in one life as your childhood is in the 
other; your nonage is as blighted in one life as your dotage is in the other.”  
(Velleman, 1993: p.331)  
Intuitively, it seems that the first life, where things get progressively better, is 
better for you than the second, where things get progressively worse, and it 
seems this way even if we are to imagine that both lives contain the same 
achievements, occurring only at different stages in each life.  The first is 
seemingly a better life, not just in the sense that it makes for a better life story, 
but also in the sense that it is has a distinct kind of intrinsic value.  That such 
lives are better for us has recently come to be known as the “Shape-of-a-Life 
Phenomenon.” (Feldman 2004: ch.6)   
On Velleman’s view, the reason a benefit that comes late in life can have a 
more profound effect on the value of one’s life is that benefits experienced 
late in life can redeem misfortunes incurred early in life.  So a life that gets 
                                            
104 By this, I do not mean to claim that the narratives themselves have intrinsic prudential 
value, beyond the events and activities that make up such narratives.  Rather, I am 
interested in the claim that the events and activities that constitute good narratives have 
a distinct kind of intrinsic prudential value.    
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progressively better is, in certain cases, better for us than a life that gets 
progressively worse – it is only in the case of the former that one’s earlier 
misfortunes are redeemed.  In the life that gets progressively better, the 
earlier trials and tribulations lead to the later successes and thereby redeem 
themselves.  But in a life where the successes precede the misfortunes, the 
misfortunes could not have served as the foundation for those successes, and 
so will have been “suffered for naught” (Portmore, 2007).   
This all makes sense, but it is not obvious that these kinds of intuitions are 
best explained by the fact that such narratives have intrinsic prudential value.  
In the remainder of this section, I will argue that it is more plausible to 
presume that meaningful prudential events have instrumental prudential 
value, rather than a distinct kind of intrinsic value.  
Firstly, meaningful prudential events tend to result in causally related changes 
in well-being.  Negative events tend to result in further negative changes.  For 
example, the loss of something that matters to me (such as a job I valued, my 
reputation, or my house keys) tends to cause further bad things to happen.  
Conversely, positive events tend to result in further positive changes.     
Secondly, because of this fact, people may tend to care about meaningful 
events.  We may be unhappy as a result of our hard work not paying-off, not 
just because we failed to achieve the global change we valued, but also 
because the meaningful event is likely to cause worse things to happen in the 
future.  Thus, the meaningful event may be bad in three respects: (a) because 
of the value of the event itself (e.g. losing one’s job); (b) because of the 
instrumental value of the meaningful event (e.g. being less likely to find 
another job); and (c) because we care about the meaningful event (e.g. we 
are unhappy about its repercussions).   
Thirdly, meaningful events signal the value of several previous local and 
global changes in well-being (Dorsey, MS).  For example, “being a world class 
tennis player” consists of many discrete events in a person’s life, such as 
taking up tennis, practicing, entering into tournaments, winning, and so forth.  
The meaningful event of “being a world class tennis player” narratively unifies 
these discrete events – it signifies that each event has prudential value.  This 
does not mean that “being a world class tennis player” has value beyond the 
value of each discrete event that it is composed of, nor does it mean that each 
of the discrete events has greater value as a result of being part of the more 
meaningful event.  Rather, “being a world class tennis player” has merely 
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signatory value.  It highlights that all the events that make up “being a world 
class tennis player” have been successfully achieved.   
Fourthly, our awareness of narrative relations tends to enable us to leave 
better lives.  As Connie Rosati (MS) puts it, “narratives can affect a person’s 
good by helping her, as she reflects on events in her life, and as she takes up 
a view of herself and her life, to see herself and her life in a way that supports 
her sense of her own worth, that helps to secure her sense of who she is and 
a sense of direction, and that motivates her to move forward.”  Rosati further 
states that upward trajectories tend to be good for us in that they come out of 
being, “the controlling authority over ourselves and our lives, of being able to 
make sense of our lives and to represent them to ourselves as a product, 
ultimately, of our own autonomous efforts.”  Rosati’s point is that when we 
have experienced success in the face of failure, we will have a sense of 
ourselves as the controlling authority over our lives and ourselves.  This 
sense of authorship enables us to remain motivated when we fall short of 
achieving our aims.      
Changes in global well-being concerning long-term projects may tend to be 
especially (instrumentally) valuable in this respect.  As Dale Dorsey notes, 
“long-term projects that help to narratively unify our actions and decisions 
provide a meaningful structure to our lives as a whole, not just from the 
outside (though that itself is significant) but also from the inside.” (Dorsey 
2011a: p.178) The narrative structure provided by the meaningful pursuit of 
long-term projects enables us to keep striving in the event of set-backs.  
This suggests that narratives enable us to appreciate the value of certain 
long-term projects and actively engaging in the pursuit of such projects.  The 
difference between someone who climbs up the entirety of Mt. Everest and 
someone who climbs up Mt. Everest from base camp is that the former 
individual is in a better position to see the value of getting to the top of Mt. 
Everest more than the latter individual can.  Narrative emotions such as pride, 
joy, hope, self-esteem and elevation – emotions that we can refer to broadly 
as “feelings of fulfilment” (Kauppinen, 2012) – enable us to grasp the value of 
such an endeavour.    
In this way, I believe that narrative relations are similar to the relations we 
have with other individuals.  I follow Simon Keller (2013) in thinking that our 
personal relations with others enable us to grasp the intrinsic value of the 
individuals we have such relationships with.  I can see that my friend has 
intrinsic value in various ways (e.g. the way they listen to me, their sense of 
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humour, their interest in modern art, etc.).  This is partly due to the times I 
have spent with them over the years, the caring role they have played in my 
life, the struggles I have witnessed them go through, and so on.  Likewise, it 
may be that people can see that the achievement of their long-term goals has 
intrinsic value in various ways due to the trials and tribulations that they went 
through in the process of pursuing them.    
This analogy helps us understand the intrinsic value of global changes in well-
being that are part of good narratives.  Our personal relations enable us to 
better appreciate the intrinsic value of the individuals who we have 
relationships with.  However, even if we see the value of such individuals 
more than we see the value of others, this does not make such individuals 
more valuable.  People have equal intrinsic value.  I think we can say a similar 
thing about narratives.  Narratives enable us to appreciate the intrinsic value 
of global changes in well-being that are part of good narratives.  However, I 
do not think that such changes have a distinct kind of intrinsic value in this 
respect.  The kind of local changes in well-being discussed above may 
provide meaning to our lives, even if they do not form good narratives in the 
process.   
Indeed, Galen Strawson (2004) has influentially argued that not all people 
may come to appreciate the value of long-term goals and projects as a result 
of the narratives that they form.  He claims that not all people care about their 
life narrative, and that a person’s life narrative is not necessarily valuable.  As 
Strawson writes: “The aspiration to explicit Narrative self-articulation is natural 
for some—for some, perhaps, it may even be helpful—but in others it is highly 
unnatural and ruinous.” (Strawson, 2004: p.447).  He continues: “People can 
develop and deepen in valuable ways without any sort of explicit, specifically 
Narrative reflection, just as musicians can improve by practice sessions 
without recalling those sessions. The business of living well is, for many, a 
completely non-Narrative project.” (Strawson, 2004: p.448).  Strawson’s 
argument suggests that narratives may not have instrumental value unless 
one cares about their life story.  Indeed, it may be that, for those who don’t 
care about the narrative of their life, an awareness of narrative relations may 
tend to make their lives worse.    
5.4.2  Global changes in well-being that we deeply care about 
If narratives do not have a distinct kind of intrinsic prudential value, perhaps 
the objects of global changes in well-being themselves tend to have a distinct 
kind of intrinsic value.  Achieving such life goals as material security, personal 
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projects, long-term ambitions, achieving the respect or companionship of 
others, etc., may seem to have a distinct kind of intrinsic value in contrast to 
achieving momentary objectives and concerns such as developing skills or 
hobbies, or maintaining relationships.   
One way of making this distinction is that global changes in well-being tend to 
concern things that we deeply care about.  It is hard to image a meaningful life 
that does not involve some long-term relationships and projects that we 
deeply cared about.  This idea relates to what Bernard Williams called 
“personal projects” (Williams, 1993).  He described projects as “commitments” 
with which we are more deeply involved and identified, and which help to 
constitute our individual character.  Williams further claimed that personal 
projects are what give meaning to our lives.    
I believe, however, that this idea goes too far.  In that, it is not only the things 
we deeply care that provide meaning in our lives.  As Cheshire Calhoun 
points out: “Caring is a scalar phenomenon.” (Calhoun 2009: p.632) Once we 
account for the full spectrum of cares, from deep, moderate to minor cares, it 
ceases to be obvious that leading a meaningful life depends specifically on 
the achievement of long-term relationships and projects.     
We can agree that the pursuit of what we care about makes our lives 
meaningful without maintaining that we must “deeply” care about those things.  
A person’s life might allow plenty of opportunity to scuba dive, do volunteer 
work, spend time with friends, and take sign-language classes – these are all 
things they find satisfying and personally expressive, without having to care 
about them deeply.  Looking back at their life, they might well say that they led 
a meaningful life.  Indeed, as Calhoun correctly notes, “the meaningfulness of 
a life is a function of both how much one cares about particular relationships, 
activities, and the like as well as how much time one has the good fortune to 
spend with those things.” (Calhoun, 2009: p.632) A person who has many 
varied and easily pursued objects of lesser care may end their life having 
spent more of its days and hours in meaningful activities than their more 
single-minded, passionate counterpart. 
The claim that only global achievements, such as long-term relationships, 
careers, etc., make life meaningful ignores the meaning provided by more 
local activities.  This is perhaps not surprising insofar as achieving long-term 
goals, value and projects typically require us to ignore local changes in well-
being that have intrinsic value.  Consider the average life of a philosopher.  
While participating in academic philosophy may make their life meaningful in 
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the long-term, doing so requires that they sacrifice the pursuit of a large 
number of potentially meaningful local activities in favour of spending their 
time doing things that merely have instrumental value, such as tracking down 
footnotes, participating in departmental meetings, and so on.   
The upshot of this discussion and the discussion in the previous section is as 
follows: there are at least two different strategies for putting meaning in life. 
One may opt for a temporally global strategy, aiming to make one’s life about 
something that is objectively valuable, and to do so by focusing on global 
changes in well-being.  Or one may opt for a temporally local strategy, aiming 
to pack one’s hours and days with objectively meaningful pursuits and 
interactions, and to do so by not focusing on the sort of global changes in 
well-being that promise to reduce such opportunities (Calhoun, 2009).    
Why is it that people tend to focus so much more on global changes in well-
being if such changes do not tend to have a distinct kind of intrinsic value?  I 
suspect the answer is largely pragmatic; that is, long-term achievements tend 
to have instrumental prudential value.  The pursuit of a career, obtaining a 
degree, being in a committed relationship – these are all long-term activities 
that tend to provide substantial pay-offs: financial security, recognition, 
emotional support, etc.  Thus, if we want to measure people’s opportunities 
for future well-being, it may make sense to focus on measuring their recent 
global changes in well-being.  If someone’s well-being decreases in a global 
sense (e.g. they lose their job, break up with their long-term partner, etc.) it is 
likely that such changes will continue to have a negative impact in the future.  
In contrast, if someone’s well-being increases in a local sense (e.g. they 
spend time learning something of interest or developing a particular skill) we 
cannot infer, to the same extent, how well they are likely to be doing in the 
long-term.105         
5.5  The prudential value of both local and global changes in 
well-being  
In the previous two main sections, I argued that both local and global changes 
in well-being tend to have intrinsic prudential value; neither kind of changes in 
well-being have a distinct kind of intrinsic value.  The result is that overall well-
                                            
105 Though see Appendix A for the merit of measuring people’s opportunities for future well-
being through measuring their recent levels of happiness.   
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being is, for the same reasons, constituted by both local and global well-
being.  In this section, I want to show that the relative values of local and 
global well-being may vary throughout the life-course, across individuals and 
across cultures.  
Consider, first, how the value of local well-being varies throughout one’s life, 
beginning in childhood.  When we think about what is good for children, we 
partly think of global changes in well-being that have instrumental value, such 
as a good education.  In addition, however, we tend to give considerable 
weight to their local well-being.  Anca Gheaus illustrates this tendency with 
the following two vignettes: 
“One  
It has been snowing the entire weekend, and the public transportation 
stopped working.  School closed, and children are happily playing in the snow 
for hours.  Adults struggle to get to work and to carry on with business as 
usual.  This is an urban image that I remember from my childhood, as I 
assume many other readers will.  It is a world of Carefree Childhood and 
Serious Adulthood, where children and adults lead partially separate lives and 
enjoy partly different goods. 
Two 
It has been snowing the entire weekend, and the public transportation 
stopped working.  Schools closed, and children, who have to stay at home, 
received additional homework by email.  They concentrate on independent 
study and try to make sure they don’t fall behind with it.  Adults struggle to get 
to work and to carry on with business as usual … This is an urban image that 
one can occasionally see these days.  It is a world of Serious Childhood and 
Serious Adulthood, one in which children and adults lead more similar lives 
than in world One because children do not have access to some goods which 
are plausibly intrinsic to the good of childhood.” (Gheaus forthcoming)  
These two vignettes are designed to pump our intuitions about what is good 
for children.  I take it that most people will think that world One is better than 
world Two, even if it is the case that the children in world Two end up being 
slightly better off as adults than the children in world One.  This is presumably 
because a good childhood includes significant amounts of free time, 
unstructured play, opportunities for joyful and experimental social interaction, 
and a sense of being carefree.  These things have intrinsic prudential value, in 
addition to the instrumental value that they have – they are things we would 
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regret losing if we replaced them with alternative things of the same 
instrumental value.    
People’s attitudes tend to be different, however, with regards to adulthood – 
one’s “prime-of-life” (Slote, 1983).  As mentioned in chapter four, studies show 
that our values tend to change over the life-course, focusing on more extrinsic 
goals in our middle-age (such as career success, financial security, etc.) and 
more intrinsic goals towards retirement (friendships, family, hobbies) (Reed & 
Carstensen 2012).  Happiness has been shown to take a U-shaped curve 
over the life-course, whereby we are happiest in our childhood and at old-age, 
and unhappiest in our middle-age (Blanchflower & Oswald 2008).  This is 
presumably because we focus less on our local well-being in our middle-age.  
Adulthood is the time of life in which one can focus on long-term 
achievements that help structure one’s life and come to partly form one’s 
identity: either in the form of a particular role – a parent, lawyer, doctor – or in 
the form of a personal project – someone who is helping to save the rain 
forest, for example (Betzler 2013).  As argued in the previous section, these 
kinds of achievements may have considerable intrinsic prudential value, even 
if they are not uniquely valuable in this respect.    
It is important to note that not all people’s values will tend to change over the 
life-course in this way.  Some individuals may continue to prioritize their local 
well-being throughout their lives (e.g. the keen learner of new skills, the 
obsessed rock climber, etc.) whereas others may abandon their local well-
being altogether (e.g. the ambitious businessman, the tortured artist, etc.).  In 
other cases, extreme life events may shift one’s temporal perspective.  It is 
not uncommon, for example, to hear of cancer patients re-orienting their lives 
to focus on their local well-being as their prospects of achieving lifelong 
projects becomes uncertain.  Moreover, such shifts in perspective are often 
not reported as a compromise; rather, they are often seen as providing people 
with insights into what really matters in life.     
Indeed, the extent to which people value their local and global well-being may 
be largely determined by their particular psychological disposition.  For 
instance, Calhoun notes that people have different spatial dispositions and 
that such preferences may extend to a temporal perspective:  
“Some like open horizons, not knowing what comes next, opportunities for 
explorations, and novelty. Others prefer more closed horizons, knowing 
where they are in space and time and finding what comes next familiar and 
unsurprising. If this is so, one might expect to find some more attracted to 
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provisional planning and others to commitment.  In short, the attraction to 
commitment may reflect only one style of managing the geography of one’s 
future—a style that involves taking up permanent residences in time and 
making the future one’s home. For creatures who share with their animal kin 
a sense of comfort in returning to the familiar and a disposition to adopt 
habitual routines that reduce surprises, one might expect commitment to be 
widely attractive. But as creatures who also share with their animal kin a 
vulnerability to boredom and a curiosity about the new, one might also expect 
that attraction to have its limits.” (Calhoun, 2009: p.641) 
I believe Calhoun is right to point out the diversity with which people tend to 
respectively value their local and global well-being.  In addition to personality 
differences, the relative values of local and global well-being may vary 
considerably depending on one’s cultural environment.  Recall, for instance, 
Delle Fave and Massimo’s example above of the Occitan villagers who tend 
to live their everyday working lives in a state of flow (Delle Fave & Massimo, 
1992).  Such a culture stands in stark contrast with the busy, stressful, 
achievement-focused lives lead by those in more “Western” cultures.  This is 
presumably because long-term opportunities are available in the latter cultural 
environment, but may not be in the former.106       
Now, these facts – about how people’s relative preferences for local and 
global well-being vary according to the life-course, personality and culture – 
do not necessarily have straightforward implications for the relative values of 
local and global well-being.  It may not be the case, for example, that for 
people with a disposition to live their life from a local perspective, their local 
well-being tends to have a greater amount of intrinsic prudential value.  The 
extent to which this is true will depend on the correct account of well-being.  A 
(non-idealized) subjective theory of well-being will maintain that local well-
being matters more for those who care more about their local well-being.  In 
contrast, an objective theory of well-being may maintain that those who care 
more about their local well-being fail to appreciate the value of their global 
well-being (e.g., the value of various long-term achievements).         
                                            
106 Indeed, Delle Fave and Massimo note how, as the remote Occitan villages become more 
accessible to mainland Europe, the younger generation no longer enjoy the traditional 
forms of life: “Their concentration is disrupted by goals and desires that come from the 
culture of the plains…For them work is drudgery to be endured only for the money it 
brings…and since work brings more money in factories, most younger Occitans are 
settling down to industrial jobs far away from their native valley.” (Delle Fave & Massimo, 
1992: p.188)  
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What I think we can say is that both local and global well-being matters, and 
that this is the case according to all plausible theories of well-being.107  Insofar 
as happiness tends to indicate changes in local well-being, therefore, we can 
successfully measure changes in an important aspect of well-being through 
measuring happiness.  The extent to which we can measure well-being 
through measuring happiness will depend on the relative values of local and 
global well-being.  In this section, I have suggested that the relative values of 
local and global well-being may depend on facts about a person’s lifespan, 
personality and cultural environment.  The precise way in which this is the 
case is an exciting topic for future philosophical and empirical research.    
Conclusion 
I have argued that we can successfully measure changes in an important 
aspect of well-being through measuring happiness.  In the first section, I 
showed that happiness tends to indicate local changes in well-being, in 
contrast to life satisfaction, which tends to indicate global changes in well-
being.  In the second section, I considered the instrumental value of the local 
                                            
107 Although I am unable to consider this further here, I believe that a stronger claim may 
also be plausible, namely that achieving well-being is largely a matter of achieving the 
appropriate balance between one’s local and global well-being.  This fits with the idea 
(discussed in chapter one) that the concept of well-being refers to a kind of life in which 
one succeeds in all or most of one’s important goals relative to one’s available time and 
resources.  One may be able to achieve a good life by succeeding in one or more of 
one’s important goals (such as Mother Teresa achieving a good life through succeeding 
at helping the poor).  However, doing so may necessarily result in having to sacrifice 
many of one’s other important goals (such as developing intimate relationships, skilled 
hobbies, staying healthy, etc.).   
It seems reasonable to suggest that, in modern industrial societies, people tend to 
succeed in achieving a few of their important global goals at the expense of many of 
their important local goals.  Such people may be better off if they shifted their priorities 
more towards their local well-being.  The outcome of such a shift is likely to result in a 
society of people more like those in community A rather than those in community B as 
described at the beginning of Haybron, 2008b.  Haybron states as follows: “A typical 
member of A, on a typical day, is in more or less the following condition: at ease, 
untroubled, slow to anger, quick to laugh, fulfilled, in an expansive and self-assured 
mood, curious and attentive, altert and in good spirits, and fully at home in her body, with 
a relaxed, confident posture.  A denizen of B, by contrast, is liable to be: stressed, 
anxious and insecure, spiritually deflated, pinched, and compressed.  The differences, 
let us suppose, owe mainly to differences in the prevailing ways of life in these 
communities.” (Haybron, 2008b: p.3) I suggest that the differences between community 
A and community B is that the former is focused primarily on the pursuit of local well-
being, whereas the latter is primarily focused on the pursuit of global well-being.  A 
community that is good for its citizens may be one in which neither aspect of well-being 
is pursued at the expense of the other.                 
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changes in well-being indicated by happiness.  I argued that we cannot 
accurately approximate a person’s overall change in well-being over time by 
aggregating their local changes in well-being over that time.  In the third 
section, however, I argued that happiness tends to indicate the local changes 
in well-being that have intrinsic value.  Changes concerning both intrinsically 
and autonomously motivated activities tend to have intrinsic prudential value.   
In the remainder of the chapter, I considered the relative value of local and 
global well-being.  In the fourth section, I argued that global changes in well-
being do not tend to have a distinct kind of intrinsic value, neither as a result 
of (a) being part of good narratives nor (b) concerning things we deeply care 
about.  I argued that these aspects of global changes in well-being tend to 
enable us to appreciate the value of such changes, rather than providing them 
with a distinct kind of intrinsic value.  Lastly, in the fifth section, I suggested 
that the relative values of people’s local and global well-being may tend to 
vary across their lifespan, personality and cultural environment. 
The upshot is that we can successfully measure changes in an important 
aspect of well-being through measuring happiness.  We cannot, however, 
successfully measure changes in overall well-being through measuring either 
happiness or life satisfaction alone.  In order to measure a person’s overall 
change in well-being over time, we must measure their changes in both local 
well-being (indicated by happiness) and global well-being (indicated by life 
satisfaction) over that time.  The fact that happiness and life satisfaction are 
essential indicators of well-being in this respect is, in many ways, the central 
conclusion of my investigation.         
 
In the two thesis appendices, I will explore two further ways in which we may 
be able to measure well-being through measuring happiness.  The first is an 
extension of the Indicator View.  It is the view that happiness over time 
indicates local changes in well-being over that time and well-being in the near-
future.  The second way concerns whether we can infer levels of well-being 
from the local changes in well-being indicated by happiness.  I will suggest 
that we may be able to infer a person’s level of well-being from the level of 
variation in their happiness over time.  These two ways add to the extent to 
which we can successfully measure well-being through measuring happiness. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this thesis, I have aimed to clarify the role of happiness research in the 
measurement of well-being.  Happiness is notoriously elusive, yet has 
recently received a considerable amount of attention in the study of well-
being, and from the media and policymakers.  Theorists are divided in their 
interpretations of happiness findings.  For example, some theorists interpret 
the (contentious) finding that happiness does not correlate with income in the 
long-term as an indication that we should radically rethink the use of GDP in 
developing and assessing policy.  Other theorists interpret the same findings 
as an indication that there is more to life than happiness; indeed, that 
happiness may be a relatively trivial affair.  In this thesis, I have aimed to 
provide an account of the relationship between happiness (conceived of as a 
person’s affective state) and an understanding of well-being that is widely 
acceptable (that is, robust to most plausible substantive theories of well-
being).  It has the potential, therefore, to unite divided opinion over what 
happiness research can tell us about well-being.   
I have argued that we should treat happiness as a defeasible indicator of local 
changes in well-being.  I called this the Indicator View.  Unless we have 
reason to believe otherwise, happiness tells us about how well we are doing, 
from moment-to-moment, in our short-term objectives, goals and concerns.  In 
chapter five, I argued that how well our lives are going on this local level 
intrinsically matters for well-being.  It is not all that matters – how well we are 
doing on a global level (in our long-term projects and values) also intrinsically 
matters for well-being.  The relative values of our local and global well-being 
may vary across the lifespan, across individuals and across cultures.  Yet, at 
any age, for any individual, in any culture, we can assume that how well we 
are doing on both levels matter.  We can, therefore, successfully measure an 
important aspect of well-being through measuring happiness.   
The Indicator View rests on a theory-neutral account of well-being, outlined in 
chapter one and developed in chapter two.  According to this understanding of 
well-being, happiness may correlate with well-being either because it is 
constitutively or causally related to well-being.  The extent to which happiness 
correlates with well-being is determined by its causal connections to well-
being ingredients (objects of platitudes about well-being that are causally 
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connected to other objects of well-being platitudes).  The theory-neutral 
account provided us with a widely acceptable understanding of well-being, 
from which we could investigate the correlation between happiness and well-
being.   
In chapters three, four and five, I investigated the extent to which the function 
of happiness consists in the reliable detection of well-being ingredients.  In 
chapter three, I argued that the function of happiness is to inform and guide 
action; this partly consists in detecting well-being ingredients.  In chapter four, 
I refined this view.  I argued that the function of happiness also partly consists 
in detecting unexpected changes in well-being ingredients.  Lastly, in chapter 
five, I added that the function of happiness partly consists in detecting local 
changes in well-being ingredients.  We can infer from the function of 
happiness that happiness will tend to be reliably caused by local changes in 
well-being ingredients, and thereby tend to correlate with local changes in 
well-being.        
The theory-neutral account also enabled us to identify contexts in which we 
should not treat happiness as a reliable indicator of local changes in well-
being.  First of all, in chapter three, I argued that there are contexts in which 
happiness is systematically dysfunctional, and therefore does not tend to be 
reliably caused by well-being ingredients.  In addition, there are contexts in 
which the function of happiness consists in detecting non-prudential features 
of our environment (such as moral, aesthetic or epistemic features).  In 
chapter four, I argued that there are contexts in which the function of 
happiness consists in detecting our level of certain well-being ingredients or 
unexpected changes in well-being.  Further philosophical and empirical 
research is required to determine these contexts, and thereby the contexts in 
which information about happiness does not tell us about local changes in 
well-being.  Once these contexts have been determined and account for, we 
can treat happiness as a reliable indicator of local well-being.    
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Appendix A: 
Happiness as an Indicator of Changes in Well-being in the 
Near-Future 
 
In chapter three, I argued in favour of the Indicator View – the view that 
happiness is a defeasible indicator of well-being.  In chapter four, I refined the 
Indicator View, adding that happiness is a defeasible indicator of local 
changes in well-being.  In this section, I want to add one more claim to the 
Indicator view, namely that happiness tends to indicate near-future well-being.  
As with chapters three and four, this claim can be justified on the basis of the 
function of affective states.  I will argue that, in order to inform and guide our 
action, trends in our affective states over time orientate us towards future 
opportunities to promote well-being, the result of which is that happiness 
tends to indicate our well-being in the near-future.      
The function of happiness is both to inform and guide our action.  So far, in 
discussing the Indicator View, we have mostly considered the informational 
function of happiness.  Affective states should detect evaluative features of 
our environment that are relevant for action – it is for this reason that they 
should tend to be caused by local changes in well-being.  But, affective states 
also have various attentional, cognitive and motivational effects that have the 
function of guiding our action in light of this information.  Consider, for 
example, what happens during an episode of fear caused by a huge wolf 
leaping out in front of you (Tappolet, 2010).  First of all, we see and hear the 
wolf and implicitly evaluate the situation as threatening – this is the 
informational component of our fear.  This information then results in a 
number of cognitive and physiological changes that guides our action: our 
heart races, breathing becomes strained, mouth opens and eyes widen; we 
feel a pang in our chest and adrenaline pump through our body; we may 
closely attend to the movement of the wolf and possible exit strategies; we 
may have urge towards fight or flight; and we may think that we’re done for 
unless we act soon.  These attentional, cognitive and motivational effects 
guide us towards specific actions that will hopefully enable us to survive the 
dangerous situation.   
In general, positive affective states motivate us to sustain or seek out the 
things that they represent as being good, and negative affective states 
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motivate us to avoid or prevent the things that they represent as being bad.  
Thus, both positive and negative affective states tend to guide our behaviour 
in beneficial ways.  A person’s affective states, on a very simple level, indicate 
that their well-being will improve in the near-future to some extent, in that they 
motivate the promotion of their well-being in certain ways.   
However, this fact about affective states alone does not provide us with much 
information about a person’s near-future well-being.  We know that, however 
well or badly a person is doing, their affective states will motivate them to 
improve their situation.  But this is true for all individuals, happy and unhappy.  
The fact that affective states motivate us to promote our well-being does not 
enable us to distinguish between two individuals on the basis of how well they 
are likely to be doing in the near-future.   
In order to see how affective states may indicate well-being in the near-future, 
we need to look at trends of either positive or negative affective states over 
time.  For the purposes of this discussion, I will focus on trends that consist in 
positive affective states over time.  Positive affective states over time indicate 
that our well-being has consistently improved over that time, and thereby 
guided us to seek out similar increases in well-being in the future.  The 
important point is that, in addition, such trends impart information about the 
opportunities for well-being in our environment and guide us towards taking 
them.  Positive affective states over time may simply be caused by a string of 
good fortune, but are more likely to be caused by an environment that is full of 
opportunities for well-being.  It is presumably because a person lives within a 
favourable environment (with regard to improving their well-being) that they 
have consistently improved their well-being over a certain period of time.   
These kinds of trends in our affective states tend to cause moods.  Moods 
indicate opportunities for well-being (or, in the case of negative moods, ill-
being).  Like emotions, moods involve various physiological and cognitive 
changes that guide us towards the promotion of our well-being.  However, in 
contrast to emotions, which guide our action in specific ways in reaction to our 
immediate situation, moods guide our behaviour through orientating us 
towards the indicated opportunities for well-being in our environment.  
Consider, for example, the difference in function between anger (an emotion) 
and irritability (a mood).  While the function of anger or fear is to enable us to 
deal effectively with an offence or threat that has actually occurred, the 
function of irritability or apprehension is to orientate us towards an 
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environment in which there is an increased probability that an offence or a 
threat will occur.          
When we experience negative moods (caused by negative affective states 
over time) such as irritability, it is likely that we are in an unusually challenging 
or hostile environment.  Our mood-state acts as a state of vigilance, and 
indicates a change in the probability that a certain type of situation will occur.  
In contrast, positive moods have been shown to have almost the opposite 
effect – they act as a state of abstracted, broadened attention (Fredrickson 
1998; 2001).  Subjects in positive moods tend to take in a wider range of 
information and categorise more broadly than those in negative moods; they 
do not focus on the small details, but instead perceive ‘the bigger picture’ 
(Isen & Daubman 1984).  When people are in positive moods their brains are 
more flexibly organised and they tend to make more creative and unusual 
associations between ideas (Isen et al. 1987).  This makes sense insofar as 
positive moods indicate an environment with abundant opportunities – one in 
which we need to broaden our mindset in order to take full advantage of.   
In sum, happiness over time does not merely indicate consistent improvement 
in well-being over time, but also indicates an environment full of opportunities 
for well-being.  Such positive trends tend to result in positive moods, which 
orientate us towards taking such opportunities, thereby further promoting our 
well-being.  It is in this way that happiness over time may tend to indicate both 
local changes in well-being over that time and our well-being in the near-
future.   
Unfortunately, I am unable to consider this extended version of the Indicator 
View in more detail here.  I will, however, end this section by outlining some 
empirical evidence in favour of the view.  Firstly, people who experience 
positive affect more frequently than others tend to be more resilient 
(Fredrickson et al. 2003), resourceful (Lyubomirsky, King & Diener 2005), 
socially connected (Mauss et al. 2011) and more likely to function at optimal 
levels (Fredrickson & Losada 2005).  Barbara Fredrickson argues that these 
benefits occur as a result of the kind of ‘broadened mindset’ involved in 
experiencing a positive mood.  According to Fredrickson, this mindset is the 
recipe for discovery, discovery of knowledge, new alliances, and new skills.  
Over time, positive affect spurs the development of resources that contribute 
towards our well-being.  
In a similar vein, Charles Carver argues that positive affect over time has the 
function of signalling that we are doing much better than expected in a 
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particular respect, and that we should therefore devote more resources to 
other areas of our lives.  Thus, according to Carver, “positive affect induces 
an openness to considering possibilities other than the goal currently being 
pursued.” (Carver, 2003: p.255) Over time, this is also likely to spur the 
development of resources that contribute towards our well-being. 
This broadened, or more balanced, mindset caused by positive affective 
states over time may indicate our well-being in the near-future in an additional 
sense.  Such a mindset may enable us to appreciate our selves and our lives.  
This is perhaps best illustrated by the lack of appreciation of one’s self and 
one’s life that is associated with the mental condition of depression.  
Depressed individuals tend to lack a sense of self-worth and find no value in 
any personal activities.  They are unable to appreciate the value of 
themselves and their lives, and thereby lack the motivation to improve their 
situation (Hawkins, MS).  Thus, Haybron writes: “Depression strips pleasure 
from life, diminishing our functioning in myriad respects, and makes our 
projects, plans and relationships go worse. Severe anxiety similarly 
undermines our well-being in many ways.  Whereas happiness tends to have 
the opposite effects.” (Haybron, forthcoming: p.11) 
In sum, we have reason to believe that happiness over time both indicates 
local changes in well-being over that time and changes in well-being in the 
near-future.  This extended version of the Indicator View may fully account for 
the ways in which people tend to use happiness as a proxy for well-being in 
their practical lives.  Indeed, Haybron suggests that we sometimes make a 
judgement about how well off someone is on the basis of a few observations 
of their moods (Haybron, forthcoming).  For example, he notes that, “if a 
person’s intimates find her consistently to be relaxed and in good spirits, 
resilient in the face of frustrations and other information, they will reasonably 
infer that she is happy, and doing well.” (Haybron, forthcoming: p.11) Such 
judgements are informative not just because someone’s affective states 
indicate how well they have been doing, but also because they tend to 
indicate how well someone is likely to continue to be doing in the future.      
In the second Appendix of this thesis, I will consider one way in which 
happiness may be informative about a person’s well-being that is not reflected 
in the way we tend to use happiness as an informal proxy for well-being.  The 
idea is that we may be able to infer high levels of well-being from low levels of 
variance in our affective states over time, and vice versa.  We do not tend to 
use information about happiness in this way because it requires us to observe 
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patterns in our affective states over time that do not tend to be epistemically 
accessible.  However, the formal measurement of happiness over time may 
make it possible to observe such patterns.     
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Appendix B: 
Happiness as an Indicator of Levels of Well-being  
 
In this thesis, I have argued that happiness (defeasibly) indicates local 
changes in well-being over time and in the near-future.  In this final section, I 
will consider whether we may be able to infer a person’s level of well-being 
from this information.  Firstly, I will consider one method that does not work, 
namely inferring high levels of well-being from a high levels of positive 
affective states over time, and vice versa.  Secondly, I will argue that a more 
sophisticated version of this method may work, namely inferring high levels of 
well-being from a low level of variance in our affective states over time, and 
vice versa.   
B.1  The Progress Method 
The Progress Method assumes that high levels of positive affective states 
over time correlates with high levels of well-being.  This method may seem 
intuitive at first.  Consider, for example, the difference in well-being between a 
millionaire and a peasant – I will presume that the millionaire has a high level 
of well-being, whereas the peasant has a low level of well-being.  It seems 
that the millionaire is in a much better position to improve their well-being than 
the peasant is.  This is, presumably, because the millionaire has various 
resources and capabilities that the peasant lacks.  These resources and 
capabilities enable to millionaire to improve their well-being in ways that are 
not available to the peasant.   
It seems, therefore, that because the millionaire has a high level of well-being, 
they are likely to experience a greater amount of progress than the peasant.  
If this relationship between levels of well-being and improvements in well-
being tends to hold, we can (partly) infer a person’s level of well-being from 
their changes in well-being.  That is, we can assume that people with a high 
level of well-being has a high level of progress over time.  This progress will 
tend to be indicated by a high level of positive affective states over that time.   
The problem with this method, however, is that it ignores the fact that a 
person who is badly off may be able to improve their well-being more than 
someone who is well off.  Simply put, it is possible that the worse off a person 
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is, the more they will be able to improve their well-being – there are simply 
more improvements for them to make.   
Where we stand on this issue is largely determined by whether levels of well-
being are relatively finite or infinite.  Consider the following analogy with 
knowledge.  If there is an infinite amount of knowledge then we might think 
that attaining a greater amount of knowledge simply opens up the possibility 
of attaining even more knowledge.  In contrast, if there is a relatively finite 
amount of knowledge then we might think that attaining a greater amount of 
knowledge reduces one’s changes of attaining much more knowledge.  A 
similar situation relates to people’s well-being.  If well-being is relatively finite, 
it may be that peasants have a greater chance of making improvements in 
their well-being than millionaires do (for, how much more can millionaires do 
to make their lives better?).  Alternatively, if well-being is infinite, it may be 
that millionaires are more likely to make improvements in their well-being than 
peasants are (for, just think of the ways in which millionaires could improve 
their lives).       
I am not sure where to stand on this issue, and it seems that there are 
reasonable arguments for both positions.  Unfortunately, appealing to 
empirical evidence does not help much either.  Recall, from chapter four, 
studies that show that, on average, rich countries are happier than poor 
countries, but that this trend is negligible after average incomes of $10,000 
(Graham & Pettinato, 2002).  This suggests that people in poor countries are 
less able to consistently improve their well-being, and thereby be happy, than 
people in rich countries (i.e. countries with average incomes of $10,000 or 
higher).  However, in contrast to this evidence is the existence of “happy 
peasants” – individuals who are happy (and presumably, therefore, 
consistently improving their lives) despite having low levels of well-being.   
In sum, it is not obvious whether someone’s level of well-being tends to result 
in them experiencing happiness or unhappiness over time.  This does not 
mean to say, however, that a person’s level of well-being will tend to have no 
effect on their pattern of local changes in well-being experienced over time.  In 
the next section, I will consider one way in which a person’s level of well-being 
may influence their happiness over time in this way.     
B.2  The Steady Progress Method 
In this section, I will focus on one potential difference between people with 
high and low levels of well-being, which draws on the work of Jonathan Wolff 
and Avner De-Shalit (2007).  Wolff and De-Shalit are concerned with the topic 
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of disadvantage.  They explain why disadvantage concerns not only a lack of 
opportunity and low functioning (i.e. the failure to meet basic needs in areas 
such as being able to live, to enjoy bodily health, and to have attachments) 
but also increased risks and insecurity about future functioning.  Certain 
resources and capabilities are largely valuable, according to Wolff and De-
Shalit, because they help us attain secure functionings (i.e., secure beings 
and doings).  For example, having the opportunity to irrigate one’s land 
enables a subsistence farmer to grow food and remain well nourished even in 
times of drought.  Without this capability, the farmer may have been able to 
grow food and attain nourishment, but these functionings would not have 
been secure.  In times of drought, these functionings would have been lost.  
Thus, Wolff and De-Shalit claim that a person is largely disadvantaged insofar 
as they do not have the capabilities that enable them to attain secure 
functionings.     
The important point about Wolff and De-Shalit’s analysis of disadvantage for 
our purposes here is that certain resources and capabilities do not merely 
enable us to make progress in our well-being.  In addition, they enable us to 
make secure well-being improvements.  Thus, even if it is the case that 
people with high and low levels of well-being make the same amount of 
improvements in well-being, people with high levels of well-being may tend to 
make more secure improvements than people with low levels of well-being.    
It is worth briefly reviewing the two different kinds of ways, as outlined by 
Wolff and De-Shalit, in which improvements in well-being can fail to be 
secure.  Most straightforwardly, certain kinds of improvements in well-being 
can be risky in themselves.  For example, even if people in America and 
Ethiopia are both able to eat, being well nourished in Ethiopia is far less 
secure (due to drought, famine, etc.) than in America.  Perhaps more 
problematic, however, are the kinds of improvements of well-being that are at 
risk due to their relations with other aspects of one’s well-being.  Wolff and 
De-Shalit categorize these kinds of risks into (a) Cross Category Risks, and 
(b) Inverse Cross Category Risks.  Cross Category Risks concern 
functionings that depend on other aspects of one’s well-being.  For example, 
anyone relying on their income to buy food will find that risks to employment 
generate risks to nutrition among other things.  In contrast, Inverse Cross 
Category Risks concern functionings that are not dependent, but are affected, 
by other aspects of one’s well-being.  For example, steps taken to secure 
nutrition may have the effect of putting other aspects of one’s well-being at 
risk, such as life and bodily health.  People may put their lives in grave danger 
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to secure food for themselves and their families.  Inverse Cross Category 
Risks, therefore, show that a lack of certain capabilities can have far ranging 
effects on the security of improvements in well-being.  Not being able to attain 
nourishment, for example, may threaten many, if not all, of a person’s 
improvements in well-being.  Wolff and De-Shalit illustrate this kind of effect 
with the following example: 
“It is reported that, due to an economic crisis in Israel, during the year 2002–
3, one in five families in Israel became unable to guarantee proper nutrition 
for their children. The report uses the language of ‘insecure capability to have 
proper nutrition’. This does not necessarily entail hunger…but it means that 
these families bought cheap food rich in carbohydrates (e.g. rice, pasta) 
rather than healthier, but more expensive food rich in proteins, iron, and 
calcium. Among these poorer populations the average daily consumption of 
calcium was 55 per cent, and protein 65 per cent, of those who could afford 
proper nutrition. Moreover, among those families whose diet contains higher 
proportions of carbohydrates, the prevalence of diabetes is more than twice 
as frequent than in families that enjoy proper nutrition. What is even more 
striking is that according to this report, in order to try and secure their 
functioning of nutrition, 24 per cent of families in Israel gave up other ordinary 
basic needs such as medical supplies and continuous electricity and many of 
them choose not to pay their mortgage debts. In other words securing the 
functioning which came under threat (i.e. proper nutrition) made other 
functionings (e.g. to enjoy warmth in the winter) insecure.” (Wolff & De-Shalit, 
2007: p.72) 
The different kinds of risks outlined by Wolff and De-Shalit all tend to have the 
same upshot: People with low levels of well-being will have less secure 
improvements in well-being.  For example, a peasant may be quickly climbing 
out of poverty only to be struck by illness, which lands him back in deprivation.  
In contrast, a millionaire is not likely to lose their wealth, even if they suffer 
from a chronic illness.  The millionaire’s improvements in well-being are likely 
to be steady, whereas the peasant’s improvements are not.   
This suggests that we may be able to infer a person’s level of well-being from 
their level of variance in affective states over time.  Someone with a high level 
of well-being may not tend to experience either a greater or large amount of 
positive affective states over time than someone with a low level of well-being.  
However, someone with a high level of well-being may tend to experience a 
steady increase in their well-being over time, and thereby a low level of 
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variance in their affective states over that time.  In contrast, someone with a 
low level of well-being is more likely to suffer set-backs in improving their well-
being.  Such set-backs are unlikely to be expected and thereby will tend to 
cause negative affective states.  This will tend to result in a high level of 
variance in their affective states over that time.  That is, someone with low 
levels of well-being may tend to consistently improve their well-being, but 
such progress is likely to be more precarious than steady.   
I believe that this method is plausible, and is well supported by the evidence 
presented by Wolff and De-Shalit (2007).  The idea is that we may be able to 
(partly) infer a person’s level of well-being from their level of variance in their 
local changes in well-being (indicated by happiness).  If a person’s happiness 
over time has a high level of variance, we may be able to infer that they are 
badly off. Conversely, if a person’s happiness over time has a low level of 
variance, we may be able to infer that they are well off.  Of course, this 
method can be tested.  We can observe whether a low level of variance in 
happiness correlates with having central capabilities and functionings, for 
example.  I have hoped to show in this section that we have reason to believe 
in the value of such research.   
 
